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(#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8 #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааггггааˆр8 #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆАааindex 2index 2шоааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8 #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааггггааˆр8 #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆАааtoa headingtoa headingшоааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆ#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааггггааˆ#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆАааћџ2vњ4lp5captioncaption аагггг_Equation Caption_Equation Caption гггга ААvv аа ААˆˆ ай K йв JˆZZ€ш@@ˆZZ€ш@@J вм„„мммааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааггй Kx ймм(Decision No. C92Љ611)й x- йммааˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆаай - й ааBEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO * * *й K й в TˆZZаШˆ @@@ˆZZаШˆ @@@T в솆мммLARRY D. O'BRYANT,й K й Complainant, v. U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, INC., Respondent. ___________________________________________ й x ймм))))))))))ммаай x й аа CASE NO. 6402 аай - йммУ УCOMMISSION ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES;й - й AND, (2) REMANDING CASE TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE.Ф Ф Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Mailing date: May 8, 1992 Adopted date: April 1, 1992 Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ Љ аа УУI. SUMMARY.ФФ аа л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССFor representing the public interest, Complainant Larry D. O'Bryant is entitled to recover reasonable legal fees from Respondent U S West Communications, Inc. ("U S West"). л textллл ССAt the administrative level, Mr. O'Bryant established that it was improper for U S West to cut off all telephone service to a consumer who owed money to his long-distance telephone carrier, but who had paid his local exchange bill to U S West in full. O'Bryant thereby achieved an important result at the administrative law level for all consumers, by ensuring that U S West may not disconnect its customers' vital local telephone service because of billing disputes between a customer and a longЉdistance provider ‘for whom U S West was performing contract services. In this case, the consumer's billing dispute was with AT&T Communications of the Mountain States, Inc. ("AT&T"). ССOn judicial review of the administrative order, O'Bryant prevailed at the Colorado Supreme Court over both U S West and the Colorado Public Utilities Commission ("PUC" or "commission"). ггУУSeeФФгг УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648 (Colo. 1989). The Supreme Court held that the commission inappropriately entered into a unilateral settlement agreement with U S West after judicial review began.  The district court dismissed the case based on the PUCЉU S West settlement to which O'Bryant had not agreed. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the district court. УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 655 (Colo. 1989). In its unanimous decision, the Colorado Supreme Court remanded the УУO'BryantФФ case, finding that the settlement agreement, and the consequent improper dismissal of the case at the district court level, "deprived O'Bryant of any opportunity to recover attorney fees and costs against Mountain Bell [U S West] for successfully litigating an issue that was related to general consumer interests." УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 656 (Colo. 1989). ССThis remand, therefore, concerns whether or not O'Bryant should receive legal fees from U S West for representing the public interest. The Colorado Supreme Court at least suggested that the commission award O'Bryant attorney's fees in УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 656 (Colo. 1989). Today, in a case of first impression, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission hereby holds that O'Bryant's is entitled to: (1) attorney's fees from U S West for his representation on judicial review; (2) legal fees for the fee litigation; and (3) legal fees for advocacy at the commission. ‘PrevailingЉparty legal fees for successful appellate review of a commission decision is consistent with the Colorado Supreme Court's decisions in УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1978), and УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1972).л#footnote reference#лггУУллв X0ААX01УУФФУУФФˆˆ вжѕФФлfootnote textлааггУУллл#footnote reference#лггУУллааааааˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлгглл. In the УУMountain StatesФФ, УУsupraФФ, cases, the Supreme Court held that the commission had jurisdiction under the Colorado Constitution to award reasonable legal fees, without specific statutory authority, to a prevailing party in a commission proceeding. Further, the Court approved the commission's three standards for legal fees to consumer representatives. УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544, 548 (Colo. 1978). л#footnote tex#лллѕжФФ Indeed, the award of legal fees for successful appellate review of a commission decision necessarily follows from the УУMountain StatesФФ, УУsupraФФ, decisions. ССIf the commission limited the award of legal fees (to consumer representatives in the appropriate УУMountain StatesФФ circumstances) to advocacy performed solely before the commission, then the Supreme Court's authorization of legal fees would be significantly, perhaps fatally, limited, and a utility would have a great incentive to appeal. By appealing, the utility could exhaust the financial resources of consumers by causing them to incur nonЉreimbursed attorney's fees to defend their positions on judicial review. In fact, it would be a rare instance where a consumer would ever choose to fight a billing dispute such as this. The amount in controversy in typical consumer billing disputes is small when compared to the legal fees required for protracted litigation. The utility could win every case by the simple expedient of filing an appeal.л#footnote reference#лггУУллж лfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. УУCf.ФФ УУHeatherridge Management Co. v. PennonФФ, 558 P.2d 435, 438 (Colo. 1977) (attorney's fees allowed for appellate work in landlordЉtenant security deposit litigation, because otherwise landlords could effectively discourage tenants from seeking return of their security deposits by the "simple expedient of an appeal"). л#footnote tex#ллл жФФ Similarly, the commission needs to award legal fees for the fee ‘litigation to consumer representatives, in order not to create an incentive for the utility to prolong the fee litigation and deplete the attorney's fees award for work on the merits. ССAlso, legal fees to consumers' lawyers are a necessary equalizer to the resources of the utilities. As the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized,л#footnote reference#лггУУллжDлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. ггУУSeeФФгг УУMountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544, 547 (Colo. 1978) ("On the basis of the constitutional and statutory grant of legislative authority, the PUC has always allowed Mountain Bell [U S West] to charge off as a proper operating expense attorneys' fees and legal costs incurred in its efforts before the PUC to increase rates."). л#footnote tex#лллDжФФ U S West generally has its attorney's fees reimbursed ЉЉ whether it is the prevailing party or not ЉЉ from consumers through rates. In sum, the Supreme Court has told the commission to award legal fees in appropriate cases to consumers in the УУMountain StatesФФ, УУsupraФФ, decisions, and a meaningful award of legal fees must include the possibility of legal fees on judicial review for consumers who prevail, and fees for the fee litigation. ССFinally, the fact that O'Bryant's attorneys took this case without charging him a retainer does not preclude an attorney fee award. ггУУPro bonoФФгг attorneys who meet the appropriate tests should receive legal fees for their work on an equal basis with privately-retained attorneys, in order to encourage public representation. This case is a good example of private attorneys filling an important role in defending the public interest. Allowing legal fees compensates their participation in ггУУpro bono ФФггpublic interest litigation. At the same time, a fee award fills a gap in the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel's ("OCC") enabling statute, Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40-6.5Љ106(2) (1984 Rep. Vol.17), which has ‘been interpreted as prohibiting the OCC from representing individual consumers under all circumstances. ССTherefore, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission hereby grants O'Bryant's motion for an award of attorney's fees, which award shall include: (1) his legal fees for his administrative advocacy; (2) his legal fees for the successful defense of the commission decision upon judicial review; and (3) his legal fees for the fee litigation. ааˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааСрСУУII. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND. ааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааA. FACTS.ФФ On May 30, 1984, Respondent U S West Communications, Inc.л#footnote reference#лггУУллжwлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. "U S West Communications, Inc." is the current official name of this regional Bell operating company, which provides local exchange telecommunications service in 14 states, including Colorado.  Until January 1, 1991, its official name was the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company.  The company did business as "Mountain Bell" before and after the 1984 AT&T Breakup. More recently, the company has been doing business as "U S West Communications, Inc." its current official name. In this decision, we will refer to the company simply as "U S West," rather than change the company's name to reflect the changed names during the 1984Љ1992 time period at issue in this litigation. л#footnote tex#лллwжФФ disconnected Complainant Larry D. O'Bryant's telephone. Mr. O'Bryant could make neither local nor longЉdistance telephone calls for almost 3 months. УУSeeФФ УУStipulation of FactsФФ at 2, РРРР 8 & 9 (filed July 25, 1985, attached as Exhibit "A" to Complainant's May 8, 1991 Exceptions to Decision No. R91Љ348) ("УУStipulationФФ"). ‘ССAs all parties have stipulated, U S West disconnected Mr. O'Bryant's telephone service for failure to pay his longЉdistance bill to AT&T, not for failure to pay his bill to U S West. УУStipulationФФ at 2, РР 7. O'Bryant's May 1984 telephone bill itemized a $24.18 charge to U S West and a $141.30 charge for AT&T's longЉdistance services. On May 10, 1984, O'Bryant paid the U S West portion of the bill. He could not pay the AT&T portion of the bill ($141.30), perhaps due to a period of unemployment earlier in 1984. УУSeeФФ УУDecision No. R85Љ1294ФФ at 2, РР 3 (October 22, 1985) (the original administrative law judge decision, adopted as the decision of the commission); УУStipulationФФ at 2, РР 7; УУandФФ УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 649 (Colo. 1989) (facts found by the Colorado Supreme Court in its review of this case). ССAlthough O'Bryant had paid his U S West bill in full, U S West disconnected his telephone on May 30, 1984. O'Bryant remained completely without telephone service throughout June, July, and most of August, 1984. U S West reconnected O'Bryant's telephone when the commission ordered it to do so, on or about August 20, 1984. УУStipulationФФ at 2, РР 9. At some point in August or September 1984, O'Bryant paid all outstanding longЉdistance charges to AT&T. УУDecision No. R85Љ1294ФФ at 2, РР 3 (October 22, 1985). УУB. PROCEDURE ЉЉ THE COMMISSION, 1984Љ1986.ФФ ССOn July 11, 1984, during the period when Mr. O'Bryant was completely without telephone service, O'Bryant filed a УУproФФ УУseФФ Complaint at the commission. He alleged that U S West's disconnection of his entire telephone service, for failure to pay an AT&T bill, violated thenЉapplicable Rule 13 of the ‘‘Commission's Rules Regulating the Service of Telephone Utilities, 4 Code of Colorado Regulation 723Љ2 (1973). а vvАX ае# аааШаии аШаааааˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆаа#еRule 13 stated that a utility should not disconnect service except "for utility service rendered by УУtheФФ utility in the State of Colorado." (emphasis added). O'Bryant argued that the language referring to "the utility" meant that U S West could not cut off service for failure to pay an AT&T bill, given that U S West and AT&T were separate utilities after the January 1, 1984 breakЉup of the formerly unified Bell System.л#footnote reference#лггУУллжлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The divestiture decree separated AT&T (the longЉdistance company) from U S West and the other regional Bell operating companies (local exchange companies) ЉЉЉ making AT&T and the 7 regional Bell operating companies distinct and unrelated corporations. УУSeeФФ "Modification Of Final Judgment," Section I of the Decree entitled "AT&T and Reorganization," УУUnited States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.ФФ, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226Љ227 (D.D.C. 1982) (Greene, J.), УУaffirmed mem. sub nom.ФФ, УУMaryland v. United StatesФФ, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) ("divestiture decree"). л#footnote tex#лллжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССAs U S West concedes in this litigation, during the relevant time period (1984-1985), U S West gave its customers one telephone bill. The one telephone bill contained both local and longЉdistance charges, as it had prior to divestiture. U S West treated the telephone bill as one inseparable unit, as it had done prior to divestiture. It enforced collection of either part of the bill by disconnection.л#footnote reference#лггУУллжЇлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. УУSeeФФ УУU S West's Response to Exception and Cross ExceptionФФ at 3 (filed May 22, 1991) (arguing that U S West "became a collection agent at divestiture" for AT&T; and that it was not feasible to block longЉdistance service). л#footnote tex#лллЇжФФ O'Bryant argued that because divestiture had made AT&T and U S West into separate companies, U S West could not enforce collection of AT&T's bills by disconnecting a customer's local service, if the customer ‘had paid the local exchange portion of the telephone bill. УУSeeФФ УУComplaintФФ at 1, РРРР 3Љ5 (filed July 11, 1984). ССOn September 12, 1984, after Mr. O'Bryant had paid his AT&T bill, and after U S West had reconnected O'Bryant's telephone, U S West filed a "Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as Moot." U S West argued that the matter was moot because it had reconnected O'Bryant's telephone, and because O'Bryant and AT&T no longer had a billing dispute.л#footnote reference#лггУУллжwлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. Also, U S West argued that its action were legal under Rule 13 of the commission's telephone rules, as well as mandated by contract. U S West attached the contract with AT&T to its summary judgment motion, which it alleged compelled it to disconnect O'Bryant. ггУУSeeФФгг УУU S West Brief in Support of its Motion for Summary JudgmentФФ (filed August 15, 1985) (contract attached as sealed exhibit "H" to the brief). л#footnote tex#лллwжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССOn November 7, 1984, Chief Administrative Law Judge Robert E. Temmer denied the motion to dismiss. ггУУSeeФФгг УУDecision No. R84Љ1277ЉIФФ at 1. The administrative law judge denied the motion to dismiss because the legality of U S West's collection practices on behalf of AT&T was not resolved. ССAfter the administrative law judge denied the motion to dismiss, Mr. O'Bryant continued to prosecute the case УУproФФ УУseФФ, but encountered difficulty in attempting to respond to U S West's discovery requests. УУSeeФФ УУU S West's Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Judgment by Default Against ComplainantФФ (filed April 17, 1985). ‘ССAccording to the Affidavit of Diana M. Poole, Executive Director of the Colorado Lawyers Committee ("Lawyers Committee"), Mr. O'Bryant approached the Lawyers Committee for УУproФФ УУbonoФФ representation. The Lawyers Committee's Board of Directors approved O'Bryant's request for representation in June 1985.л#footnote reference#лггУУллжŽлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The Lawyers Committee, a nonprofit organization, works "to mobilize the private bar to provide УУproФФ УУbonoФФ assistance in matters of public concern to individuals and organizations throughout the State of Colorado who cannot afford legal services." УУPoole AffidavitФФ at 1. УУSee alsoФФ УУBrochure from Lawyers CommitteeФФ (Attached to Amicus Brief). The Lawyers Committee acts as a clearinghouse, evaluating requests for УУproФФ УУbonoФФ assistance, and then placing approved requests with volunteer lawyers from its 22 member firms in the metropolitan Denver area. The Lawyer Committee has over 800 individual lawyers to call upon to provide free legal service. УУPoole AffidavitФФ at 1. л#footnote tex#лллŽжФФ УУAffidavit of Diana M. PooleФФ at 2, РР 5 (Attached to the Lawyers Committee УУAmicus BriefФФ) (filed on May 30, 1991) ("УУPoole AffidavitФФ"). The Lawyers Committee states that its Board of Directors agreed that the УУO'BryantФФ case was an appropriate matter for placement with a volunteer law firm. It decided to take O'Bryant's case after considering U S West's practice of disconnecting local telephone service, and the "particularly extreme" impact of the disconnection practice on senior citizens and disabled individuals. УУLawyers Committee Amicus BriefФФ at 2 (May 30, 1991). After the Lawyers Committee Board of Directors approved Mr. O'Bryant's request for representation, it assigned one of its member firms, Hill & Robbins, to the case.л#footnote reference#лггУУллж’ лfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл After the Supreme Court remanded this case to the commission, the Lawyers Committee, through the law firm of Hutchinson, Black, Hill & Cook, filed an Amicus Brief supporting O'Bryant's motion for attorney's fees. л#footnote tex#ллл’жФФ УУPoole AffidavitФФ at 2, РР 5. On July 3, 1985, the law firm of Hill & Robbins entered its appearance as the attorneys for Mr. ‘O'Bryant. (Hill & Robbins represented Mr. O'Bryant at all stages of this litigation from July 1985 until the victory in the Colorado Supreme Court in September 1989.л#footnote reference#лггУУллжЂ лfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл After remand to this commission, the law firm of Gorsuch, Kirgis, Campbell, Walker, and Grover entered its appearance. The Gorsuch firm represents O'Bryant (and his attorneys, Hill & Robbins) in this motion for attorney's fees. л#footnote tex#лллЂжФФ) ССOn July 5, 1985, the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel moved for leave to intervene, or in the alternative, to participate as УУamicusФФ УУcuriaeФФ. O'Bryant supported Consumer Counsel's intervention. Respondent U S West and Intervenor AT&T opposed the intervention. They argued that the Consumer Counsel's enabling statuteл#footnote reference#лггУУллжь лfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The relevant statutory language, which has remained the same since the creation of the OCC by the legislature in 1984, states: "the consumer counsel shall not be a party to any individual complaint between a utility and an individual." Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ6.5Љ106(2) (1984 Rep. Vol.17). л#footnote tex#ллльжФФ precluded the OCC from intervening in cases involving individual residential customers, notwithstanding the argument that a case such as Mr. O'Bryant's disconnection case might have broader public interest implications to the class of consumers that the OCC represents. On July 17, 1985, Administrative Law Judge Arthur G. Staliwe denied the OCC's motion to intervene, agreeing with the narrow reading of the OCC statute successfully argued by U S West and AT&T.л#footnote reference#лггУУллжю лfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. "The motion of the Office of Consumer Counsel for leave to intervene, or, alternatively, to participate as an УУamicusФФ in this matter is denied. Such denial is premised solely on the statutory limitation contained in РР 40Љ6.5Љ106(2), C.R.S." УУDecision No. R85Љ921ЉIФФ at 1Љ2 (July 17, 1985). л#footnote tex#лллюжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССSubsequently, the three parties in the case (O'Bryant, U S West, and AT&T) each filed motions for summary judgment on August 15, 1985. On October 22, 1985, the administrative law judge granted ‘O'Bryant's motion, ruling that U S West violated Rule 13 of the Telephone Rules, 4 Code of Colorado Regulation 723Љ2 (1973). For relief, the administrative law judge ordered U S West to "immediately cease from disconnecting any of its customers for failure to pay any charges except for those services rendered by Mountain Bell [U S West] in the State of Colorado." УУDecision No. R85Љ1294ФФ at 5, РР 1 (October 22, 1985). Further, he ordered U S West to stop disconnecting customers such as Mr. O'Bryant who were current on their U S West bill, and ordered U S West to restore service immediately to all such disconnected customers. УУDecision No. R85Љ1294ФФ at 5, РРРР 1Љ2. ССU S West and AT&T filed joint exceptions to the administrative law judge's recommended decision. O'Bryant also filed exceptions. On December 23, 1985, the commission denied all exceptions.  It adopted Decision No. R85Љ1294 as the decision of the commission. УУDecision No. C85Љ1549ФФ. U S West and AT&T filed applications for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of the decision (the requirement for judicial review). On February 20, 1986, the commission denied all applications. УУDecision No. C86Љ210ФФ. On March 21, 1986, U S West filed a petition for a writ of certiorari or review of the commission's decision at Denver District Court. УУ C. PROCEDURE ЉЉ JUDICIAL REVIEW 1986Љ1989. ФФ л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССIt is important to note that the judicial review of the УУO'BryantФФ case did not directly concern the legality of U S West's disconnection of Mr. O'Bryant's telephone. While the УУO'BryantФФ case was pending ‘‘in district court, the Staff of the commission and U S West entered into a settlement agreement, and then filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the Appeal. УУSeeФФ УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 651Љ652 (Colo. 1989). The district court granted the motion, and approved the settlement agreement over O'Bryant's objections. O'Bryant appealed the dismissal to the Colorado Supreme Court. л textллл The Colorado Supreme Court summarized the relevant terms of the settlement agreement as follows: л block quoteлггллааТТС€СССAttached to the joint motion to dismiss was a settlement agreement that contained the following relevant provisions: (1) a stipulation that the PUC decision requiring Mountain Bell to cease disconnecting its customers for failure to pay charges, except for services furnished by Mountain Bell, was rendered moot by an amended Rule 13 which would allow Mountain Bell to disconnect its service for failure to pay the long-distance charges of AT & T Communications; (2) a stipulation that the portion of the PUC order requiring Mountain Bell to immediately restore service to customers whose telephones were disconnected in violation of Rule 13(b) be modified in such a manner as to require reconnection only upon the customer's request; (3) a stipulation that the PUC specifically agreed that its prior decision was not a finding by the PUC that Mountain Bell had willfully or intentionally violated the provisions of Rule 13(b).й Ш й л" block quote"лллааУУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 651Љ652 (Colo. 1989).й Ш й л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССThe Colorado Supreme Court reversed the district court, and remanded this case to the commission for further proceedings, holding that the commission had acted improperly by entering into the settlement agreement and modifying its decision while judicial review was pending. л textллл л block quoteлггллааТТС€СССWhile section 40Љ6Љ115, 17 C.R.S. (1984), provides for judicial review o л" block quote"лллеAл" block quote"лллТТС€Сии ааааˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааAеТТС€СССf a PUC decision in the district court and for appellate review in the supreme court, УУthere is nothing in the statutory procedure for judicial and appellate review which authorizes ‘the PUC, once a judicial review proceeding has been commenced, to alter or amend its decision by entering into a settlement agreement with only one party to the judicial review proceeding to the exclusion of the other party.ФФ On the contrary, the Public Utilities Law contemplates that the PUC, which obviously has no personal, economic, or other tangible interest in its decision, will act as a neutral decisionmaker in resolving the issues before it. Once judicial review is commenced in the district court by filing a petition for writ of certiorari, the PUC's obligation is to certify the record in a timely fashion and, if it so desires, to appear before the district court in support of its decision. й Ш й ааУУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 655 (Colo. 1989) (emphasis added).й Ш й л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааССThe Supreme Court found that the Settlement Agreement, and the district court's acceptance of the agreement, and dismissal of O'Bryant's case, violated O'Bryant's "legally protected interests" in three ways. л textллл ааТТС€СССFirst, the settlement agreement, along with the judgment of dismissal, deprived O'Bryant of his right to require Mountain Bell to comply with Rule 13(b) and to require the PUC to abide by its own rules in administering the statutory scheme affecting public utilities; second, the agreement and the ensuing judgment had the effect of impairing O'Bryant's prospective statutory claim for punitive damages against Mountain Bell for willful violation of Rule 13(b); and finally, the settlement agreement and judgment of dismissal УУdeprived O'Bryant of any opportunity to recover attorney fees and costsФФ against Mountain Bell for УУsuccessfully litigating an issue that was related to general consumer interests.й Ш й аай Ш й л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааССO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 656 (Colo. 1989) (emphasis added). л textллл Thus, this case is before the commission on the remand instructions of the Colorado Supreme Court, which explicitly required the commission to consider the award of attorney's fees and costs to Mr. ‘O'Bryant "for successfully litigating an issue that was related to general consumer interests." УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 656 (Colo. 1989). аа ааˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааСрСУУУУIII. DISCUSSION.ФФ ааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆаа A. THE "AMERICAN RULE" AGAINST THE AWARD OF PREVAILING PARTYФФ УУATTORNEY'S FEES AND ITS EXCEPTIONS. ФФ ССIn England, the prevailing party has his legal fees paid by the losing party as part of winning the judgment. In the United States, unless there is specific legislative authorization for attorney's fees, "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser." УУAlyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness SocietyФФ, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (environmental group challengers to the transЉAlaska pipeline not entitled to attorney's fees from the consortium of oil companies owning Alyeska Pipeline).л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллж‰ лfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The УУAlyeska PipelineФФ case caused Congress to enact legislation the next year to overturn the result. ггУУSeeФФгг УУCity of Riverside v. RiveraФФ, 477 U.S. 561, 567 (1986) ("In response to УУAlyeskaФФ, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. РР 1988, which authorized the district courts to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing parties in specified civil rights litigation."). л#footnote tex#ллл‰жФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССThe exceptions to the "American Rule" ЉЉ that each party pays its own legal fees in lawsuits ЉЉ are various statutes and rules which allow attorney's fees to be imposed in situations of "bad faith" by the nonЉprevailing party. As the Colorado Supreme Court has summarized the Colorado "bad faith" exceptions to the American Rule: ТТС€СССOur state has various statutory and rule exceptions to the American rule regarding attorney fees which allow attorney fees to be imposed for suits brought in bad faith. In general, section 13Љ17Љ101, 6A C.R.S. (1987), provides that attorney fees may be recovered at the discretion of the trial court if it is determined that the bringing or defense of an action has been "substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious." Furthermore, section 13Љ17Љ101 instructs the courts to construe the provisions of the article regarding attorney fees liberally. УУSeeФФ УУWestern United Realty, Inc. v. IsaacsФФ, 679 P.2d 1063 (Colo.1984) (attorney fees awarded for bad faith which includes conduct which is arbitrary, vexatious, abusive, or stubbornly litigious, and conduct aimed at unwarranted delay or disrespectful of truth and accuracy). Also, our rules of civil procedure explicitly authorize the award of attorney fees in certain circumstances. УУSee, e.g.ФФ, C.R.C.P. 3(a) (civil action vexatiously commenced); C.R.C.P. 11 (willful violation of rule regarding the signing of pleadings); ‘C.R.C.P. 30(g) (failure to attend deposition or failure to serve a subpoena for attendance to deposition); C.R.C.P. 37(a)(3) (failure to respond to discovery requests); C.R.C.P. 37(c) (failure to admit the genuineness of any documents or the truth of requests for admission); C.R.C.P. 56(g) (affidavits made in bad faith); C.R.C.P. 107(d) (sanction for civil contempt). Consequently, the trial courts have ample authority to award attorney fees in appropriate cases. УУBunnett v. SmallwoodФФ, 793 P.2d 157, 162 (Colo. 1990). аа ССThe commission finds that the "bad faith" exceptions to the American Rule do not apply to the facts in the УУO'BryantФФ case. Although U S West did not prevail, the commission finds that its actions in this matter were not in bad faith.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжpлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The dissent, УУseeФФ УУPostФФ at 52УУ,ФФ selectively quotes Colorado Revised Statutes РР 13-17Љ102 (1987 Repl. Vol.6A), without pointing out that the statute is УУnotФФ a prevailing-party attorney fee statute. Instead, it is one of the statutes to sanction "frivolous, groundless, or vexatious actions," discussed in УУBunnett v. SmallwoodФФ, УУsupraФФ. As stated, we do not believe that this statute, or any other exception to the American Rule, applies to an award of attorney's fees against U S West on these facts, because U S West did not engage in frivolous, vexatious, or bad faith litigation. Hence, we find Colorado Revised Statutes РР 13-17-102 inapposite. л#footnote tex#лллpжФФ The divestiture decree established that U S West and AT&T were separate, unrelated entities. U S West's collection and billing practice, as applied to Mr. O'Bryant, i.e., total disconnection of service for failure to pay the new unrelated longЉdistance company's charges, was improper, as the administrative law judge found in УУDecision No. R85Љ1294ФФ. (Also, U S West's disconnection policy to enforce collection of AT&T's charges was probably in violation of United States District Judge Harold H. Greene's divestiture decree.) Nevertheless, the commission finds that U S West's argument that its contract with AT&T required disconnection was not frivolous, and was not in bad faith. Given the confusion in 1984Љ1985 after divestiture, U S West had a plausible argument. Thus, the American Rule exceptions discussed in УУBunnett v. SmallwoodФФ, 793 P.2d 157, 162 (Colo. ‘1990), are not applicable. If Mr. O'Bryant is entitled to attorney's fees from U S West (as the prevailing party in this litigation), O'Bryant is not entitled to fees from U S West for "bad faith" litigation. УУB. THE COMMISSION'S JURISDICTION TO AWARD NONЉSTATUTORYФФ УУATTORNEY'S FEES: THE 1972 AND 1978 MOUNTAIN STATES CASES. ФФ л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааССThe leading case holding that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission has the power to order that a prevailing party have its legal fees paid by the losing party is УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1978). ("УУMountain StatesФФ"). л textллл л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааССIn a case decided in 1972, УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945, 952 (Colo. 1972), the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the commissionл" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжVлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The commission, over the dissent of one commissioner, denied the Colorado Municipal League's request for attorney's fees and costs "after finding it had no jurisdiction to award attorney's fees and costs." УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945, 951 (Colo. 1972). The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the commission, and held that the PUC had jurisdiction to award legal fees. л#footnote tex#лллVжФФ and held that the Colorado PUC had jurisdiction to award reasonable attorney's fees to the Colorado Municipal League from U S West as the prevailing party for successfully litigating a refund action against U S West. The 1978 УУMountain StatesФФ Colorado Supreme Court case, however, analyzed the commission's constitutional and statutory power to award attorney's fees in detail, not merely in passing. Thus, УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1978), is the best authority for the proposition that the commission can award attorney's fees in appropriate cases, without statutory authority. ‘ ССIn every reported case, the Colorado Supreme Court has upheld the commission's power to award legal fees and costs to the prevailing party in appropriate circumstances. УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945, 952 (Colo. 1972); УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1978); УУColoradoЉUte Electric Association, Inc. v. PUCФФ, 602 P.2d 861, 868 (Colo. 1979). The Colorado Supreme Court also has upheld the commission's determination regarding the appropriateness of legal fees and costs in every reported case. УУE.g.ФФ, УУColorado Municipal League v. PUCФФ, 591 P.2d 577, 583 (Colo. 1979). ССThe Colorado Supreme Court has often cited the УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1978), case for the p л" block quote"ллле9л" block quote"лллааии ааааˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆаа9ел textллл л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааССroposition that the commission possesses legislative powers, by the analogy to the commission's power to award attorney's fees without statutory authorization. УУSee, e.g.ФФ, УУColorado Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mountain States Telephone and TelegraphФФ, 816 P.2d 278, 283 (Colo. 1991) ("Article XXV delegates to the Commission legislative authority to regulate public utilities previously vested in the General Assembly.") (citing the 1978 УУMountain StatesФФ case); УУColoradoЉUte Electric Assn., Inc. v. PUCФФ, 760 P.2d 627, 638 (Colo. 1988); УУColorado Municipal League v. PUCФФ, 597 P.2d 586, 588 (Colo. 1979). л textллл The reason that the 1978 УУMountain StatesФФ case is such a powerful precedent for the commission's legislative powers, is that under the "American Rule" each party bears its own litigation costs, absent ‘УУlegislationФФ to the contrary. УУAlyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness SocietyФФ, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975). УУSee alsoФФ УУBunnett v. SmallwoodФФ, 793 P.2d 157, 160, 162 (Colo. 1990) (discussing the American Rule, and its exceptions, under Colorado law). УУCf.ФФ УУBuder v. SartoreФФ, 774 P.2d 1383, 1390Љ1391 (Colo. 1989) (new exception to the American Rule). The fact that the Colorado PUC has the power to award attorney's fees is a result of the commission's legislative powers, as noted by courts from other jurisdictions. ггУУSeeФФгг УУConsumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. California PUCФФ, 603 P.2d 41, 54 & n. 10 (Cal. 1979) (holding California PUC had power under the equitable "common fund" exception to the American Rule to award attorney's fees to public interest participants in quasiЉjudicial proceedings, but that the California PUC did not have the power to award attorney's fees in quasiЉlegislative proceedings) (distinguishing the Colorado PUC and its authority to award attorney's fees also in quasiЉlegislative proceedings) (citing УУMountain StatesФФ). УУSee alsoФФ УУIdaho Power Co. v. Idaho PUCФФ, 639 P.2d 442, 450Љ451 (Idaho 1981) (citing УУConsumers LobbyФФ, УУsupraФФ, and УУMountain StatesФФ, УУsupraФФ,) ("In Colorado the commission has even broader constitutional powers than the California commission. Thus neither УУConsumers LobbyФФ, nor УУMountain StatesФФ, УУsupraФФ, has relevance to the scope of the Idaho Commission's legislative grant of power."). The month before the Colorado Supreme Court unanimously held in УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1978), that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission had the power to award attorney's fees without statutory authority, the same Colorado Supreme Court unanimously held that the commission did not have the power to impose monetary fines, as an alternative to revocation of a contract carrier's certificate of public convenience and necessity. УУHaney v. PUCФФ, 574 P.2d 863, 864Љ865 (Colo. 1978) ("УУHaneyФФ"). ‘How can the two lines of Supreme Court authority in the ггУУHaney ФФггand УУMountain StatesФФ cases be reconciled? The best way to distinguish the cases is to note that the Supreme Court analyzed the commission's action in the УУHaneyФФ case under two narrow transportation statutes ЉЉ Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ11Љ110 (1973) and Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ11Љ112 (1973) ЉЉ concerning the revocation of transportation permits. In УУHaneyФФ, the Colorado Supreme Court held that as a matter of statutory construction, the commission did not have the power to impose monetary fines as an alternative to the revocation of transportation permits. The language in the then-applicable statutes stated that the commission "may revoke, suspend, alter, or amend" any permit or certificate ЉЉ the statute did not list the less drastic alternative of a monetary fine. Because the statute did not contain the alternative of a fine, the Colorado Supreme Court held in УУHaneyФФ that the commission exceeded its statutory authority.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжCлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. In 1989, the Legislature modified the result in the УУHaneyФФ case by adding the phrase "or may impose a civil penalty" to list of sanctions the commission could impose for violations on transportation permit holders. The current version of the statutes is codified at Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ10Љ112 (1991 Cum.Supp. Vol.17) and Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ11Љ110 (1991 Cum.Supp. Vol.17). ааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆаа Rather than attempt to reconcile the УУHaneyФФ and УУMountain StatesФФ cases, if one wishes to interpret the cases as inconsistent, the УУMountain StatesФФ case controls because it was decided last. Furthermore, the fact that the Legislature changed the two transportation statutes to overturn the Supreme Court's decision in УУHaneyФФ may indicate that the Legislature felt that the УУHaneyФФ case was wrongly decided. We choose to distinguish the cases on the basis of statutory construction, and not to decide that the Legislature felt that УУHaneyФФ was wrongly decided. УУHaneyФФ interpreted the PUC's authority under two narrow transportation statutes; while УУMountain StatesФФ interpreted the PUC's authority under Article XXV of the Colorado Constitution, which the Colorado Supreme Court found to be bolstered by the statute giving the PUC broad power and duty to do all things "necessary and convenient" in the exercise of its regulatory duty, Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ3Љ102 (1984 Repl. Vol.17). л#footnote tex#лллCжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССBy contrast, in the 1978 УУMountain StatesФФ case, the Colorado Supreme Court analyzed the commission's powers under the Constitution itself. Further, the Colorado Supreme Court found that a ‘statute, Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ3Љ102, supported the commission's constitutional powers to award legal fees. The statute states that the commission has the power "to do all things, whether specifically designated in articles 1 to 7 of this title or in addition thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power." ггУУSeeФФгг УУMountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544, 547 (Colo. 1978) (in the opinion, the Colorado Supreme Court cited and emphasized this language in the statute). As applied to the УУO'BryantФФ case before us today, the УУMountain StatesФФ case is more applicable authority than the УУHaneyФФ case, because we are applying the commission's constitutional and statutory powers to award attorney's fees, as in УУMountain StatesФФ, not interpreting a narrow statute, as in УУHaneyФФ. ССAs discussed, Colorado Supreme Court cases have held that the Colorado Public Utilities Commission holds the legislative authority to award legal fees. УУE.g.ФФ, УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1978). УУSee alsoФФ УУColorado Energy Advocacy Office v. Public Service Co. of ColoradoФФ, 704 P.2d 298, 306 (Colo. 1985) ("The Colorado PUC is given power by the Colorado Constitution, and its power is equivalent to the legislature except as limited by statute."). In the 20 years since the Colorado Supreme Court first held that the commission had jurisdiction to award attorney's fees in the 1972 УУMountain StatesФФ case, the Legislature has chosen not to alter the commission's authority with respect to the award of legal fees and costs.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжЯлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. Especially significant on the facts of this case, the Legislature has not restricted the commission's authority to award legal fees for judicial review of a commission decision, nor has the Legislature limited the commission's power to award legal fees for fee litigation. л#footnote tex#лллЯжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#б ‘УУC. CRITERIA FOR COMMISSION AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES. ФФ л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааССThe Colorado Supreme Court has approved the three standards established by the commission for the award of attorney's fees and costs to consumer representatives. УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544, 548 (Colo. 1978). The three standards are: (1) the representation and expenses must relate to the "general consumer interest"; (2) the party's testimony, evidence, and exhibits must "materially assist" the commission in reaching its decision; and, (3) the legal fees and costs must be "reasonable." УУId. л textлллФФ O'Bryant, in his УУExceptionsФФ, incorrectly states that there are four standards for the commission's award of attorney's fees, unnecessarily adding "the service performed must be exceptional," a fourth standard that УУMountain StatesФФ does not require. УУSeeФФ УУO'Bryant's Exceptions to Decision No. R91Љ348ФФ at 4Љ5 (filed May 8, 1991).л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжeлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. Similarly, the dissent incorrectly states that there are four standards for the commission's award of attorney's fees. ггУУSeeФФгг УУPostФФ at 44. л#footnote tex#лллeжФФ The confusion may result from УУColoradoЉUte Electric Association, Inc. v. PUCФФ, 602 P.2d 861 (Colo. 1979). As in УУMountain StatesФФ, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the commission's attorney fee award. The Court also upheld the commission's creation of two extra standards, in addition to the normal three УУMountain StatesФФ standards, due to the particular facts of the case. ааТТС€СССHere, the commission determined the fees and costs came within the УУMountain StatesФФ standard. Moreover, because of its concern that these fees ultimately would be borne by the member cooperatives and their customers, the commission imposed two additional standards. The first was that the services performed be exceptional, and the second that ‘they materially contribute to the decision of the commission (the standard in УУMountain StatesФФ was "materially assist").й Ш й аай Ш й ааˆЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆмЬ  T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааТТТТТТС€СС€СССУУColoradoЉUte Electric Assn. Inc. v. PUCФФ, 602 P.2d 861, 868 (Colo. 1979). ааˆмЬ  T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆмЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааТТ л textлааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАˆааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллааˆр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆмЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааТТССThe more stringent standard in УУColorado-UteФФ, УУsupraФФ, is not applicable to U S West, a private for-profit corporation, not a memberЉowned cooperative like Colorado-Ute. Therefore, the three original standards in the 1978 УУMountain StatesФФ case govern the УУO'BryantФФ case, which involves legal fees against the same company, now officially known as U S West Communications, Inc. л textлллТТ ТТУУD. APPLICATION OF THE THREE MOUNTAIN STATES CRITERIAФФ ТТ УУ TO THE FACTS OF THE O'BRYANT CASE. ТТ ааˆмЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆмр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааТТСрС1. First standard for legal fees: representation of the consumer interest. ааˆмр8  ш @˜№H јPЈ #џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆмЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆˆааТТФФ ТТССУУa. Legal fees at the commission.ФФ O'Bryant meets the "general consumer interest" standard for his work at the commission, because the result of his lawsuit benefited all 1.8 million Colorado U S West customers. The УУO'BryantФФ case established the principle that it is improper for U S West to disconnect a customer's entire telephone service for failure to pay a long-distance company's charges. O'Bryant was completely without telephone service for almost 3 months (June, July, and August 1984), even though he had paid in full his bill to U S West. U S West's practice contradicted the legislative mandate and commission policy of ‘‘universal service, the idea that access to basic telephone service is a necessity.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжлfootnote textлааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл ггУУSeeФФгг Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ15Љ101 (1991 Cum.Supp. Vol.17) (legislative declaration that it is the "policy of the state of Colorado to promote a competitive telecommunications marketplace УУwhile protecting and maintaining the wide availabilityФФ of highЉquality telecommunications services") (emphasis added).л#footnote tex#лллжФФ Further, on the facts of the case, O'Bryant was unemployed during part of 1984. O'Bryant may have found it more difficult to get a new job without telephone service. а ˆˆмм аааˆмЬ T ˜ м dЈь0tИќ!#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџˆмаа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа‘ССThe Colorado Supreme Court, in its unanimous УУO'BryantФФ decision, found that O'Bryant satisfies the first criteria for the award of legal fees, when it remanded the case, and explicitly required the commission to consider the award of attorney's fees and costs to Mr. O'Bryant "for successfully litigating an issue that was related to general consumer interests." УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 656 (Colo. 1989). Under the "law of the case" doctrine, this commission on remand should follow the Colorado Supreme Court's finding that Mr. O'Bryant represented the "general consumer interests."л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллв X01УУФФУУФФˆˆX01УУФФУУФФмм вжAФФл" block quote"ллллfootnote textла мм аааггУУллл#footnote reference#лггУУллааа ммА ааааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлгглл. The dissent ignores the mandate of the Colorado Supreme Court when it makes the finding that O'Bryant's conduct "placed him in a УУperФФ УУseФФ adversarial position against the general consumer interest." ггУУPostФФгг at 46Љ47. The Colorado Supreme Court found, in the quoted passage, that O'Bryant successfully litigated an issue that was "related to the general consumer interest." We must follow the Colorado Supreme Court. л#footnote tex#лллAжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССFurther, the commission itself determined that O'Bryant represented the general consumer interest. On September 12, 1984, after Mr. O'Bryant had paid his AT&T bill and U S West had reconnected O'Bryant's telephone, U S West filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint as Moot. On November 7, 1984, Chief Administrative Judge Temmer denied the motion to dismiss, finding that "[t]here still exists a controversy between the complainant and the respondent concerning whether or not Rule 13 has been violated." УУDecision No. R84Љ1277ЉIФФ at 1. The administrative law judge denied the motion to dismiss because the legality of U S West's collection practices on behalf of AT&T (disconnection of all telephone service) was not resolved. Even though the УУspecificФФ case of Mr. O'Bryant was moot because U S West reconnected his telephone, the УУgeneralФФ legal issue of whether U S West could disconnect consumers for failure to pay a longЉdistance bill, remained a live controversy. Thus, the ‘plaintiff in the УУO'BryantФФ case represented interests of all Colorado consumers in the dispute with U S West. ССFinally, a review of the relief recommended by Administrative Law Judge Staliwe in October 1985 ЉЉ ordering U S West to stop disconnecting customers who were current on their U S West bill, and ordering U S West to restore service immediately to all such disconnected customers, УУDecision No. R85Љ1294ФФ at 5, РРРР 1Љ2 (October 22, 1985) ЉЉ demonstrates that the УУO'BryantФФ case had broad consumer impact. As far as O'Bryant's work at the commission is concerned, the first УУMountain StatesФФ standard of representation of the "general consumer interest" is met. On remand of this case from the Colorado Supreme Court in 1991, Administrative Law Judge Staliwe found that to award Mr. O'Bryant attorney's fees for winning this victory for Colorado U S West consumers: ааТТС€СССwould be uncomfortably close to rewarding a bank robber on the theory that his misconduct exposed security defects in the bank. Simply put, Mr. O'Bryant's refusal to timely pay his bills should not be rewarded, regardless of any perceived collateral benefits.й Ш й ааССУУDecision No. R91Љ348ФФ at 7 (March 19, 1991).й Ш й л textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССWe strenuously disagree with this reasoning. O'Bryant paid his U S West bill in full, and the legal question was not whether he should be "rewarded" for failing to pay his AT&T bill on time, but rather, whether or not U S West's disconnection of his local service, for which he had paid in full, was a fair collection practice. л textллл ‘The dissent to this decision, while not adopting the extreme language in УУDecision No. R91Љ348ФФ (the administrative law judge's recommended decision), also seems to impute bad motives to Mr. O'Bryant. For example, the dissent at one point discusses O'Bryant's alleged "deep desire" to "avoid paying for his toll charges." ггУУSeeФФгг УУPostФФ at 49. We fail to find the evidentiary basis for such a characterization of Mr. O'Bryant's motives. The dissent makes other unfounded conclusions, such as that O'Bryant "tried to use his long distance provider as a ггУУde factoФФгг shortЉterm lender, with the interest on the 'loan' to be paid by all other rate payers." ггУУSeeФФгг УУPostФФ at 47. We believe the dissent mischaracterizes Mr. O'Bryant's motives, and, more importantly, the dissent ignores the possibility that longЉdistance companies can make billing errors. To allow disconnection of all service every time a consumer has a billing dispute with a long-distance carrier is a collection practice that may not always be fair, especially if the longЉdistance company made a billing error. Disconnection of all service, such as Mr. O'Bryant experienced, is not a fair collection practice during a pending billing dispute. Again, we find the record in this case amply supports the Colorado Supreme Court's determination that Mr. O'Bryant should receive attorney's fees from U S West for "successfully litigating an issue that was related to general consumer interests." УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 656 (Colo. 1989). УУb. Legal Fees On Appeal.ФФ The question of legal fees on appeal is especially significant in the УУO'BryantФФ case because the major part of the fee request is for work done outside the commission. O'Bryant requests approximately $22,000 in fees and costs for work at the ‘commission; $11,000 in fees and costs for work at the district court; and $40,000 in fees and costs for work done at the Colorado Supreme Court.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжФлfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл УУSeeФФ УУO'Bryant's Reply on Motion for Award of Fees and CostsФФ, "Exhibit B ЉЉ Summary of Fees and Costs" (filed April 11, 1990). УУSee alsoФФ УУO'Bryant's Motion to File One Copy of Billing RecordsФФ (attaching voluminous billing records) (filed April 11, 1990).л#footnote tex#лллФжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССIn discussing the legal fees for work on appeal issue, we will divide the discussion into four parts: (1) whether O'Bryant represented the general consumer interest in his advocacy on appellate review of the commission's decision at the district court and at the Colorado Supreme Court; (2) whether there is precedent for the fees-on-appeal question; and, if not, (3) whether the commission has the authority to make such an award of attorney's fees for work on review of the commission's decision; and finally, (4) whether an award is appropriate on the specific facts of this case. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССССССУУ1. Legal fees for the appeal: O'Bryant represented the general consumer interest on appeal.ФФ As mentioned previously, to analyze O'Bryant's entitlement to attorney's fees at all stages of the litigation, it is necessary to realize that the issue on appeal was not quite the same as the issue at the commission. УУSeeФФ УУAnteФФ, at 10Љ12. At the commission in the proceedings from 1984Љ1986, the УУO'BryantФФ case concerned the legality of U S West's disconnection of Mr. O'Bryant's telephone. While the УУO'BryantФФ case was pending in district court, the commission and U S West entered into a settlement agreement ЉЉ without the consent of Mr. O'Bryant. УУSeeФФ УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 651Љ652 (Colo. 1989). An ‘‘important issue on appeal was whether the commission could "settle" a case ЉЉ modifying its prior decision after judicial review had begun ЉЉ over the objections of one of the parties. л textллл ССAs discussed previously, the Colorado Supreme Court, in strong language, held that the commission had acted improperly by "settling" the УУO'BryantФФ case with U S West, over the objections of Mr. O'Bryant. ггУУSeeФФгг УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 655 (Colo. 1989) ("there is nothing in the statutory procedure for judicial and appellate review which authorizes the PUC, once a judicial review proceeding has been commenced, to alter or amend its decision by entering into a settlement agreement with only one party to the judicial review proceeding to the exclusion of the other party."). Also of importance on the issue of consumer interest is the fact that a review of the commission's settlement agreement with U S West shows that the commission converted O'Bryant's victory for consumers into a defeat for consumers, because the commission amended Rule 13 of the commission's Rules Regulating the Service of Telephone Utilities, 4 Code of Colorado Regulation 723Љ2 (1973). The amendment to the telephone rules allowed U S West to disconnect consumers for failure to pay longЉdistance charges ЉЉ the very practice that the commission found to be improper in УУO'BryantФФ's case. ггУУSeeФФгг УУO'Bryant v. PUCФФ, 778 P.2d 648, 651Љ652 (Colo. 1989) (summarizing the terms of the settlement agreement). л" block quote"ллле9л" block quote"лллааии аааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа9еWe conclude that O'Bryant meets the standard for representing the consumer interest on appeal. If O'Bryant had not pursued his case on judicial review, then his victory over U S West's disconnection practices would have been specific only to him, not generally applicable to all Colorado U S West customers. The УУO'BryantФФ case established not only the impropriety ‘of U S West disconnection practices; the УУO'BryantФФ case also established the impropriety of the commission's "settling" a case after judicial review had started. On both grounds, Mr. O'Bryant won an important victory for consumers ЉЉ over Colorado's largest telecommunications company (and its powerful ally, AT&T), and over the Colorado Public Utilities Commission. We conclude that O'Bryant protected the public interest on judicial review of the commission's decision. We must next determine whether he can receive legal fees for his efforts. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССССССУУ2. Legal fees for the appeal: There is no binding precedent concerning attorney's fees for appellate review of a Colorado PUC decision.ФФ In the first Colorado case stating that the commission had jurisdiction to award attorney's fees, without limiting language, the Colorado Supreme Court declared the commission's general power to award legal fees to a party. In that case, the complainant sought fees for "various proceedings," including judicial proceedings. УУSeeФФ УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945, 951 (Colo. 1972) ("The Colorado Municipal League asked the Commission for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by it in the УУvarious proceedingsФФ in which it opposed the 1969 Mountain Bell rate increase.") (emphasis added). л textллл O'Bryant argues that "the first Colorado Supreme Court case to recognize the Commission's jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees dealt with an amalgam of Commission and appellate proceedings." УУO'Bryant Exceptions to Decision No. R91-348ФФ at 10. We do not view the "various proceedings" language in the 1972 УУMountain StatesФФ case as a "holding" that the commission can award attorney's fees in judicial proceedings, as O'Bryant seems to argue. ‘We similarly reject U S West's argument that the Colorado Supreme Court, by case law, has foreclosed an award of legal fees for judicial review of a PUC decision. U S West cites the language in УУColoradoЉUte Electric Association, Inc. v. PUCФФ, 602 P.2d 861, 868 (Colo. 1979), that "the commission has broad constitutional and statutory discretion to determine when attorneys' fees should be awarded in its own proceedings," for the proposition that the courts restricted the commission's jurisdiction to award attorney's fees on appellate review of a commission decision. We do not read the УУColoradoЉUteФФ УУsupraФФ, case so broadly. The case did not "hold" that the commission could not award legal fees on appeal. The language is positive, in stating what the commission can do, not restrictive, and did not decide whether or not a commission "proceeding" includes judicial review of a commission decision.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжЦлfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The New Jersey Supreme Court has construed the term "proceeding" to include judicial review of its public utility commission orders. ггУУSeeФФгг УУAlexander v. New Jersey Power & Light Co.ФФ, 21 N.J. 373, 122 A.2d 339, 343, 13 PUR3d 620, 624 (N.J. 1956). л#footnote tex#лллЦжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССBesides the vague "various proceedings" language of УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945, 951 (Colo. 1972), no reported Colorado decision has specifically addressed the commission's power to award attorney's fees for judicial review of its decisions.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжsлfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. U S West cites an unreported district court decision supporting its view that the commission does not have the right to award attorney's fees in appellate proceedings. УУSeeФФ УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, Case No. 85 CV 11531 (Denver Dist. Ct. March 6, 1990). (As an unreported district court decision, the ruling is entitled to no precedential weight.) The decision correctly restates the American Rule that legal fees are not recoverable as part of the judgment absent specific contractual, statutory or other basis, but seems to imply that the Colorado Municipal League ("League") was not entitled to legal fees on judicial review because the Office of Consumer Counsel was a party to the case and represented the public interest and the interests of the consumers. Thus, the decision may have found against the League on the second УУMountain StatesФФ legal standard ("materially assisting" the commission in its decision). In any event, the case is distinguishable from УУO'BryantФФ because the Consumer Counsel was prevented from intervening in УУO'BryantФФ, and Mr. O'Bryant alone represented the consumer interest, both at the commission and on judicial review. л#footnote tex#лллsжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б ‘ б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССThere are only two reported cases concerning stateл" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжЧлfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The federal Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 provides for attorney's fees for consumer representative intervenors, and specifically states that the authority includes "fees and costs of obtaining judicial review of any determination." 16 U.S.C. РР 2632(a)(1). л#footnote tex#лллЧжФФ public utility commissions that are on point, and both of them tend to support O'Bryant's position that an attorney fee award should include fees on appeal. The Maine Public Utilities Commission has established that consumers are entitled to their reasonable attorney's fees, expert witness fees and other reasonable costs, in certain instances for their participation before the commission, and upon successful judicial review of a commission decision. ггУУSeeФФгг УУRe Costs of Participation in Commission Proceedings on PURPAФФ, 37 PUR4th 280 (Maine PUC 1980). ССMuch earlier, the New Jersey Supreme Court reached a similar result, and allowed legal fees for judicial review of its public utilities commission's decisions. The New Jersey Supreme Court decided that a New Jersey statute, allowing attorney's fees to private attorneys who protect the public interest before the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners, also included attorney's fees for judicial review of the Board's decision, in situations such as the УУO'BryantФФ case where the utility unsuccessfully appealed a Board decision in favor of a consumer. УУAlexander v. New Jersey Power & Light Co.ФФ, 21 N.J. 373, 122 A.2d 339, 13 PUR3d 620 (N.J. 1956).л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллж)лfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. In construing the statutory term Board "proceeding," the New Jersey Supreme Court held that because the intent of the statute was the protection of the public interest, a "proceeding" should not be limited to a Board proceeding. УУAlexander v. New Jersey Power & Light Co.ФФ, 21 N.J. 373, 122 A.2d 339, 343, 13 PUR3d 620, 624 (N.J. 1956) ("The statutory 'proceeding' did not come to an end until the last judicial review was had. The Legislature quite evidently had in view a rate 'proceeding' that in its very nature was subject to judicial examination, and so the continuance of the public representation to the end[.]").л#footnote tex#ллл)жФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б ‘ л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССССССУУ3. Legal fees for the appeal: The Commission has jurisdiction to award attorney's fees for judicial review of a Commission decision, and for the fee litigation.ФФ As discussed, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission has УУlegislativeФФ powers, granted to the commission by the people of Colorado in Article XXV of the Colorado Constitution of 1954. The Colorado Constitution provides: л textлллаааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааб#6є\  PŽ6QP#бУ УСрСArticle XXV СрСPublic Utilities аам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааФ Ф ТТС€СССIn addition to the powers now vested in the General Assembly of the State of Colorado, all power to regulate the facilities, service and rates and charges therefor, including facilities and service and rates and charges therefor within home rule cities and home rule towns, of every corporation, individual, or association of individuals, wheresoever situate or operating within the State of Colorado, whether within or without a home rule city or home rule town, as a public utility, as presently or as may hereafter be defined as a public utility by the laws of the State of Colorado, is hereby vested in such agency of the State of Colorado as the General Assembly shall by law designate. Until such time as the General Assembly may other designate, said authority shall be vested in the Public Utilities Commission of the State of Colorado; provided however, nothing herein shall affect the power of municipalities to exercise reasonable police and licensing powers, nor their power to grant franchises; and provided, further that nothing herein shall be construed to apply to municipally owned utilities. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССAs the Colorado Supreme Court has construed the constitutional provision, "Article XXV delegates to the Commission legislative authority to regulate public utilities previously vested in the General Assembly." УУColorado Office of Consumer Counsel v. Mountain States Telephone and TelegraphФФ, 816 P.2d 278, 283 (Colo. 1991). This Constitutional grant of power to the commission means that the commission may do anything that the Legislature may do regarding the regulation of public utilities, unless a statute specifically restricts the commission's authority. УУColorado Energy Advocacy Office v. Public Service Co. of ColoradoФФ, ‘‘704 P.2d 298, 306 (Colo. 1985) ("The Colorado PUC is given power by the Colorado Constitution, and its power is equivalent to the legislature except as limited by statute."). л textлллааб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б We hold that the commission has jurisdiction to award the attorney's fees requested by Mr. O'Bryant and for legal fees for the fee litigation, based on the Colorado Constitution, as construed by the Colorado Supreme Court in the cases cited in this decision, including of course the two УУMountain StatesФФ decisions, УУMountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544, 547 (Colo. 1978) and УУMountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1972). л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССССУУ4. Legal fees for the appeal: On the facts of this case, an award is appropriate to O'Bryant as the prevailing party on appeal, and his fees for the fee litigation, even though his lawyers took the case on a pro bono basis.ФФ Without allowing legal fees for the judicial review of a commission decision, the Supreme Court's УУMountain StatesФФ, УУsupraФФ, decisions would be eviscerated. This case is a good example. The initial amount of controversy was Mr. O'Bryant's $141.30 AT&T bill. While we do not have records for the amount of fees U S West spent in liti л" block quote"лллеЏл" block quote"лллааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бии л textлллаааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бЏел textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССgating this matter, we know that the law firm of Hill & Robbins has submitted billing records requesting approximately $22,000 in fees and costs for work at the commission; $11,000 in fees and costs for work at the district court; and $40,000 in fees and costs for work done at the Supreme Court on this case. л textлллааб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б If the commission today were to decide that it lacked jurisdiction to award attorney's fees for judicial review, no future rational litigant in O'Bryant's situation would have continued this litigation. If such a litigant continued the fight, it would be reimbursed only $22,000 for work at the commission, and would expend $51,000 in securing the "victory" in the court system. Thus, as "reward" for representing the consumer interest, the litigant would pay a net amount of $29,000 after years of litigation. If the УУMountain StatesФФ decisions are to have any practical meaning, the commission should award legal fees for successful appeals, such as O'Bryant's appeal.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжілfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. Given that the underlying amount of damages in individual consumer complaint cases such as this may be small (unless of course one multiplied O'Bryant's problem times 1.8 million Colorado U S West customers), the amount of attorney's fees in situations such as this will greatly exceed the damages. Again, if the Colorado Supreme Court's УУMountain StatesФФ decisions are to have any practical meaning, an attorney fee award cannot be required to be proportional to the amount of actual damages. We agree with the United States Supreme Court's determination that the amount of the attorney fee award can greatly exceed the underlying award of damages. УУCity of Riverside v. RiveraФФ, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) (attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. РР 1988 not required to be proportional to award of damages actually recovered).л#footnote tex#ллліжФФ ‘ б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССCourts have interpreted other statutes in this same manner ЉЉ if there is a fee entitlement for legal fees as part of the judgment to the prevailing party in the court or agency of first instance, then the fee entitlement continues for appellate review. Under Colorado attorney fee law, the best example of this principle to include fee entitlement for appellate review is Colorado's statute on security deposits. The statute provides that a landlord who wrongfully retains a tenant's security deposit is "liable for treble the amount of that portion of the security deposit wrongfully withheld from the tenant, together with reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs." Colorado Revised Statutes РР 38Љ12Љ103(3)(a) (1982 Repl. Vol.16A). As in the Colorado Supreme Court's pronouncements in the УУMountain StatesФФ decisions, the security deposit statute states that there is an entitlement to reasonable attorney's fees, but is silent as to whether the fee entitlement includes legal fees for judicial review. ССIn order to make sense of the statutory scheme, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that tenants who are successful on appeal are entitled to legal fees on appeal, even though the statute is silent. ггУУSeeФФгг УУMartinez v. SteinbaumФФ, 623 P.2d 49, 55 (Colo. 1981); УУMartin v. AllenФФ, 566 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Colo. 1977); УУHeatherridge Management Co. v. PennonФФ, 558 P.2d 435, 438 (Colo. 1977). As the Colorado Supreme Court has stated: ТТС€СССThis statute [the security deposit statute, Section 38Љ12Љ103, Colorado Revised Statutes], salutary in nature, is designed to assist tenants in vindicating their legal rights and to equalize the disparity in power which exists between landlord and tenant in conflicts over such relatively small sums. To deny attorney's fees to tenants who are forced to prosecute an appeal would undercut the objectives of these provisions. Landlords, by the simple expedient of an appeal, could effectively discourage tenants from obtaining legal redress. We, therefore, hold that tenants who are successful on appeal are entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССУУMartin v. AllenФФ, 566 P.2d 1075, 1076 (Colo. 1977) (citations omitted). л textлллаа The same considerations are present here ЉЉ if attorney's fees were not awarded for successful appellate review of a commission decision such as the УУO'BryantФФ decision, then the utility could win every case by the simple expedient of an appeal. The amount in controversy in individual consumer complaints is typically far less than the costs of protracted litigation. The purpose of allowing legal fees at the commission is to encourage public interest litigation by the private bar in limited circumstances such as the УУO'BryantФФ case where the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel cannot represent an individual consumer. ‘The Colorado Supreme Court has explained the purpose of the security deposit statute in a manner that supports the rationale for the fee request by Mr. O'Bryant. The purpose of the statute, allowing attorney's fees to tenants who prevail in recovering security deposits wrongfully kept by landlords, is for: ТТС€ССС(1) insulating the award of damages to the plaintiff from being substantially depleted by attorneys' fees, and (2) encouraging the private bar to enforce the provisions of section 38Љ12Љ103 in actions which generally involve only small sums of money. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССУУTorres v. PortillosФФ, 638 P.2d 274, 277 (Colo. 1981), УУcitingФФ УУBall v. WellerФФ, 563 P.2d 371 (Colo. App. 1977) ( footnote and citation omitted). л textлллаа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССOnce again, we believe that the considerations, for prevailing party attorney's fees for consumer representation at the commission, are the same the Colorado Supreme Court in УУTorres v. PortillosФФ, УУsupraФФ, noted for prevailing party attorney's fees in the security deposit statute. By allowing attorney's fees at the commission, the Colorado Supreme Court's УУMountain StatesФФ decisions are insulated from having the award of damages to the plaintiff being substantially depleted by attorney's fees. Also, legal fees to prevailing parties encourages the private bar to enforce the provisions of the public utility law, in actions that generally involve only small sums of money. л textлллаа The award of attorney's fees for successful appellate review of a commission decision is consistent with the Colorado Supreme Court's УУMountain StatesФФ decisions. Indeed, the award of legal fees for appellate review necessarily follows from the УУMountain StatesФФ decisions. Otherwise, the initial award would be substantially depleted by appellate legal fees (we have shown how O'Bryant's award would be more than just substantially depleted ЉЉ it would be wiped out and turned into a substantial loss), and the private bar would be discouraged from enforcing the public utility law. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted federal feeЉshifting statutes just as the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted the attorney's fees in the security deposit statute ЉЉ once there is fee entitlement, that entitlement includes fees for judicial review. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Statute, 42 U.S.C. РР 1988, and the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. РР 2412, to include fees to litigation at the ‘‘trial court, and all subsequent appeals, and has even allowed federal courts to award attorney's fees backwards in time to cover work done in УУstateФФ administrative agencies before the matter came to federal court.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжMлfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. УУSeeФФ УУNew York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. CareyФФ, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). The Court reasoned that allowing attorney's fees for state administrative work would further the goals of the civil rights laws: "Only authorization of fee awards ensures incorporation of state procedures as a meaningful part of the Title VII enforcement scheme." УУNew York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. CareyФФ, 447 U.S. 54, 65 (1980). л#footnote tex#лллMжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССFor the same reasons that a "halfway" award of fees would eviscerate the УУMountain StatesФФ holding that the commission has the jurisdiction to award prevailing party attorney's fees, legal fees for the fee litigation should be awarded. U S West has vigorously fought this fee request for several years now. If O'Bryant did not receive an award for the fee litigation, his attorney's fees for the fee litigation would substantially deplete the initial award owed to him for representation at the commission. The УУexpenseФФ and the УУdelayФФ in collecting fees would discourage the private bar from enforcing the public utility law in lawsuits such as the УУO'BryantФФ case.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжулfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. УУCf.ФФ УУTorres v. PortillosФФ, 638 P.2d 274, 277 (Colo. 1981) (purpose of attorney fee provision in security deposit statute to insulate award of damages from being depleted by attorney's fees, and to encourage private bar to enforce the law, in actions which typically involve small sums of money).л#footnote tex#лллужФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССThe United States Supreme Court allows "fees on fees," legal fees for the fee litigation, as a matter of right, under a lesser showing than the original threshold showing for entitlement to attorney's fees. ггУУSeeФФгг УУCommissioner INS v. JeanФФ, __ U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2316 (1990) (unanimous decision). The Court reasoned that the average person challenging government action needed fees on fees, to effectuate one of the purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") statute, to eliminate the financial disincentive for the average person to challenge unreasonable governmental actions. Because the cost of litigating fee requests often exceeds the costs incurred for litigating the merits of a claim: "If the Government could impose the cost of fee litigation on prevailing parties . . . the financial deterrent that the EAJA aims to eliminate would be resurrected." УУCommissioner INS v. JeanФФ, __ U.S. __, __, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 2322 (1990). In this case, the cost of O'Bryant's fee litigation may exceed the costs of litigating the merits of his claim. ССWithout fees for fee litigation, U S West has a л" block quote"ллле-л" block quote"лллии аааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа-ел textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССpowerful incentive to prolong fee litigation. We believe that legal fees for the fee litigation is a the necessary final step needed to implement the Supreme Court's УУMountain StatesФФ decisions. If fees are allowed at the commission, it is essential that the commission award legal fees for appellate review, and legal fees for the fee litigation, to complete the logical circle. л textлллаа ‘We believe that this complete implementation of the УУMountain StatesФФ decisions will actually lower costs, by encouraging quick settlements, instead of providing an impetus for further litigation. The complete framework will lead a utility such as U S West, facing prevailing party fees for work at the commission, an added calculus in the decision about whether or not to appeal a commission order. Given that fees will continue to mount, and that U S West will be liable for appellate attorney's fees to the other side if it loses the appeal, the company will appeal only those cases that it feels confident that it can win. If there were no appellate attorney's fees, counsel for U S West might reasonably appeal every case, as wise litigation strategy to wear down the opposition. Similarly, fees for fee litigation are needed in order to provide a financial disincentive for the utility to delay, and to litigate further, instead of resolving fee matters quickly. Under the American Rule, litigants are not accustomed to paying the attorney's fees of their opponent, unlike in England where the risk of paying attorney's fees to the opponent if one loses is part of the calculus for every lawsuit. Fees for fee litigation may by particularly needed to increase the incentive to settle fee disputes if fees for fee litigation were not allowed. There may be considerable bitterness on the part of the losing party in being required to pay the opponent's legal fees, which could lead the client to order their attorneys to drag out the fee litigation. With fees for the fee litigation provided, a cost-conscious attorney would advise the client to accept a reasonable fee request. Therefore, we conclude that fees for the fee litigation, and fees for appellate review, is the most equitable and the most efficient way for this commission to implement the Colorado Supreme Court's УУMountain StatesФФ decisions. Legal fees on appeal to a consumer are a necessary equalizer to the resources of the utilities. As the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized, the ratepaying public generally reimburses U S West's attorney's fees whether the company is the prevailing party or not. ггУУSeeФФгг УУMountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544, 547 (Colo. 1978). Just as the United States Supreme Court was concerned about the financial disincentive the average person has in litigating against the United States government in its discussion in УУCommissioner INS v. JeanФФ, __ U.S. __, 110 S.Ct. 2316, 2322 (1990), the average Colorado consumer faces a powerful financial disincentive in litigating against U S West. U S West receives fees win or lose, and the average consumer ironically funds U S West's litigation war chest through rates. If the prevailing consumer party can recover legal fees, there is some balance for the consumer litigating against wealthy regulated corporations, such as U S West Communications, Inc. Next, it is important to realize that there will be very few instances in the future in which a consumer representative will qualify for attorney's fees. The Colorado Supreme Court decided УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1972) and УУMountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544, 547 (Colo. 1978), before the Legislature institutionalized an "equalizer" to the regulated corporations' power at the commission by creating the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel in 1984. Now, the Office of Consumer Counsel represents the consumer interest ЉЉ except in situations involving an individual consumer such as the УУO'BryantФФ case. In typical cases where consumers and the utilities have a dispute, such as rate cases, the OCC will represent the consumer interest. The second УУMountain StatesФФ standard for awarding fees ЉЉ "materially assisting" the commission in reaching the decision ЉЉ probably will block attorney's fees to individual consumer litigants, if the OCC is involved. In other words, the Legislature has significantly addressed the consumer representation problem by creating the OCC, and there will be few instances where the ‘commission will use its jurisdiction under УУMountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. PUCФФ, 576 P.2d 544 (Colo. 1978), to award legal fees to consumer representatives.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллжYлfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. O'Bryant filed this case on July 11, 1984, eleven days after the Legislature established the OCC. Although the was in existence at the time of O'Bryant's lawsuit, it was not allowed to participate, as discussed previously, due to the strict construction of the OCC's enabling statute, preventing the OCC from intervening on behalf of individual consumers under all circumstances. УУSeeФФ УУAnteФФ at 9 & nn. 11Љ12. л#footnote tex#лллYжФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б б#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССAlso, as a practical matter, it is important to realize that there is no "windfall" to attorneys by awarding legal fees in these limited circumstances. First, O'Bryant's attorneys only will be paid, as any other person would be paid for doing a job. We are not awarding any bonus; we are simply ordering that O'Bryant's attorneys be paid, just as U S West's attorneys are paid. Second, an attorney thinking of accepting a public interest case and representing an individual consumer at the PUC hardly will be overwhelmed by the "bonanza" of legal fees ЉЉ all the attorney will receive is his payment for a job ЉЉ and only after considerable effort, outЉofЉpocket expense, and delay. ССMr. O'Bryant's attorneys, Hill & Robbins, took this case ггУУpro bonoФФгг, receiving the assignment on a volunteer basis from the Lawyers Committee. ггУУSeeФФгг УУAnteФФ at 8. We believe that the fact that O'Bryant's attorneys took this case without charging him a retainer does not preclude an attorney fee award. ггУУPro bonoФФгг attorneys should receive legal fee awards for their work on an equal basis with privatelyЉretained attorneys. We need to encourage consumer representation, and to emphasize that public interest litigation is just as important and just as serious as the litigation performed by paid, privately-retained law firms.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллж№лfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. The Colorado Court Of Appeals reaffirmed these principles, УУIn re Marriage of SwinkФФ, 807 P.2d 1245, 1248 (Colo. App. 1991): л#footnote tex#ллл л block quoteлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглла Амм аааАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааС€СССallowance of reasonable fees to attorneys who provide ггУУpro bono ФФггservices to the economically disadvantaged tends, as a matter of economic reality, to encourage greater lawyerЉparticipation in such activities and that such practice should be encouraged as a matter of public policy. л" block quote"лллшѹжФФ As discussed, this case is a good example of private attorneys filling an important role in defending the public and consumer interest. The allowance of fees compensates their participation in ггУУpro bono ФФггpublic interest litigation, and at the same time fills a gap in the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel's enabling statute. УУSeeФФ Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40-6.5Љ106(2) (1984 Rep. Vol.17) (consumer counsel not allowed to represent individuals). ССThe Colorado Supreme Court recognized that it should award legal fees to attorneys employed by a public interest firm or organization on the same basis as private practitioners in УУMau v. E.P.H. Corp.ФФ, 638 P.2d 777 (Colo. 1982).л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллж лfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл а Амм аааАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа. УУMau v. E.P.H. Corp.ФФ, 638 P.2d 777, 780 (Colo. 1982) (evidence that a students association furnished tenant's attorney with an office, a monthly salary, and secretarial service, does not justify reducing the attorney's fee award) (referring with approval to the federal civil rights cases where "attorney's fees are awarded to attorneys employed by a public interest firm or organization on the same basis as to a private practitioner"). УУSee alsoФФ, УУNew York Gaslight Club Inc. v. CareyФФ, 447 U.S. 54, 70, n. 9. (1980) (public interest group); УУBlum v. StensonФФ, 465 U.S. 886, 894Љ895 (legal aid society); УУKeyes v. School Dist. No. 1ФФ, 439 F. Supp. 393, 405Љ407 (D. Colo. 1977) (the fact that attorneys from Holland & Hart appeared ггУУpro bono ФФггon behalf of NAACP Legal Defense Fund does not affect their entitlement to fee recovery); УУRamos v. LammФФ, 539 F. Supp. 730, 744 (D. Colo. 1982) (attorneys from Holland & Hart appearing ггУУpro bono ФФггon behalf of ACLU entitled to recover fees "equal to that paid to regularlyЉemployed attorneys involved in this type of litigation"), УУaffirmedФФ, 713 F.2d 546, 551Љ552 (10th Cir. 1983) (denial of fees would reduce the incentive to eliminate violations and to settle; recovery will increase the ability to finance litigation that otherwise would not be pursued). л#footnote tex#ллл жФФ In areas outside the security deposit ‘‘statute, Colorado courts have applied similar reasoning. УУSeeФФ УУIn re Marriage of SwinkФФ, 807 P.2d 1245, 1247Љ1248 (Colo. App. 1991) (ггУУpro bono ФФггdivorce attorney entitled to attorney's fees); УУHartman v. FreedmanФФ, 591 P.2d 1318, 1322 (Colo. 1979) (attorney's fees allowed on appeal where there is an entitlement to fees by statute in the original proceeding) (wage collection statute). ССOther courts also have affirmed the proposition that ггУУpro bono ФФггattorneys should not have their fees eliminated or reduced, merely because they took a case without a retainer paid by the client.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллж› лfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. Denying attorneys' fees to public interest counsel would substantially decrease the incentive to "obey the law," УУAlexander v. HillФФ, 553 F. Supp. 1263, 1266 (W.D.N.C. 1983), and to agree to reasonable settlements once proceedings are commenced, УУGunther v. Iowa State Men's ReformatoryФФ, 466 F. Supp. 367, 369 (N.D. Iowa 1979). ("Why should an employer settle when it can go to court and risk so little as long as a salaried public interest lawyer is representing plaintiff?").л#footnote tex#ллл›жФФ As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has noted, the securing of legal protection and statutory compliance "has frequently depended on the exertions of organizations" dedicated to public interest goals, and awarding legal fees to public interest law firms "promotes their continued existence and service to the public in this field," and "helps assure the continued availability of the services to those most in need of assistance."  ггУУTorres v. SachsФФгг, 538 F.2d 10, 13 (2nd Cir. 1976). As the Colorado Supreme Court has noted, the recovery of fees is also necessary in order to attract competent counsel to pursue private statutory enforcement. ггУУMau v. E.P.H. Corp.ФФгг, 638 P.2d 777, 780 (Colo. 1982). Hill & Robbins, Mr. O'Bryant's attorneys, performed the public service function mentioned by the Second Circuit in ггУУTorres v. SachsФФгг, with the professional competence mentioned by the Colorado л" block quote"ллле-л" block quote"лллии аааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа-ел textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССSupreme Court in ггУУMau v. E.P.H. Corp.ФФгг. л textлллаа O'Bryant is an individual consumer who filed a ггУУproФФгг ггУУseФФгг complaint in July 1984. O'Bryant's counsel, Hill & Robbins, began representing him in July 1985, and the matter proceeded as follows: ‘ ТТС€СССССJulyЉDecember 1985: Discovery, filing of factual stipulations, filing of summary judgment motions, issuance of Commission decision of violation, U S West's filing of exceptions. ТТТТС€СС€ССССС1986: Commission adoption of decision, U S West's filing of application for rehearing, denial of rehearing, U S West's petitioning for writ of certiorari in District Court, PUC rulemaking procedures, attempted settlement, O'Bryant's objection to settlement. ТТС€ССС ТТТТС€СС€ССССС1987: District Court's dismissal, initiation and pursuit of Colorado Supreme Court appeal. ТТС€ССС ТТТТС€СС€ССССС1988: Supreme Court proceedings. ТТС€ССС ТТТТС€СС€ССССС1989: Supreme Court reverses District Court dismissal and remands; U S West voluntarily dismisses complaint for judicial review at district court, and matter goes back to PUC. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССThis individual consumer probably could not have afforded to hire and pay for counsel to pursue these proceedings. It was not in Mr. O'Bryant's economic best interest to do so even if he were able, given the extremely small amount of money or damages at stake for him alone. л textлллаа Finally on appellate legal fees, we conclude that O'Bryant did not waive his fee request by filing this motion for attorney's fees at the commission on March 16, 1990, after remand from the Colorado Supreme Court in 1989. Under the analogous federal statutes, O'Bryant's fee request was timely. Normally, a prevailing party is not allowed to file a fee petition until after the merits of a claim have been finally determined. In administrative attorney fee awards, the prevailing party must wait until the appeals are over ЉЉ then go back to the agency to seek attorney's fees ЉЉ exactly what O'Bryant has done in this case. The Equal Access to Justice Act statute, allowing attorney's fees to prevailing parties in administrative adjudications, is typical of the normal procedure. The Equal Access to Justice Act provides: ТТС€СССA party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of a ггУУfinalФФгг disposition of the adversary adjudication, submit to the agency an application which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this section, and the amount sought, including an itemized statement from any attorney, agent, or expert witness representing or appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the agency was not substantially justified. When the United States appeals the underlying merits of an adversary adjudication, no decision ‘on an application for fees and other expenses in connection with that adversary adjudication shall be made under this section until a ггУУfinal and unreviewableФФгг decision is rendered by the court of appeal or until the underlying merits of the case have been determined pursuant to appeal. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССEqual Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. РР 504(a)(2) (emphasis added). л textлллаа Thus, by analogy, O'Bryant did not waive his attorney's fees request by failing to file a motion for attorney's fees at the commission in 1984Љ1986. U S West exhausted its administrative remedies, then appealed the commission's decision to district court within the 30Љday statutory period, before O'Bryant could seek fees. ггУУSeeФФгг УУAnteФФ at 10. After the Colorado Supreme Court issued a final decision ending the litigation of the merits, O'Bryant properly filed a fee petition with the commission. The Colorado Supreme Court, in the first УУMountain StatesФФ case, recognized that the commission, not the Supreme Court, should make the determination of attorney's fees. ггУУSeeФФгг УУMountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. PUCФФ, 502 P.2d 945, 952 (Colo. 1972) ("Whether or not such an award would be equitable and proper under the circumstances of the case is, of course, a question to be decided by the Commission and not initially by this court."). We conclude that O'Bryant properly filed his fee request with the Commission after remand. Further, he should receive legal fees for judicial review and for the fee litigation, and the commission should not reduce O'Bryant's fee due to the fact that his attorneys took the case on a ггУУpro bono ФФггbasis. ССУУ2. Second standard for legal fees: "materially assisting"the Commission inФФ СС УУreaching the decision. ФФ л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССThe second standard for the award of attorney's fees ЉЉ "materially assisting" the commission in reaching the decision ЉЉ is aimed principally at multiple intervenor litigation such as U S West or Public Service Company of Colorado rate cases, where the Colorado Municipal League, for example, intervenes as one of many parties. If the commission denied a rate increase, for example, the Colorado Municipal League as one of many opponents would not automatically receive attorney's fees for its efforts, if the key evidence came from other sources, for example the Staff of the commission or the Colorado Office of Consumer Counsel. ‘ O'Bryant meets the second criteria because he was the only party plaintiff in the case at the commission.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллж?!лfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. U S West and AT&T helped to ensure that O'Bryant stood alone by successfully preventing the OCC from intervening. УУSeeФФ УУAnteФФ at 9. л#footnote tex#ллл?жФФб#6є\  PŽ6QP#б л textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бССSimilarly, on appeal, O'Bryant "materially assisted" the Colorado Supreme Court's decision by not withdrawing, and by refusing to accept the district court's dismissal of the appeal as "moot" because of the settlement agreement between U S West and the commission.  Thus, O'Bryant meets the second criteria. л textлллаа ССУУ3. Third standard for legal fees: "reasonableness." ФФ л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССThe third standard for attorney's fees and costs is that the amount requested must be "reasonable." We cannot rule on the amount of legal fees today, and must remand this motion to the administrative law judge for a hearing. л textлллаа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССEvidentiary hearings are required to determine the reasonableness of attorney's fees. ггУУSeeФФгг УУHeatherridge Management Co. v. PennonФФ, 558 P.2d 435, 438 (Colo. 1977). We cannot rule on the amount of attorney's fees, because the administrative law judge did not hold an evidentiary hearing on O'Bryant's fee request.л" block quote"лллл#footnote reference#лггУУллж8"лfootnote textла мм аааб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУллл#footnote reference#лб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бггУУлла ммА аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааФФ    УУФФл)footnote reference)ллллfootnote texлб#XZ"Ab"Monotype SorX #бгглл. On remand to the commission, the administrative law judge determined, as a matter of law, that O'Bryant failed the first threshold standard in the УУMountain StatesФФ test for the right to claim attorney's fees. ггУУSeeФФгг УУDecision No. R91Љ348ФФ at 8, Ordering РР 1 (March 19, 1991). Therefore, he held no evidentiary hearings on the amount of the fee request.л#footnote tex#ллл8жФФ Today, we find only that, as a matter of law, ‘O'Bryant: (1) is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs before the commission; (2) is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and cost on appeal; and (3) is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs for the fee litigation. We remand the case to the administrative law judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to the appropriate amount of legal fees and costs. УУE. ISSUES ON REMAND TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE. ФФ л textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССOn remand to the administrative law judge, the commission directs the administrative law judge to hear legal argument on the standard for determining the reasonableness of a fee request. л textлллаа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССIn Colorado, there are few attorney fee statutes, unlike the federal system which has fee shifting statutes such as the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. РР 1988; the Equal Access to Justice Act statute allowing attorney's fees for a prevailing party (other than the government) in administrative adjudications, 5 U.S.C. РР 504; and the Equal Access to Justice Act statute awarding fees to prevailing parties in civil actions by or against the United States, 28 U.S.C. РР 2412. The federal test awards fees by, УУmultiplyingФФ: (1) the hourly fee, determined at prevailing market rates, УУtimesФФ (2) the number of hours reasonably expended in the case. УУSeeФФ УУBlum v. StensonФФ, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). (This reasonable hourly fee, times reasonable number of hours, is the "lodestar" calculation.) л textлллаа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа‘ССOne of the few Colorado feeЉshifting statutes is the security deposit statute. If a landlord wrongfully retains a security deposit, the statute awards a tenant treble the amount of the wrongfully withheld deposit, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. УУSeeФФ Colorado Revised Statutes РР 38Љ12Љ103 (1982 Rep. Vol.16A). In construing the attorney fee provision in Colorado's security deposit statute, the Colorado Supreme Court has looked to the extensive body of law construing the federal Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act, 42 U.S.C. РР 1988. УУSeeФФ УУMau v. E.P.H. CorpoФФ л" block quote"лллеЏл" block quote"лллааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бии л textлллаааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бЏел textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССУУrationФФ, 638 P.2d 777, 780 (Colo. 1981). Therefore, the administrative law judge may also find the federal lodestar standard applicable for judging the reasonableness of the fee request in УУO'BryantФФ. л textлллаа аам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааСрСУУIV. CONCLUSION. аам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааФФ л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССO'Bryant is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs from U S West, which should: (1) include legal fees for his representation at the commission; (2) include legal fees for his representation on judicial review; and (3) include legal fees for the fee litigation, for the reasons stated above. л textлллаа УУTHEREFORE THE COMMISSION ORDERS THAT; ФФ л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааСС1. Complainant Larry D. O'Bryant's motion for attorney's fees and costs is granted. л textлллаа 2. This matter is remanded to the administrative law judge for further findings and conclusions not inconsistent with this Decision. ‘3. The 20Љday time period provided in Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ6Љ114(1) (1991 Cum.Supp. Vol.17) to file an application with the Commission for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of this Decision, begins on the day after the release date (mailing date) of this Decision. л" block quote"ллл е-л" block quote"лллии аааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа-е4. This Order is effective on its date of mailing. а ммм„ ааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССССADOPTED IN OPEN MEETING ON April 1, 1992. а м„м4 аааTHE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO а м4м„ ааа ССССССССССУУСССССССССССС СС ФФ ССССССССССУУСССССССССССС ССФФ а м„мм ааааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССССCommissioners аа ааССССССССССCHAIRMAN ARNOLD H. COOK DISSENTING.й K й в JˆZZИ @@ˆZZxИ @@J вм„„мммй Kx йммй x й й - йммл textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССBased upon the actual record in this case, I cannot find that the complainant represented the general consumer interest, nor do I believe that our authority to award attorneys fees extends to proceedings conducted in the judicial branch of government. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.й - й л textлллаа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССССССССССССI. л textлллаа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССTo begin, the criteria for determining whether to award attorneys fees, and how much, were set forth in Decision No. R91Љ348, dated March 19, 1991. They are: л textлллаа л" block quote"ллллhangedлггллТТС€ССС1.ССThe representation of the party and the expenses incurred must relate to general consumer interests, not to interests of individuals or a limited class of consumers;лhangedлллл block quoteлгглл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа‘СС2.ССThe evidence presented must materially contribute to the decision of the Commission; л textлллаа 3.ССThe service performed must be exceptional; 4.ССThe fees and costs incurred must be reasonable. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССThe threshold issue, of course, is whether the party seeking attorneys' fees represented the general consumer interest, or whether the party only represented an individual or limited class interest. л textлллаа Our administrative law judge ruled that the complainant did not meet the first threshold, i.e., the complainant only represented his own interest, or the interest of a class ггУУnot ФФггentitled to protection. The administrative law judge noted that the gravamen of the complaint was that the existing rules prohibited disconnection of local service for failure to pay for an interexchange carrier's toll service, and thus the complainant felt free to only pay his local bill while delaying for months his payments for AT&T toll service, and did so at a time when AT&T had no ability to block or disconnect the complainant. I have personally reviewed the limited material actually filed by the complainant (see Folio 01Љ80). If my colleagues have not already done so, I can only urge that they review it, since nowhere do I find a factual dispute by the complainant that he owed AT&T the full amount in question. Indeed, he openly admits that the AT&T charges were never in dispute. (See Folio 61.) Rather, he seems to argue some notion of a violation of "...my constitutional rights...," presumably to continue to use AT&T toll service while deliberately refusing to pay for it. However, as noted in the recommended decision, no one has a legal right to demand and use utility service without paying for it. УУDenver Welfare Rights Organization v. P.U.C.ФФ, 190 Colo. 329, 547 P.2d 239 (1976). Indeed, any requirement that utilities must continue to serve nonЉpaying customers would raise questions about confiscation of utility property (i.e., their money), which truly ггУУisФФгг an issue of constitutional magnitude. As an aside, I note that at the time in question (1984Љ1986), AT&T was an intrastate interЉLATA utility pursuant to then Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ15Љ102 (1984 Repl. Vol. 17). To a large extent the complainant tried to justify his nonЉpayment of toll charges upon the notion that AT&T wasn't a utility, thus not entitled to timely compensation for services rendered. (See Folio 80, February 4, 1985 answers to interrogatories.) Obviously, such was not the case as a matter of law. The administrative law judge correctly noted that one who doesn't pay his lawful debts shifts the burden of that debt upon those who do pay their bills under the Uniform System of Accounts, 47 CFR РР 32.5301 of Part 32. This section deals with longЉterm uncollectibles in a utility's accounts receivable, and the administrative law judge was correct in noting that as a matter of fact and law the refusal to pay lawful debts has adverse longЉterm effects upon the paying customers of a utility. ‘ Unfortunately omitted from the discussion, however, was the immediate shortЉterm effect of nonЉpayment. As the recent spate of rate cases by Public Service Company and U S WEST have demonstrated, one of the elements of rate base is ггУУcash working capitalФФгг, i.e., that money the utility supplies from its own funds to meet current obligations. The need for cash working capital arises from the time lag between when the utility must pay for expenses and the time the utility receives payments from its customers. See Decision No. C84Љ598. See also УУBoise Water Corp. V. Idaho P.U.C.ФФ, 97 Idaho 832, 555 P.2d 163 (1976). As with any other utility property used and useful in providing service, cash working capital earns a rate of return. In the case of U S WEST, for instance, the then authorized rate of return on rate base was 11.93%. See Decision No. C82Љ1905. Simply put, any additional delay in paying a lawful utility bill places an immediate strain upon cash working capital, and through it a burden upon other ratepayers. Simple arithmetic will allow no other result, regardless of whether the utility is U S WEST, AT&T, or some other provider. Given that, I cannot help but agree with the administrative law judge that the complainant's conduct in this case placed him in a ггУУper seФФгг adversarial position against the general consumer interest. In effect, the complainant tried to use his long distance provider as a ггУУde factoФФгг shortЉterm lender, with the interest on the "loan" to be paid by all other ratepayers. Regarding the argument that the complainant represented a general consumer interest and made U S WEST and AT&T play by the rules, I merely note that when this case became administratively final in early 1986 the thenЉCommission engaged in emergency rulemaking to change the rule upon which complainant relied, to insure that no one else could do the same thing. Indeed, counsel for complainant argued that the situation will not be changed for some time. In other words, interstate toll service can presently only be disconnected by new rule would deprive complainant of his victory. For the benefit of my colleagues, I would quote at length from our predecessors' decision: л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССThe Commission finds that temporary Rule 13(b), attached to this Decision as Appendix A, should be adopted without notice and without hearing. We make the following specific findings and statement of the reasons and the circumstances which imperatively require the immediate adoption of temporary Rule 13(b) without notice and hearing, and which render compliance with the hearing requirements of РР 24Љ4Љ103, C.R.S. contrary to the public interest: л textлллаа л" block quote"лллл double quoteлггллТТТТС€СС€ССССС(1)ССLocal exchange telephone companies for the past 40 years have disconnected local service for the failure of customers to pay interstate toll charges. Divestiture of local operating companies from AT&T (the previous sole, interstate longЉdistance carrier) has legally separated these entities but, in many instances, the local carrier cannot disconnect interstate toll ‘‘service without disconnecting both local and intrastate toll service, and this situation will not be changed for some time. In other words, interstate toll service can presently only be dis л# double quote#лллеVл# double quote#лллТТТТС€СС€Сии аааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааVеТТТТС€СС€СССССconnected by disconnecting all local and intrastate toll service. аам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааТТТТС€СС€ССССС(2)ССAT&T should not be required by this аам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа Commission to serve nonЉpaying customers. Given the technology at many Colorado central offices, AT&T cannot shut off the long distance service of nonЉpaying customers. аам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа(3)ССMedia attention may have given customers the аа impression that their local service cannot be disconnected for failure to pay either intrastate or interstate toll charges. Thus, the potential for consumer confusion, for consumers to run up high bills under a mistaken belief, and for telephone utility service theft are threats to the public health, safety and welfare. УУThe Commission finds that the entire body of ratepayers may be required to pay nonЉrecoverable toll thefts through higher telephone costs.ФФ (4)ССУУThe desire of a few customers who wish to avoid the payment of proper toll charges must be weighed against the likelihood that the entire body of ratepayers may be obligated to pay any uncollected toll charges.ФФ (5)ССThe Commission notes that the temporary rule only applies to toll charges which are not in dispute. The Commission has procedures to protect the ratepayer and utility during resolution of a disputed bill. The Commission will continue its practice of staying the discontinuance of local service for nonЉpayment of toll charges of another utility, where a customer contests the validity of the toll charges, and in most cases the Commission will require posting of bond in the disputed amount. (6)ССIt is the desire of the Commission to clarify to the respondents in this proceeding, and to the general body of ratepayers, that Decision No. C85Љ1549 did not establish a situation where customers of Mountain Bell and AT&T may with impunity avoid payment of toll charges which are unquestionably due. The Commission also points out that emergency Rule 13(b) will operate prospectively only and will not apply to the Commission's previous determination for Larry D. O'Bryant in Decision No. R85Љ1294. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССThe Commission concludes from these six findings that Case No. 5323 should be reopened to immediately establish emergency temporary telephone Rule 13(b), without hearing and notice, as shown in Appendix A to this Decision and Order. Emergency temporary Rule 13(b) should be adopted upon the effective date of this Decision and shall remain effective for three months from adoption. The Commission simultaneously will propose emergency temporary Rule ‘13(b), adopted by this Decision, as a permanent rule, and will on the date of the issuance of this Decision begin a permanent Rule 13(b) rulemaking proceeding on notice and hearing. л textлллаааа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССEmphasis supplied, Decision No. C86Љ183 (February 13, 1986), at pp.4, 5. л textлллаааа аам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССI would merely note in passing that thenЉChairman Lehr and Commissioners Miller and Schmidt all enjoyed reputations as guardians of the consumer interest. Nevertheless, they unanimously found it necessary to go to emergency rulemaking to prevent complainant's conduct from happening again. The issues of fair collection practices and representation of general consumer interest were resolved by the thenЉCommission ггУУagainstФФгг Mr. O'Bryant by the creation of the emergency (later, permanent) rule. And, that rule is still in effect. See current Rule 9.3, Rules Regulating Telephone Utilities, 4 CCR 723Љ2. Curiously, I see no suggestion to change that rule. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССIf it is to be argued that complainant's conduct was somehow done to effect a change in the rules, thereby benefiting the utilities and thus compelling attorney's fees, I can only note that the record is devoid of any request or suggestion by complainant that the thenЉrules be changed. All of the complainant's filings with this Commission reflect a deep desire to rely on the rules as thenЉwritten, and not only avoid paying for toll charges but also avoid penalties, reconnection charges, etc. It must be remembered that under our statutes, Colorado Revised Statutes РР 40Љ6Љ108(1)(d) (1984 Repl. Vol.17), one does not have to refuse to pay before questioning a disconnection policy. л textлллаааа Similarly, the record is devoid of any evidence that complainant undertook this complaint to benefit the elderly or handicapped. Indeed, given the adverse impact of nonЉpayment upon revenues and rates, I fail to see how anyone can make this argument. Would we be alone in holding that it is against the general consumer interest to avoid paying lawful utility bills? Hardly. Our counterparts in Michigan recently had occasion to discuss this matter in УУRe Investigation of Policy of Permitting Local Exchange Carriers To Discontinue Local Telephone Service for Nonpayment of a Bill To Another CompanyФФ, August 21, 1991, 125 PUR4th 251 (1991), wherein they noted: л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа‘ССIn order to understand the issue before the Commission, some background regarding the current billing and collection arrangements between LECs and IXCs is essential. LECs have been providing billing and collection services to IXCs for a number of years. Normally, an LEC enters into a contract with the IXC that provides for the LEC to purchase the IXC's accounts receivable. Generally, the LEC uses a consolidated billing format that displays one total amount due for all telephone services, including the IXC's services for which the LEC bills and collects. The single filling format allows the customer to make one payment for all telephone services. In the event that nonpayment of any of the telephone charges occurs, the LEC disconnects both local and IXC telephone services. л textлллаааа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССPrior to the divestiture of the regional Bell Operating Companies (BOCs), the termination of local service for nonpayment of long distance charges was not an issue since all telephone services were provided on an integrated basis. However, as a result of divestiture and the growth of competition of LEC services, local and interexchange service are now provided by separate entities. Therefore, the Commission is faced with the question of whether historical practices concerning disconnection are still reasonable in the new telecommunications environment. л textлллаааа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааСС125 PUR4th at 154. The Michigan commission then went on to discuss the practices in ten other jurisdictions (Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin), noting that nine of the ten allowed disconnection for nonpayment of toll charges where the interexchange carrier couldn't block the use of its toll ‘‘service, or that the costs of blocking technology would have to be borne by those who do pay their bills. The Michigan commission concluded its discussion thusly: л textлллаааа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССAfter carefully considering the testimony and all of the comments filed in this matter, the Commission finds that the current policy of permitting the LECs to disconnect local service when a customer fails to pay for a service provided by another company should be continued. The principal reason for continuing the existing policy is the expense that would be incurred to enable local service to be provided while barring the provision of IXC toll service. While current technology to block toll calls selectively may exist to some degree, the comments filed by TAM, ATTCOM, and US Sprint bear out that there would be significant additional expenses associated with implementation of a decision to universally prohibit disconnecting of local service. ...Prohibiting disconnection might keep a small number of customers on the system, УУbut this would be at the expense of the majority of customers who pay their toll billsФФ. л textлллаааа Further, given the paucity of complaints received by the Commission, continuation of the current LEC procedures for disconnection of service does not appear to present a major problem for telephone subscribers. Customers, for the most part, seem to be aware of their LEC's policies on disconnection, and, as a consequence, are paying the IXC's charges without controversy, which keeps the overall cost of telephone service down and promotes the Commission's goal of universal service. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССEmphasis supplied, 125 PUR4th at 255, 256. л textлллаааа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССIn summation, based upon the actual record before us I cannot find where the facts, the law, sound public po л# double quote#лллеАл# double quote#лллааб#XPє\  PŽ6QXP#бии л textлллаааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бАел textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа‘ССlicy, or simple arithmetic support the notion that the complainant was acting for the benefit of the general consumer. Accordingly, on this threshold issue I would deny the request for attorneys' fees. л textлллаааа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССII. л textлллаааа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССThe majority in this case supports the award of attorneys' fees for work undertaken in the court system upon appeal of this matter between April 1986 and December 1989. Since I believe this to be a violation of existing statutes, as well as a violation of separation of powers, I am compelled to dissent. л textлллаааа л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаааам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССI wish to state at the outset that there is no dispute but that this agency has authority to award attorneys' fees in its own proceedings. As noted in the recommended decision: л textлллаааа л# double quote#лллл block quoteлггллТТС€СССUnder Mountain States supra, the Commission has broad constitutional and statutory discretion to determine when attorneys' fees should be awarded УУin its own proceedingsФФ. Colo. Const. Art. XXV, and 40Љ3Љ102, C.R.S. 1973.л" block quote"лллл double quoteлгглл ааааEmphasis supplied, УУColoradoЉUte Electric Assn. v. PUCФФ, Colo., 602 P.2d 861, at 868, (1979).  However, nowhere in our statutes or our state constitution, Article XXV, do I find extraЉterritorial jurisdiction for this agency to supplant or substitute its judgment for the jurists who hear appeals. л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа‘ССAs pertinent here, РР 13Љ17Љ102, C.R.S., enacted in 1977, provides in part: л textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааУ УССAttorney feesФ Ф (1)ССSubject to the provisions of this section, in УУany civil action of any natureФФ commenced or УУappealed in any court of record in this state the court may awardФФ, except as this article otherwise provides, as part of its judgment and in addition to any costs otherwise assessed, reasonable attorney fees. л textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааСС(2)ССSubject to the limitations set forth elsewhere in this article, in УУany civil action of any nature commenced or appealed in any court of recordФФ in this state, УУthe court shall awardФФ,...reasonable attorney fees... л textллл (3)ССУУWhen a court determines that reasonable attorney fees should be assessedФФ,... (4)ССУУThe court shall assess attorney feesФФ if,... л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааСССССССССС* * * л textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааССEmphasis supplied. л textллл л text2ла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа‘ССAs is abundantly clear from the above, civil appellate courts have authority to award attorneys' fees when the courts (not this agency) determine it should be done, subject to the statute. Where there is a statute empowering the court system to act, there is no intent to grant the same authority to this agency. As the supreme court noted in УУHaney v. PUCФФ, 194 Colo. 481, 574 P.2d 863 (1973), regarding this agency's argument that it must have the implicit authority to impose fines to effect its mission: л text2ллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааСС...The fact that the legislature has expressly empowered the courts to impose fines for defined criminal misconduct in this area clearly indicates that there was no intent to grant such authority to the commission. УУCf.ФФ УУColorado Transfer and Storage v. Public Utilities CommissionФФ, 180 Colo. 327, 505 P.2d 370 (1973); УУRumney v. Public Utilities CommissionФФ, 172 Colo. 314, 472 P.2d 149 (1970). л textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммааСС194 Colo. at 484. Whatever authority, if any, we might have had to award attorneys' fees for work in other forums effectively evaporated in 1977 with the enactment of Colorado Revised Statutes РР 13Љ17Љ101, (1987 Repl. Vol. 6A), ггУУet seq. л textллл л textла мм аааааXА` И hРpШ xа (#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџАмааб#XbоB € P“СЖC$XP#бггллаам4Œ ф <”ьDœєLЄќ!џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа‘ФФггССTo attempt to award attorneys' fees for work on appeal in the district court and the supreme court would not only substitute our judgment for that of the various jurists, it would also amount to an administrative rewriting of Section 13Љ17Љ101, C.R.S., ггУУet seqФФгг. That we may not do. УУFleming v. Civil Serv. Comm.ФФ 31 Colo. App. 463, 506 P.2d 158 (1972), reversed on other grounds 183 Colo. 71, 514 P.2d 1135 (1973). See also УУBuckingham and Gottula Trucking v. PUCФФ, 180 Colo. 267, 504 P.2d 677 (1972). л textллл While I have personal sympathy for the notion that the prevailing party in a matter should not have his award erased by appellate expenses, that sympathy does not equate with authority to act where there is a statutory scheme in place specifically empowering the courts. At the risk of belaboring the obvious, since statehood in 1876 the government of this state has been divided into three distinct branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial.  Article III, Colorado Constitution. As part of its authority under Article VI, Colorado Constitution, the judiciary regulates the cases before it, to include the practice of law itself. УУDenver Bar Assn. v. PUCФФ, 154 Colo. 273, 391 P.2d 467 (1964). And since at least 1872, Colorado courts have been awarding costs (if not attorneys' fees) as part of their routine and jurisdiction. УУConsolidated Gregory Co. v. RaberФФ, Colo. Terr., 1 Colo. 511 (1872). I am concerned about the potential scenario where a court might deny a request for attorneys' fees only to have this agency grant them later, causing a conflict between the executive and judicial branches of government. Is this agency to be a ггУУde factoФФгг appellate body from a court's denial (or a grant) of attorneys' fees? May a litigant against a utility in court later seek attorneys' fees here on some theory that by his court litigation he has improved the utility and ‘bettered society? Are we by a lack of deference to the powers of the judicial branch compelling the legislature to act to limit our reach? I hope the answers to all these questions are in the negative, but I am apprehensive. In order to avoid the potential of a constitutional crisis, I would defer to the judiciary in administration of those matters assigned to it, to include consideration of the award of attorneys' fees for work performed in the courts. In conclusion, I cannot find that the complainant represented a general consumer interest under the facts present in this case and the related emergency rulemaking. Assuming, ггУУarguendoФФгг, that complainant did represent such interest, I believe that our ‘ authority over any reimbursement of attorneys' fees is limited to those fees incurred for work before us, and not for work in the judicial branch of government. ааа ммм4 ааа THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO а м4м„ ааааам d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџм d Ј ь0tИќ@„Ш !P#T$џџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџџммаа ССССССССССУУСССССССССССС ССФФ а м„мм аССССССССССCHAIRMAN ARNOLD H. COOK DISSENTING.