

**BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO**

PROCEEDING NO. 21A-0141E

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IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO FOR APPROVAL OF ITS 2021 ELECTRIC RESOURCE PLAN AND CLEAN ENERGY PLAN.

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**PHASE II DECISION: (1) ADDRESSING RESOURCE SELECTION AND THEREBY MODIFYING PUBLIC SERVICE’S CLEAN ENERGY PLAN; (2) ADDRESSING THE ADDITIONAL TRANSMISSION INVESTMENTS IDENTIFIED IN PHASE II; (3) ESTABLISHING PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR UTILITY-OWNED GENERATION; (4) ADDRESSING THE 2024 JUST TRANSITION SOLICITATION; AND (5) ADDRESSING RELATED MATTERS**

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## **I. BY THE COMMISSION**

### **A. Statement**

1. In accordance with § 40-2-125.5(4), C.R.S., the electric resource plan (ERP) filed by Public Service Company of Colorado (Public Service or the Company) on March 31, 2021, includes a Clean Energy Plan (CEP) to reduce the Company's carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) emissions by a target of 80 percent by 2030 as compared to 2005 levels. As set out in Decision No. C22-0459 (the Phase I Decision)<sup>1</sup> and Decision No. C22-0559 (addressing applications for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration)<sup>2</sup> the Commission approved certain elements of the Company's CEP, including the Coal Action Plan that transitions Public Service away from its remaining coal facilities. The Commission also authorized Public Service to use Phase II of this Proceeding to further implement the requirements for approval of a CEP such that the Commission could continue evaluation of, among other things, the additional clean energy plan activities, the actions and investments projected to achieve compliance with the clean energy targets in § 40-2-125.5(3)(a)(I) and (3)(a)(II), and whether the CEP is in the public interest and consistent

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<sup>1</sup>Issued August 3, 2022.

<sup>2</sup> Issued September 21, 2022.

with the clean energy target in § 40-2-125.5(3)(a)(I). The Commission's decisions in Phase I and Phase II of this ERP proceeding thus implement a bold clean energy policy that helps avoid the worst impacts of climate change while allowing Coloradoans to enjoy the benefits of reliable clean energy at an affordable cost.

2. Throughout the course of Phase II, Public Service showcased its preferred resource portfolio of new utility resources to be acquired through 2027 and, in response to party and public comments, its updated preferred portfolio of resources. In accordance with the Commission's Phase I directives, the Company also presented numerous alternate portfolios for consideration. Although the Company's preferred resource portfolio<sup>3</sup> projects sufficient emission reductions to exceed statutory requirements, comments point out that not only might these projected reductions in emissions be overstated, but that the costs to customers would be significant – pointing to, among other major concerns, billions of dollars in modeled transmission investment changes between Phase I and II, and significant utility ownership in gas resources presented in the Company's updated preferred plan.

3. Building on our determinations in Phase I, we find that modifying the Company's CEP by selecting an alternative resource portfolio (the Alternative Portfolio)<sup>4</sup> is necessary considering statutory and public interest concerns.

4. The Alternative Portfolio exceeds Colorado's goals in emission reductions and protects reliability of the electrical system, according to the Company's analysis. At the same time,

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<sup>3</sup> As detailed below, in the 120-Day Report, Public Service presented its Preferred Portfolio, and this Preferred Portfolio is what comments from intervenors address. In its Response Comments, the Company presents an Updated Preferred Portfolio. Apart from a few minor modifications (*e.g.* replacing a wind project with a different wind project) the Updated Preferred Portfolio and the Preferred Portfolio are identical. The benefits of the Alternative Portfolio set forth throughout this Phase II decision apply both to the Preferred Portfolio and the Updated Preferred Portfolio.

<sup>4</sup> As discussed below, the Alternative Portfolio is the Inverse 1324 (\$0CO<sub>2</sub>) Plan that Public Service included in the 120-Day Report. (*See* 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, p. 26).

the Alternative Portfolio—which includes fewer new utility-owned resources than the Company’s preferred resource portfolio and is thus better tailored to the developing capabilities of the Company’s system—will reduce costs to customers, especially considering factors such as the curtailment of generated renewable energy.

5. This case propels Colorado’s transition towards greater reliance on renewable resources, takes massive strides towards emission reductions, and continues on a path towards 100 percent clean energy resources; however, the Company maintains that system reliability currently requires at least some new natural gas-fired generation resources. Like the Company’s updated preferred portfolio, the Alternative Portfolio includes nearly half the amount of gas resources predicted in the Phase I Settlement modeling, which was supported by a majority of parties with diverse interests, including some environmental advocates.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, and unlike the Company’s updated preferred plan, the Alternative Portfolio better allows for technological advancements and flexibility by deferring certain resource acquisitions, reducing the amount of Company-owned gas resources, and significantly increasing the amount of storage on the electrical system. For similar reasons, the Alternative Portfolio creates the opportunity to better optimize transmission upgrades during resource procurement in future proceedings.

6. Particularly given the billions of dollars in discrepancies of modeled transmission costs, granting authority to Public Service to move forward with acquiring the resources in the Alternative Portfolio with the Phase I authorizations also allows us to better support Colorado customers and communities. Through directed modeling and filing considerations, we include further direction to support transitioning communities through the 2024 Just Transition Solicitation. As we remain dedicated to supporting the economic changes facing our state’s

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<sup>5</sup> Phase I Settlement (Attachment D), p. 2.

transitioning communities, optionality and opportunity through ongoing, robust, competitive bidding is essential to continue selecting optimal resources to support Colorado's needs. In recognition that affordability of energy bills remains a significant focus, we also include direction on performance incentive mechanisms that further incentivize Public Service to reduce the costs of the new Company-owned generation and promotes fairness and transparency within the competitive bidding process.

7. On balance, the Phase I and Phase II Decisions together provide a measured approach to reliability and cost considerations, while taking exponential strides towards a clean energy future that supports Colorado citizens. These decisions propel the Company towards an 86 percent reduction in emissions by 2030 as well as the goal of providing its customers with energy from 100 percent clean energy resources by 2050.

8. Thus, through this Decision we find that modification of the proposed CEP to include the Alternative Portfolio is necessary to ensure the CEP is in the public interest. Consistent with the Phase I Decision and determinations in this Phase II order, we direct Public Service to pursue this modified CEP and its Alternative Portfolio of resources with further due diligence and contract negotiations and to file applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCNs) for all Company-owned generation resources arising from the modified CEP. We further direct that all Company-owned generation resources arising from the modified CEP are subject to both the cost to construct performance incentive mechanism (PIM) and the operational PIM set forth below.

9. In addition, we make several directives regarding transmission investments as well as future proceedings, including the 2024 Just Transition Solicitation proceeding and the

application Public Service will file regarding the attribution of costs between the CEP rider (CEPR) and the Renewable Energy Standard Adjustment (RESA).

## **B. Discussion**

### **1. Electric Resource Planning**

10. The Commission's ERP Rules, set forth at 4 *Code of Colorado Regulations* (CCR) 723-3-3600, *et seq.*, serve two primary functions. First, the rules require a regular, periodic examination of an electric utility's energy sales and demand forecasts as compared to an assessment of its existing resources to ensure that sufficient generation will be available to meet customer needs in the future. Second, the Commission's review and approval of an ERP ensures that the utility acquires a cost-effective mix of additional resources consistent with the state's public policy objectives.

11. As established in the ERP Rules, for decades Colorado electric utilities have used competitive bidding to procure additional resources to meet identified future resource needs. An ERP thus describes in detail how the utility will evaluate the bids and proposals submitted in response to Requests for Proposals (RFPs), including the inputs and assumptions to its bid evaluation models (*e.g.*, natural gas prices, the social costs of emissions, discount rates, etc.), and how it will apply resource selection criteria.

12. The ERP process includes two phases. In Phase I, the Commission reviews and may approve, or approve with modifications, the utility's plan to acquire new utility resources.<sup>6</sup> In Phase II, the Commission issues a final decision regarding the utility's preferred cost-effective plan for pursuing the acquisition of particular resources.

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<sup>6</sup> Rule 4 CCR 723-3-3617(c) describes the contents of the Commission's Phase I decision in more detail.

13. Phase II begins after the Commission issues its Phase I decision. Public Service issues its RFPs, receives competitive bids and utility-owned proposals, and files a report no later than 120 days after the bids are received in accordance with Rule 4 CCR 723-3-3613(d) (120-Day Report). The 120-Day Report presents an evaluation of all proposed resources, based on the criteria established in the Phase I decision (*e.g.*, the base modeling inputs and assumptions to be used in developing optimized resource portfolios and the sensitivities that “re-price” optimized portfolios using alternative values for selected inputs and assumptions).

14. At the end of Phase II, the Commission issues a final decision that approves, conditions, modifies, or rejects the utility’s preferred cost-effective resource plan. Rule 3613(h) describes the contents of a Phase II decision as follows:

Within 90 days after the receipt of the utility’s 120-day report under paragraph 3613(d), the Commission shall issue a written decision approving, conditioning, modifying, or rejecting the utility’s preferred cost-effective resource plan, which decision shall establish the final cost-effective resource plan. The utility shall pursue the final cost-effective resource plan either with a due diligence review and contract negotiations, or with applications for CPCNs (other than those CPCNs provided in paragraph 3611(e)), as necessary. In rendering the decision on the final cost-effective resource plan, the Commission shall weigh the public interest benefits of competitively bid resources provided by other utilities and non-utilities as well as the public interest benefits of resources owned by the utility as rate base investments. In accordance with §§ 40-2-123, 40-2-124, 40-2-129, and 40-3.2-104, C.R.S., the Commission shall also consider renewable energy resources; resources that produce minimal emissions or minimal environmental impact; energy-efficient technologies; and resources that affect employment and the long-term economic viability of Colorado communities. The Commission shall further consider resources that provide beneficial contributions to Colorado’s energy security, economic prosperity, environmental protection, and insulation from fuel price increases.

15. Upon the conclusion of Phase II, and consistent with Rule 3613(h), upon the issuance of this Phase II Decision, Public Service will continue its due diligence and contract negotiations, as appropriate, and file applications for CPCNs in accordance with § 40-5-101, C.R.S., for each of the Company-owned projects arising from approval of the modified CEP.

These projects will be entitled to a presumption of prudence per Rule 3617(d), supported primarily through the determinations of need in Phase I and Phase II, the use of competitive bidding, and the implementation of bid evaluation and selection pursuant to our Phase I decision. Given the magnitude of this ERP Proceeding and the complexity associated with the CEP considerations set forth below, the Commission waives the 90-day deadline to issue a Phase II decision as contemplated by Rule 3613(h).

## **2. Clean Energy Plans Pursuant to SB 19-236**

16. While longstanding statutes, the Commission's rules, and competitive bidding processes are foundational to the Colorado's utility resource planning process, recent legislative changes, including Senate Bill (SB) 19-236 further overlay CEP considerations on Public Service's current ERP.

17. SB 19-236 enacts § 40-2-125.5(1) that declares the statewide importance of promoting cost-effective clean energy and new technologies and reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from the Colorado electric generating system and includes that "[a] bold clean energy policy will support this progress and allow Coloradans to enjoy the benefits of reliable clean energy at an affordable cost." Specifically, § 40-2-125.5(3) requires that, in addition to the other requirements of the section, Public Service shall meet the following clean energy targets:

- (I) By 2030, the qualifying retail utility shall reduce the carbon dioxide emissions associated with electricity sales to the qualifying retail utility's electricity customers by eighty percent from 2005 levels; and
- (II) For the years 2050 and thereafter, or sooner if practicable, the qualifying retail utility shall seek to achieve the goal of providing its customers with energy generation from one-hundred-percent clean energy resources so long as doing so is technically and economically feasible, in the public interest and consistent with the requirements of this section.

18. The statute further requires that the first ERP following January 1, 2020, must include a CEP that “will achieve the clean energy target set forth in subsection (3)(a)(I)” and will “make progress toward the [100 percent] clean energy goal set forth in subsection (3)(a)(II).”<sup>7</sup> Subsection 4 further specifies what a CEP must include (*e.g.*, a plan of actions and investments projected to achieve compliance with the clean energy targets set forth in subsection (3)(a)(I) and (3)(a)(II), the projected costs of the CEP’s implementation, and workforce transition and community assistance plans).

19. Subsection 4(d) includes that the Commission “shall approve the [CEP] if the commission finds it to be in the public interest and consistent with the [80 percent target], and the commission may modify the plan if the modification is necessary to ensure the plan is in the public interest.” In evaluating whether a CEP submitted is in the public interest, the Commission is directed to consider the following factors, “among other relevant factors as defined by the commission”:

- (I) Reduction in carbon dioxide and other emissions that will be achieved through the clean energy plan and the environmental and health benefits of those reductions;
- (II) The feasibility of the [CEP’s] impact on the reliability and resilience of the electric system. The commission shall not approve a plan that does not protect system reliability.
- (III) Whether the [CEP] will result in a reasonable cost to customers, as evaluated on a net present value basis.<sup>8</sup>

20. If the Commission approves a CEP that achieves an emission reduction of at least 75 percent from 2005 levels, then the relevant utility is provided with a “safe harbor” from any

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<sup>7</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(a).

<sup>8</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(d)(III).

additional emission reduction regulations that the Air Quality Control Commission (AQCC) might develop for the power sector through 2030.<sup>9</sup>

21. As a general matter, the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) is tasked with calculating whether a proposed CEP will meet these clean energy targets. In particular, the division of administration in the CDPHE must describe the methods of measuring CO2 emissions and verify the projected CO2 emission reductions of the CEP.<sup>10</sup> The statute goes on to state that the division of administration, in consultation with the AQCC, must determine whether the CEP will meet the 2030 clean energy targets, and will report to the Commission the division's calculation of CO2 emission reductions attributable to any approved CEP.<sup>11</sup>

22. SB 19-236 also sets forth accounting requirements to track the costs of the CEP. For instance, § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(III) states the utility must “clearly distinguish” between the set of resources necessary to meet customer demands in the resource acquisition period (RAP) and the additional CEP activities—such as the retirement of existing generating facilities—that may be undertaken to meet the clean energy target of 80 percent emission reduction by 2030. Moreover, the CEP must set forth the projected cost of its implementation and anticipated reductions in carbon dioxide and other emissions.<sup>12</sup> Likewise, the CEP must list the “actions and investments” necessary to meet the clean energy target and describe the effect of such actions and investments on the safety, reliability, renewable energy integration, and resiliency of the electric system.<sup>13</sup>

23. The statute goes on to direct the utility to collect revenues for the additional CEP activities through a CEPR assessed on a percentage basis on all retail customer bills.<sup>14</sup> This CEPR

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<sup>9</sup> § 25-7-105(1)(e)(VIII)(C), C.R.S.

<sup>10</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(b).

<sup>11</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(c)(I).

<sup>12</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(VI)

<sup>13</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(IV)—(V).

<sup>14</sup> § 40-2-125.5(5)(a)(II)

is limited to a maximum electric retail rate impact of 1.5 percent of the total annual electric bill for each customer for implementation of the approved additional clean energy plan activities and “may be established as early as the year following approval of a clean energy plan by the commission.”<sup>15</sup>

24. SB 19-236 requires that the ERP containing the CEP use a RAP extending through 2030. If the CEP calls for the accelerated retirement of any generating facilities, the CEP must include a workforce transition plan for impacted utility workers. Similarly, the CEP must include a plan to pay community assistance to any local government or school district whose voters previously approved projects, the costs of which are expected to be paid for from property taxes that the accelerated retirement directly impacts.<sup>16</sup>

25. While the statute requires the utility to use a competitive bidding process to procure any energy resources to fill the cumulative resource need derived from the ERP and CEP, the Commission shall also allow the utility to own a target of 50 percent of the energy and capacity developed or acquired to meet the resource need “if the commission finds the cost of utility or affiliate ownership of the generation assets comes at a reasonable cost and rate impact.”<sup>17</sup>

26. As discussed in our Phase I Decision, several of the statutory findings required for an approved CEP could not be made in the Phase I Decision but must wait until Phase II. For instance, the actions and investments required to fill the additional resource need for the CEP, the projected cost to implement the CEP, and the cost and rate impact of the 50 percent utility ownership target could not be known until after the 120-Day Report. The Phase I Decision permitted Public Service to issue the RFP and proceed to Phase II and established the framework in which bids will be evaluated and selected, setting important Phase II assumptions regarding the

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<sup>15</sup> § 40-2-125.5(5)(a)(I).

<sup>16</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(VII).

<sup>17</sup> § 40-2-125.5(5)(b).

treatment of the Company's remaining coal-fired power plants, and ensuring that the 120-Day Report contains the information required to make the statutory findings necessary to reach an approved CEP.

27. The Commission did not anticipate, and no party requested, a fully litigated hearing in Phase II.<sup>18</sup> Rather, through its usual Phase II process, the Commission can address the necessary statutory findings in this Phase II Decision (*e.g.*, upon consideration of the 120-Day Report, the parties' comments to the 120-Day Report, and the IE Report). As the parties assert in their Joint Brief Addressing Phase II Topics, (filed on August 2, 2021) SB 19-236 might change the objectives of the ERP process, but it does not direct any changes to the process itself.<sup>19</sup>

### 3. Procedural Background

28. A complete procedural history through Phase I of this Proceeding is provided in the Phase I Decision.

29. The parties in this Proceeding consist of the following: Public Service; Staff of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (Staff); the Office of Utility Consumer Advocate (UCA); the Colorado Energy Office (CEO); the City of Boulder (Boulder); the Colorado Energy Consumers (CEC); Climax Molybdenum Company (Climax); Colorado Independent Energy Association (CIEA); Interwest Energy Alliance (Interwest); Colorado Solar and Storage Association and Solar Energy Industries Association (jointly COSSA/SEIA); the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 111 (Local 111); Rocky Mountain Environmental Labor Coalition and Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-CIO (jointly,

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<sup>18</sup> This is consistent with the position of the parties. (Joint Brief Addressing Phase II Topics, p. 8 (arguing that the statutory findings required to approve a CEP do not necessitate a Phase II hearing)).

<sup>19</sup> Joint Brief Addressing Phase II Topics, p. 13.

RMELC and CBCTC);<sup>20</sup> Holy Cross Electric Association, Inc. (Holy Cross); CORE Electric Cooperative (CORE); Western Resource Advocates (WRA); Vote Solar; Walmart Inc. (Walmart); Colorado Renewable Energy Society (CRES); Natural Resources Defense Council and Sierra Club (collectively, the Conservation Coalition); the City and County of Denver (Denver); the Board of County Commissioners of Pueblo County (Pueblo County); the City of Pueblo and Board of Water Works of Pueblo (jointly Pueblo City and Water); Onward Energy Management (Onward); and the Colorado Oil and Gas Association (COGA). The Commission also granted Black Hills Colorado Electric, LLC (Black Hills) leave to participate as an *amicus curiae* in this Proceeding.<sup>21</sup>

30. In addition, in Decision No. C21-0343-I,<sup>22</sup> the Commission granted the Unopposed Motion for Limited Participation that CDPHE filed on April 29, 2021. As such, CDPHE is participating in this Proceeding as a neutral verifier.

31. In response to Decision No. C21-0404-I,<sup>23</sup> in which the Commission solicited briefs from the parties regarding Phase II procedures, on August 2, 2021, Public Service, Staff, UCA, CEO, CIEA, COSSA/SEIA, RMELC and CBCTC, Local 111, Conservation Coalition, Interwest, Onward, Pueblo County, Pueblo City and Water, Walmart, and WRA jointly filed a brief arguing that no Phase II hearing is required. Vote Solar was the only party to file a separate Phase II brief, in which it states that it “does not believe Senate Bill 19-236 requires a Phase II hearing” but argues that “additional evidentiary hearing process may nonetheless be necessary in Phase II if Public Service Company of Colorado proposes any portfolios in its 120-Day Report that include gas plants located in, or near, any disproportionately impacted communities.”<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Local 111, RMELC, and CBCTC collectively refer to themselves as the Labor Interests.

<sup>21</sup> The Commission denied the Motions to Intervene filed by Ms. Leslie Glustrom and the Coalition of Ratepayers. (Decision No. C21-0315-I, pp. 16-22.)

<sup>22</sup> Issued June 9, 2021.

<sup>23</sup> Issued June 23, 2021.

<sup>24</sup> Vote Solar’s Phase II Brief, p. 1.

32. On September 30, 2021, the Office of Just Transition (OJT) filed a motion to intervene out of time, or in the alternative, to participate as *amicus curiae*. On October 25, 2021, the Commission granted OJT's motion to intervene out of time, allowing OJT to participate as a party in this Proceeding.<sup>25</sup>

33. On August 3, 2022, the Commission issued the Phase I Decision addressing Public Service's ERP and CEP and approving, in part, the Updated Non-unanimous Partial Settlement Agreement (Phase I Settlement) filed on April 26, 2022.<sup>26</sup> Among other things, the Phase I Decision directed Public Service to issue RFPs for an all-source, competitive bidding process to meet its resource need.

34. On September 21, 2022, the Commission issued Decision No. C22-0559 addressing applications for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration of the Phase I Decision.

35. On December 1, 2022, Public Service issued its 2022 All-Source RFPs.

36. On March 31, 2023, Public Service filed its "30-Day Report" describing bids received in response to its competitive bid solicitation.

37. On March 31, 2023, Public Service filed an unopposed motion to, among other things, extend by 50 days the time to file the 120-Day Report. By Decision No. C23-0246-I,<sup>27</sup> the Commission granted the Company's motion and extended the deadline for the 120-Day Report as well as all associated deadlines.

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<sup>25</sup> Decision No. C21-0666-I, issued October 20, 2021.

<sup>26</sup> The Phase I Settlement was supported by the following parties: Public Service, Staff, UCA, CEO, RMELC and CBCTC, COSSA/SEIA, Pueblo County, Holy Cross, Pueblo City and Water, Walmart, Boulder, Denver, COGA, Local 111, the OJT, CIEA, Onward, Interwest, Conservation Coalition, and WRA.

<sup>27</sup> Issued on April 13, 2023.

38. On July 27, 2023, Public Service filed the Motion for Second Extension requesting an additional 24-day extension of time within which to file the 120-Day Report. By Decision No. C23-0522-I,<sup>28</sup> the Commission granted the Motion for Second Extension.

39. On September 5, 2023, Public Service together with the Independent Evaluator (IE) and Staff filed a Motion that requested a third extension of time for the Phase II deadlines. On September 5, 2023, various parties representing the interests of independent power producers (IPPs) filed a Response to the Joint Motion for Third Extension (Joint IPP Interests Response). The Joint IPP Interests Response was specifically filed by COSSA/SEIA, CIEA, and Interwest. These parties argued that the IPP projects will be prejudiced by the additional requested delay, which could postpone final decisions in this matter through March of 2023 to consider requests for rehearing, reargument, and reconsideration. By Decision No. C23-0594-I<sup>29</sup> and Decision No. C23-0647-I,<sup>30</sup> the Commission granted, in part, and denied, in part, the requested Phase II extensions. While the Commission recognized the significant complexity of this Phase II process relative to past ERPs, it agreed with other parties regarding the urgency of issuing a Phase II decision.

40. Ultimately, the Company filed the 120-Day Report on September 18, 2023, approximately 80 days after the Company was initially scheduled to file the 120-Day Report.<sup>31</sup> Public Service would subsequently file corrections to the 120-Day Report on October 18, 2023.

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<sup>28</sup> Issued on August 8, 2023.

<sup>29</sup> Issued September 7, 2023.

<sup>30</sup> Issued September 27, 2023.

<sup>31</sup> The original deadline for the 120-Day Report was June 29, 2023. (Decision No. C23-0246-I, ¶ 4).

41. On October 5, 2023, the Commission issued Decision No. C23-0672-I, that required the Company, and invited other parties, to submit comments outlining a potential risk sharing mechanism for Company-owned generation.

42. On October 18, 2023, the Air Pollution Control Division of the CDPHE filed the Phase II Clean Energy Plan Verification Report.

43. On October 20, 2023, in response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, Public Service submitted a proposal for risk-sharing mechanisms regarding Company-owned generation resources. Staff similarly filed a proposal on October 20, 2023, which UCA and CEC joined.

44. On October 21, 2023, the IE filed its report (the IE Report).

45. On November 8, 2023, intervenor comments on the 120-Day Report were filed.

46. On November 20, 2023, Public Service filed its Response Comments to the 120-Day Report.

47. On December 6 and 13, 2023, the Commission commenced deliberations. On December 13, 2023, the Commission also issued Decision No. C23-0841-I, directing Public Service to set forth certain information related to the cost-to-construct performance incentive mechanism (PIM) and the operational PIM. In addition, we instructed the Company to consider and potentially refile the Highly Confidential Exhibit 1 to the Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I.

48. On December 19, 2023, Public Service filed its Response to Decision No. C23-0841-I, providing the specific information requested, and a corresponding narrative on the identified highly confidential document.

49. The Commission resumed deliberations on December 20, 2023, and concluded deliberations that same day.

50. In addition to the public comment hearings and written comments provided in Phase I, throughout Phase II of this Proceeding, the Commission received numerous written public comments that the Commission reviewed and retains in the administrative record.

**C. Phase I Decision and Public Service CEP**

51. In the Phase I Decision, the Commission set the framework in which Public Service may proceed to issue RFPs for an all-source, competitive bidding process to meet its resource need and advance its CEP toward final consideration and approval. The Commission's rulings on topics such as the Company's coal action plan, workforce transition and community assistance, best value employment metrics (BVEMs), and the CEPR paved the way for the development of a CEP in Phase II that complies with the requirements of SB 19-236 and advances the establishment of a bold clean energy policy for Colorado.

52. The following list summarizes the primary rulings the Commission made in its Phase I Decision that relate to the Company's CEP and the requirements of SB 19-236:

- a) Consistent with the Phase I Settlement, the resource acquisition period (RAP) for the Company's ERP/CEP extends through 2030 per § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(I).
- b) Subject to certain exceptions, starting in 2024, the Company must retire all RECs in the year generated, per § 40-2-125.5(3)(a)(III).
- c) In the 120-Day Report, the Company will clearly distinguish between the set of resources necessary to meet customer demands in the resource acquisition period and the additional clean energy plan activities that may be undertaken to meet the clean energy target in § 40-2-125.5(3)(a)(I), per § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(III).
- d) In the 120-Day Report, the Company will set forth the actions and investments required to meet the clean energy target of § 40-2-125.5(3)(a)(I).
- e) The Company will set forth a proposal for the CEPR as part of the 120-Day Report that enables us to consider the appropriate timing for Public Service to initiate the CEPR via an advice letter filing.
- f) The suite of portfolios the Company will present in the 120-Day Report will allow the Commission to evaluate whether the proposed level of utility ownership comes at a reasonable cost and rate impact per § 40-2-125.5(5)(b).

- g) Consistent with the Phase I Settlement, the 120-Day Report will include the information necessary for the Commission to consider BVEM in conjunction with our other Phase II decisions.
- h) The Company will include the projected costs of both workforce transition plans and community assistance plans in the Phase II modeling. The estimated cost of the community assistance aspect will be equal to projected lost property tax revenues for six years following retirement (or conversion) for Hayden 1 and Hayden 2, and Pawnee (the Brush Coal plant), respectively, and ten years for Pueblo Unit 3, and will be offset by any new investment in the respective community.<sup>32</sup>
- i) Public Service will file post-Phase II updated Just Transition Plans (JTPs) for the Hayden coal plants, the Brush Coal Plant, and Pueblo Unit 3.<sup>33</sup> Regarding the Pueblo Unit 3 in particular, no later than June 1, 2024, Public Service will file a JTP that includes a standalone competitive solicitation. To the extent not otherwise addressed in the Phase I Settlement, this 2024 Just Transition Solicitation (the 2024 JTS) shall be treated as an interim ERP under Rule 3603(a). While the focus of the 2024 JTS is the replacement of Unit 3 and the Pueblo community, the 2024 JTS is not geographically limited to the Pueblo area nor is the resource need limited to replacing Unit 3.<sup>34</sup>
- j) The Phase II modeling will allow the Commission to evaluate both the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the social cost of methane (SCM), consistent with the spirit of § 40-3.2-106.

53. In addition, the Phase I Decision ruled on such things as the provisions in the Company's model PPA, the inputs and assumptions to be used in the Phase II modeling, and the portfolios and sensitivities that the Company will present in the 120-Day Report.

#### **D. Phase II Filings**

##### **1. 120-Day Report**

54. The 120-Day Report summarizes the results of the Public Service's Phase II modeling and puts forth the Company's Preferred Portfolio for Commission approval. Under the Preferred Portfolio, the Company would move forward with developing numerous generation resources and associated transmission infrastructure. While the relevant details of the 120-Day

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<sup>32</sup> Phase I Settlement, pp. 18-19.

<sup>33</sup> Phase I Settlement, p. 19.

<sup>34</sup> Phase I Decision, pp. 40, 42; Phase I Settlement, pp. 27-31.

Report and the subsequent Updated Preferred Plan (UPP) will be discussed below, we highlight here some of the major components.

55. Public Service's Preferred Portfolio contains about half as much gas-fired generation resources as what the Phase I modeling predicted (628 MW versus 1,176 MW).<sup>35</sup> Conversely, the Preferred Portfolio adds almost twice as much renewable generation and six times as much storage as was anticipated in Phase I.<sup>36</sup> As to the storage specifically, Public Service states that the Preferred Portfolio takes advantage of the IRA tax benefits for storage, and uses storage to "effectively utilize otherwise curtailed renewable energy, provide critical ancillary services, and meet peak demand in the evenings when solar generation declines."<sup>37</sup>

56. Regarding emissions reductions, Public Service estimates that the Preferred Portfolio will achieve 87.4 percent reduction in CO2 emissions by 2030—far exceeding the 80 percent clean air target.<sup>38</sup> Public Service acknowledges, however, that "in addition to all of the normal variance in forecasting, the modeling process itself leads to structural optimism in emissions reduction potential" and that "real time operations will likely have less optimistic results than those predicted by the models."<sup>39</sup> The Company states that it "believes we would likely achieve an 80%-85% reduction."<sup>40</sup>

57. The emissions reductions are due largely to the Coal Action Plan and the renewable resources the Preferred Portfolio adds as replacement and new utility resources. Indeed, Public Service states that the Preferred Portfolio is "the largest portfolio ever advanced through the ERP

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<sup>35</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 36.

<sup>36</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 36.

<sup>37</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 36.

<sup>38</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 38.

<sup>39</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 23.

<sup>40</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 24.

process.”<sup>41</sup> Public Service estimates that through 2055 the Preferred Portfolio has a net present value (NPV) of approximately \$44.2 billion. Included in this total price is an estimated \$2.82 billion in transmission investments. By far the most significant portion of the total transmission investment is an estimated \$2.2 billion needed for Denver Metro Transmission Network Upgrades.<sup>42</sup>

58. The Preferred Portfolio includes higher levels of Company-owned resources compared to past ERPs. Out of the 7,192 MW of nameplate capacity additions that would be acquired under the Preferred Portfolio, Public Service would own 66.6 percent of the capacity and 69.7 percent of the energy. The Company argues that the higher ownership percentage is a direct result of the more equitable tax credit policy for clean energy resulting from the historic IRA.<sup>43</sup>

## **2. CDPHE Verification**

59. On October 18, 2023, CDPHE filed the Phase II CEP Verification Report. In its Verification Report, CDPHE opines that the GHG emissions reduction calculations for each portfolio submitted in this Phase II of Proceeding No. 21A-0141E are expected to be 80 percent or more below 2005 baseline levels. CDPHE further states that the portfolios “would be expected to achieve the minimum percent reduction levels required by the statutes for the CEP and Safe Harbor.”<sup>44</sup>

60. In its Phase II CEP Verification Report, CDPHE lists the expected 2030 emissions reductions for each of the submitted portfolios. Of note, the expected emissions reductions for the Preferred Portfolio is 87 percent.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 22.

<sup>42</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 130.

<sup>43</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 40-41.

<sup>44</sup> CDPHE Phase II CEP Verification Report, p. 6.

<sup>45</sup> CDPHE Phase II CEP Verification, pp. 4-6.

### 3. IE Report

61. On October 21, 2023, the IE filed its Report in this Proceeding. In its Report, the IE attests that the Phase II process was conducted fairly and without bias. The IE states: “The IE can attest to the results of the evaluation and fidelity to the protocols and that the Phase I assumptions were used in evaluation. The IE also was unable to identify any bias towards or against any technology or respondent, including the options presented for the [Public Service] self-owned assets.”<sup>46</sup>

62. That said, the IE also raised several recommendations for future ERP proceedings that the IE asserts will allow the process to better accommodate the large number of bids and increasing reliance on renewable resources. For example, the IE states that “inadequate time was allotted for the transmission analysis” and suggests changes going forward that allow for a better understanding of the transmission requirements associated with the proposed generation projects.<sup>47</sup>

### 4. Intervenor Comments

63. Numerous intervenors submitted comments on the 120-Day Report, including Staff, CEO, the UCA, CEC, CIEA, COSSA/SEIA, Interwest, WRA, the Conservation Coalition, Boulder, CRES, the OJT, and the Labor Interests.

64. Several parties, such as CEO, WRA, CRES, and Conservation Coalition, cite concerns with the Phase II modeling process and recommend selecting an alternative portfolio with fewer gas resources or simply removing some or all of the gas resources from the Preferred Portfolio.<sup>48</sup> Conversely, UCA argues that the Phase II modeling shows that eliminating gas-fired

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<sup>46</sup> IE Report, p. 35.

<sup>47</sup> See IE Report, p. 37.

<sup>48</sup> CEO’s Comments, pp. 13-14; WRA’s Comments, pp. 15-17; CRES’s Comments, p. 2; Conservation Coalition’s Comments, pp. 12-13.

capacity is extremely expensive.<sup>49</sup> CEC similarly argues that the Commission should approve a less-costly portfolio that meets but does not greatly exceed the required emissions reductions.<sup>50</sup>

65. Some parties, including Boulder and UCA, suggest that the existing resources in the Preferred Portfolio could be replaced with other resources that they perceive to be lower-priced.<sup>51</sup>

66. Other parties representing IPP interests, like CIEA, argue that the Commission should choose an alternative portfolio that better balances how many resources will be owned by Public Service versus IPPs.<sup>52</sup> Conversely, the Labor Interests argue that there is a positive relationship between portfolios with high BVEM and portfolios with high Company-ownership numbers.<sup>53</sup>

67. At a high level, the parties have mixed opinions regarding the transmission investments presented in the 120-Day Report—some raise serious concerns while others argue the Commission should approve and expedite the transmission. Likewise, several parties raise cost and emissions concerns about the Hayden Biomass project, while other parties argue that the project should be included in any approved portfolio.

68. Out of the intervenors that filed comments, it appears that the Labor Interests, COSSA/SEIA, the OJT, and Pueblo County, do not oppose adoption of the Preferred Portfolio as presented.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> UCA's Comments, p. 17.

<sup>50</sup> CEC's Comments, pp. 12-13.

<sup>51</sup> See UCA's Comments, pp. 20-24; Boulder's Comments, pp. 14-15.

<sup>52</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 12-15.

<sup>53</sup> Labor Interests' Comments, pp. 2.

<sup>54</sup> See, e.g., Labor Interests' Comments, pp. 2; COSSA/SEIA's Comments, pp. 1-2.

69. For its part, Staff raises concerns that Public Service's Preferred Portfolio is too aggressive, too costly, and not well supported. Staff states that the Preferred Portfolio contains unexpectedly large generation and transmission investments and high levels of expected curtailments that together could lead to potentially large rate impacts for customers.<sup>55</sup> Staff encourages the Commission to consider selecting one of five smaller portfolios that would reduce expected curtailments, enable the Commission to defer some of the proposed projects, and to further analyze alternatives for the proposed transmission investments.

## **5. Comments from the Northern Cheyenne Nation**

70. At the CWM on October 25, 2023, William Walksalong presented comments on behalf of the Northern Cheyenne Nation regarding the potential impacts to the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site. As described more below, tribal leaders urged the Commission to protect the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site as sacred grounds and its view shed from the encroachment of energy development.

## **6. Public Comments**

71. After Public Service filed the 120-Day Report, the Commission received numerous public comments. Many of these public comments argue against the Preferred Portfolio's inclusion of three new-build gas facilities that Public Service would own. At a high level, these comments urge the Commission to reject the new natural gas plants, citing concerns regarding stranded costs, climate change, and air pollution. The Commission also received more substantive public comments from Leslie Glustrom, Advanced Energy United, Sustainable Resilient Longmont, and 350 Colorado that similarly argue for modifications to the Preferred Portfolio, including not approving the proposed gas facilities in the Preferred Portfolio.

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<sup>55</sup> Staff's Comments, pp. 5-7.

72. In addition, the Commission received several comments from organizations and local governments like Upstate Colorado, Alamosa County, the City of Alamosa, Kiowa County, Prowers County, Baca County, and Pueblo County that support the Preferred Portfolio on the basis of emissions reductions and economic development. Of these supportive comments, several public comments specifically support the inclusion of the Hayden Biomass facility in the Preferred Portfolio, arguing that it will provide important economic benefits to Moffat and Routt Counties, which will be impacted by the closure of coal-fired power plants. Northwest Colorado Development Council, Routt County, Colorado State Senator Dylan Roberts, and the Town Council and Mayor of Hayden are some of the entities that submitted these types of comments specifically addressing the Hayden Biomass facility.

73. Since the Commission had its initial Phase II deliberations on December 6, 2023, we have continued to receive and review numerous public comments. At a high level, the majority of these most recent public comments urge the Commission to select a resource portfolio with fewer or no gas resources on the basis of climate change, air pollution, price volatility for natural gas, or concerns that the resources will become stranded. Several of the public commenters argue that the Alternative Portfolio is more expensive on a dollar per MW basis than the Company's UPP.

## **7. Public Service's Response Comments and the UPP**

74. In its Response Comments, Public Service responds to criticisms and concerns raised by intervenors and public commentators and presents an UPP that modifies a few of the proposed generation projects. Aside from the modifications to a few of the generation projects, however, the Company largely maintains its initial position in the 120-Day Report.

75. For example, in response to arguments that the Commission should reduce or eliminate the amount of gas resources included in the portfolio, Public Service asserts that—due to reliability concerns—the Company “cannot become comfortable with any level of reduction in dispatchable resources.”<sup>56</sup> Public Service argues that adjusting the portfolio by eliminating gas units or using questionable short-term power purchase agreement (PPA) extensions makes the portfolio less reliable and the Company “cannot compromise on reliability.”<sup>57</sup>

76. As for arguments that the UPP has too many utility-owned resources or is too large, the Company argues that all of the selected clean energy projects are either build-own-transfer, PPA, or were purchased from IPPs by the Company earlier in the commercial lifecycle. Public Service agrees that the UPP is large but asserts that the size of the portfolio is ultimately driven by economics and state energy policy goals.<sup>58</sup>

77. Turning to the concerns raised about the approximately \$2.8 billion in transmission investments, Public Service states that the ultimate decision before the Commission is approval of a generation portfolio and that “approval of a resource portfolio does not constitute a final approval of the transmission projects presented in the 120-Day Report.”<sup>59</sup> Public Service maintains, however, that to achieve the State’s emissions reduction goals, the Company must begin moving forward with the transmission investments needed to support the CEP.<sup>60</sup>

78. As for the proposed resource modifications under the UPP, in response to concerns that Bid 1029 could impact the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site due to its proximity, in the UPP, Public Service recommends that the Commission approve a specific backup bid for

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<sup>56</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 29.

<sup>57</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, pp. 27-29.

<sup>58</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, pp. 33-34.

<sup>59</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 66.

<sup>60</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 65.

Bid 1029 while still allowing Bid 1029 to move forward. Similarly, the Company proposes that the Commission conditionally approve the Hayden Biomass project but further analyze the costs, emissions reductions, workforce and community benefits, tax benefits, and viable alternatives in a follow-on CPCN proceeding.<sup>61</sup>

79. The Company proposes a few other changes to the resources in the UPP, but the suggested changes result from problems with the original resources as opposed to intervenor concerns.<sup>62</sup>

80. As compared to the Preferred Portfolio, the UPP adds 329 MW of nameplate capacity. This increase is comprised of an additional 101 MW of solar resources and an additional 228 MW of additional wind resources. The UPP is also \$288 million more expensive on a present value revenue require (PVRR) basis.<sup>63</sup> Regarding the price increase, Public Service asserts that the \$288 million increase is caused by unavoidable changes to bids that appear in virtually all portfolios. Thus, the Company asserts that all of the other portfolios would increase by the same amount, meaning there is little to no impact on the differences between plans.<sup>64</sup> The percentage of resources that the Company would own decreases slightly in the UPP from 66.6 percent of capacity to 62.7 percent.<sup>65</sup>

#### **E. Modification of the CEP's Resource Portfolio**

81. As described above, the statute prescribes when the Commission must approve a CEP and when the Commission may modify the CEP. Specifically, the Commission may modify the plan if the modification is necessary to ensure the plan is in the public interest. In evaluating

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<sup>61</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 19-20.

<sup>62</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 18-24.

<sup>63</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 9.

<sup>64</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 9.

<sup>65</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 9.

whether a CEP submitted to the Commission is in the public interest, the Commission shall consider (1) emissions reductions, (2) the CEP's impact on reliability and resilience of the electric system,<sup>66</sup> and (3) the cost of the CEP on a NPV basis. The statute also permits the Commission to consider "other relevant factors."

82. A CEP includes "clean energy plan activities that may be undertaken to meet the clean energy target... which may create an additional resource need for the [CEP]."<sup>67</sup> Public Service's CEP is thus comprised of several components, including the Coal Action Plan, the workforce transition and community assistance plans,<sup>68</sup> and the "investments required to fill the additional resource need,"<sup>69</sup> (*i.e.*, the portfolio of resources procured through the competitive solicitation). In this Proceeding, significant clean energy plan activities involve the conversion of the Brush plant from coal to gas and the lower capacity values of Pueblo Unit 3.<sup>70</sup> The UPP represents a portion of Public Service's CEP as proposed by the Company.

83. Given that the Company's preferred resource portfolio comprises a portion of the total CEP, the selection of an alternative resource portfolio does not replace the overall CEP. Because the Commission maintains the other important elements of the CEP—like the Coal Action Plan—the selection of an alternative portfolio is a modification to the overall CEP.

84. While the Commission recognizes that Company proposals in Phase I and II in this Proceeding have made progress towards Colorado's energy transition, there are significant

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<sup>66</sup> The statute makes clear that the Commission "shall not approve a plan that does not protect system reliability." (§ 40-2-125.5(4)(d)(III), C.R.S.)

<sup>67</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(III), C.R.S.

<sup>68</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(VII), C.R.S.

<sup>69</sup> § 40-2-125.5(4)(a)(IV), C.R.S.

<sup>70</sup> Although the Coal Action Plan includes the early retirement of the Hayden and Craig coal plants, the coal actions are not technically part of the CEP because they are also included in the reference ERP portfolio.

concerns raised by parties and public commenters regarding the UPP.<sup>71</sup> For instance, Staff argues that given the large price tag of the Preferred Portfolio as well as the concerns Staff has about the Phase II modeling process, the Commission should reduce the size of the resource portfolio or delay decisions until further analysis and support can be provided.<sup>72</sup> Regarding its modeling concerns, Staff notes that Public Service's decision to increase the generic price of most renewables for years 2029 and 2030 might be causing the model to over-value acquisitions in the near-term.<sup>73</sup> Similarly, the reliability rubric the Company implemented in Phase II arguably prohibited the model from "backsliding" or removing resources after dispatchable resources were added. Staff states that the reliability rubric "introduced constraints into the capacity expansion step that fundamentally render the process suboptimal as it is no longer able to truly optimize the portfolio."<sup>74</sup> Staff goes on to suggest that the reliability rubric's constraints made the Commission-ordered demand response sensitivity ineffective.<sup>75</sup>

85. In addition, Staff notes that the Preferred Portfolio likely fails to account for high levels of curtailment and the resulting increase in costs and emissions. Staff argues that the model likely fails to capture significant levels of curtailments for several reasons, including the model's limitations regarding simplified commitment logic and the inability to capture curtailments from perturbations in the system as well as the timing mismatch between when generation will come online and when the transmission will be ready to serve the new generation. Staff ultimately concludes that the "the level and costs of curtailments portrayed by the model cannot be trusted"

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<sup>71</sup> Because Public Service presented the UPP after intervenors submitted their Comments on the 120-Day Report, intervenors address the Preferred Portfolio rather than the UPP. The differences between the UPP and the Preferred Portfolio, however, are largely immaterial as to the concerns that the intervenors raise.

<sup>72</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 6.

<sup>73</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 28.

<sup>74</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 30.

<sup>75</sup> Staff's Comments, pp. 34-35.

and that the Preferred Plan “may saddle customers with extra costs for renewable energy that does not reduce emissions because it is never delivered.”<sup>76</sup> In contrast, Staff notes that other portfolios presented in the 120-Day Report achieve comparable levels of emission reductions with much lower levels of curtailments and higher levels of storage.<sup>77</sup>

86. UCA also criticizes the Phase II modeling process and is especially critical of the May Valley Longhorn Extension (MVLE) and the most expensive part of the Denver Metro Area transmission upgrades—the Harvest Mile Chambers-Sandown-Cherokee (HCSC) project. UCA recommends that the Commission reject the HCSC, the MVLE, and the wind projects that UCA argues necessitate the transmission projects.<sup>78</sup>

87. Other parties, such as Conservation Coalition and CRES argue that the Commission should not approve any of the gas resources in the Preferred Portfolio.<sup>79</sup> CEO similarly recommends the Commission not approve 200 MW of the 628 MW of gas included in the Preferred Portfolio. CEO argues that it is unclear whether an additional 200 MW of new gas generation will actually be necessary and recommends that the Commission address this proposed new gas in future ERPs, including the 2024 JTS and the 2026 ERP.<sup>80</sup> WRA suggests that the Commission select the lower dispatchable portfolio, which has 504 MW of new gas generation—124 MW less than the Preferred Portfolio.<sup>81</sup> WRA also suggests modifying the Preferred Portfolio by reducing reliance on new construction and instead utilizing available existing generation.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> Staff’s Comments, pp. 31-32, 34.

<sup>77</sup> Staff’s Comments, p. 32.

<sup>78</sup> See UCA’s Comments, pp. 29-30.

<sup>79</sup> Conservation Coalition’s Comments, p. 10; CRES’s Comments, p. 2. Relatedly, the Commission has received numerous public comments urging the Commission to select a resource portfolio with fewer or no gas resources on the basis of climate change, air pollution, price volatility, or concerns that the resources will become stranded.

<sup>80</sup> CEO’s Comments, p. 14.

<sup>81</sup> WRA’s Comments, pp. 15-16.

<sup>82</sup> WRA’s Comments, pp. 16-17.

88. CIEA raises several concerns with the Phase II modeling, arguing that the Company used a heavy-handed approach to manipulate the model.<sup>83</sup> Many of CIEA's recommendations are aimed at the goal of achieving a higher proportion of PPA resources in the Company's resource mix—both in this Proceeding and in future ERPs. CIEA asserts there have been “huge project cost overruns at the [Company-owned] Cabin Creek, Comanche, and Pawnee stations” and that customers are seeing less value than anticipated from two Company-owned wind projects.<sup>84</sup> CIEA argues that given the high percentage of Company-owned projects in the Preferred Portfolio, Public Service might be biting off more than it can chew.<sup>85</sup> CIEA reasons that PPA resources can help insulate ratepayers from both capital cost overruns and performance issues with generators. Noting that all of the gas resources in the Preferred Portfolio would be owned by Public Service, CIEA recommends that the Commission select an alternative resource portfolio that replaces some of the Company-owned gas-fired projects with existing PPA gas resources.<sup>86</sup> CIEA argues that PPA resources “should be at least 50% of Public Service's resource mix to balance ratepayer and shareholder risks.”<sup>87</sup>

89. CEC argues that there are too many red flags and unknowns for this Commission to approve the Preferred Portfolio as presented. CEC notes that Preferred Portfolio will far exceed the clean air targets established by SB 19-236 and argues that the Commission should not approve a plan that goes “above and beyond” statutory requirements to the detriment of customers, particularly given the current affordability concerns.<sup>88</sup> For instance, CEC notes that the Preferred

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<sup>83</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 26-28.

<sup>84</sup> CIEA's Comments, p. 13.

<sup>85</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 9-10.

<sup>86</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 16-18.

<sup>87</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 13-15.

<sup>88</sup> CEC's Comments, pp. 12-13.

Portfolio is approximately \$600 million more expensive than the \$0CO<sub>2</sub> Least Cost Plan, and the \$0CO<sub>2</sub> Least Cost Plan still exceeds SB19-236 bold emission reduction targets.<sup>89</sup>

90. Given these concerns, and considering the record as a whole, we find that modification of the CEP in the selection of an alternative portfolio is necessary to ensure the plan is in public interest based on the three enumerated statutory factors as well as “other relevant factors” that the Commission defines.

91. As noted above, Staff recommends for several reasons that the Commission focus its consideration on five “portfolios of interest.”<sup>90</sup> We agree with Staff and, consistent with the discussion below, determine that the Inverse 1324 (\$0CO<sub>2</sub>) Plan best represents an “Alternative Portfolio” that incorporates the necessary modifications to Public Service’s CEP to support the public interest findings required by SB 19-236.

92. Compared to the Preferred Portfolio set forth in the 120-Day Report, the Alternative Portfolio has 1,338 MW lower nameplate additions (7,192 MW – 5,854 MW). More specifically, the Alternative Portfolio has 19 MW fewer biomass, 41 MW more gas resources, 350 MW fewer solar resources, and 1,706 MW fewer wind resources. However, the Alternative Portfolio has 678 MW more storage resources.<sup>91</sup> The Alternative Portfolio also requires fewer transmission investments and is \$194 million less expensive on a NPV basis. Regarding curtailments, the Phase II report suggests that in 2028 the Alternative Portfolio will result in 1,629 GWh of modelled curtailments, compared to 5,433 GWh of modelled curtailments in the Preferred Portfolio.<sup>92</sup> Moreover, the Company states in its Phase II Report that the modelled curtailment is the “best

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<sup>89</sup> CEC’s Comments, pp. 12-13.

<sup>90</sup> Staff’s Comments, p. 11.

<sup>91</sup> See Staff’s Comments, p. 49.

<sup>92</sup> See Staff’s Comments, p. 49.

possible case scenario [rather] than a realistic expectation of [the curtailment level that]...would occur in real-time operations.”<sup>93</sup> This uncertainty over actual curtailment levels further supports the more cautious approach taken with the Alternative Portfolio.

93. In addition, unlike three of the five portfolios of interest, the Alternative Portfolio was included in the 120-Day Report and thus was reviewed by the IE and CDPHE. As noted by Staff and confirmed by CDPHE, the emissions reductions resulting from the Alternative Portfolio exceed the 2030 greenhouse gas reduction targets. While the Alternative Portfolio has somewhat lower interim emissions reductions compared to the Preferred Portfolio, consistent with the Company’s statements that the modeling does not capture curtailments resulting from transmission congestion and other perturbations in the system, Staff argues that it is unclear that the higher emissions reductions in the Preferred Portfolio “would bare out in reality” given the concerns regarding curtailments and the deliverability of the renewable energy.<sup>94</sup>

94. Moreover, the smaller size of the Alternative Portfolio addresses concerns raised by Staff and others that the Preferred Portfolio is too large due to factors such as the repricing of generic resources in the Phase II modeling and the no “backsliding” component of the Reliability Rubric modeling. Likewise, the smaller size ameliorates Staff’s concerns about new generation coming online before the 2029/2030 in service date (ISD) for major transmission projects that Public Service indicates are necessary to take full advantage of the renewable resources.<sup>95</sup> Finally, the Alternative Portfolio reduces the Company’s ownership percentage so that it is expected to be

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<sup>93</sup> See 120-Day Report, at p. 95.

<sup>94</sup> Staff’s Comments, p. 63.

<sup>95</sup> Staff’s Comments, p. 61.

closer to the 50 percent IPP and 50 percent PPA statutory expectations.<sup>96</sup> Given the Company's significant upcoming investments in transmission through the Colorado Power Pathway and issues identified by intervenors of the Company's struggles to adhere to project budgets and timelines in different instances, a better balance between Company and IPP ownership presents an opportunity to decrease the risk of performance issues by a single entity impacting overall performance of the CEP.

95. Considering the statutory factors and additional public interest considerations raised in comments by parties and the public, based on this record and supported by party filings, we find that the Alternative Portfolio better aligns with Colorado's multi-faceted goals to achieve significant emission reductions and progress towards 100 percent emission reductions in the future, all while ensuring reliability and protecting affordability for ratepayers. Addressing specific factors below—and as supported by policy direction throughout our Phase II Decision that also includes PIMs and directives for the 2024 JTS—we find that modification of the CEP to include the Alternative Portfolio is necessary to ensure the CEP is in the public interest.

### **1. Emission Reductions**

96. The statute requires the Commission to consider the emissions reductions associated with the CEP. Because the Alternative Portfolio is included in the 120-Day Report, CDPHE evaluated it along with all of the other Phase II portfolios in the Phase II Clean Energy Plan Verification Report. CDPHE opines that the emissions reduction calculations for each of the Phase II portfolios are expected to be 80 percent or more below 2005 baseline levels.

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<sup>96</sup> To be clear, the Commission does not find that SB 19-236 in any way sets a floor or a ceiling for Company-ownership. The Commission does, however, find persuasive arguments from CIEA and others that more balanced levels of PPA and Company-owned resources help insulate ratepayers from potential cost overruns and performance issues.

Regarding the Alternative Portfolio in particular, CDPHE estimates that the expected 2030 emissions reductions will be 86 percent by 2030.<sup>97</sup> Thus, the Alternative Portfolio is expected to exceed the 80 percent emissions reductions set forth in the statute and makes progress towards achieving the goal of 100 percent clean energy resources by 2050.

97. As presented in the Phase II modeling, the UPP arguably achieves slightly greater emissions reductions, especially in the interim years prior to 2030. However, Public Service admits that these emissions reductions estimates are optimistic and that the model does not include curtailments caused by transmission congestion or perturbations in the system.<sup>98</sup> Thus, it is questionable how accurate these emissions reductions predictions are, especially in the interim years before Public Service has finished building the transmission upgrades the Company states are necessary to reliably deliver power.<sup>99</sup> In other words, these modeled interim emissions reductions are unlikely to materialize if Public Service cannot construct the majority of the associated transmission investments until 2030.<sup>100</sup> Moreover, it is these same transmission upgrades that resulted in the \$2.2 billion “surprise” in Phase II, as discussed more below. We find it unsettling to rely on predictions that are speculative, at best, on transmission availability in the UPP that result in the seemingly higher emissions reductions. Given that the transmission modeling results changed dramatically between Phase I and II with costs escalating billions of dollars beyond the Company’s initial estimates, we cannot depend on emission reduction predictions tied explicitly to those same transmission needs.

98. Throughout this Proceeding and in selecting the Alternative Portfolio, the Commission has considered the PVRR of both the social cost of carbon (SCC) and the social cost

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<sup>97</sup> CDPHE Phase II CEP Verification, pp. 4-6.

<sup>98</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 95.

<sup>99</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 130-133.

<sup>100</sup> See Staff’s Comments, pp. 43-44 (citing Appendix Q to the 120-Day Report).

of methane (SCM), which also helps in our considerations on emission reductions. The Alternative Portfolio significantly reduces the SCC and SCM compared to Public Service's ERP or business-as-usual portfolio.<sup>101</sup> For the capacity expansion phase of the modeling, the Alternative Portfolio does not include the social cost of emissions.<sup>102</sup> Post-modeling, however, in the 120-Day Report the SCC and SCM associated with the Alternative Portfolio are both presented.<sup>103</sup> Moreover, the Coal Action Plan, which is critical to emissions reductions, is hardwired into the Alternative Portfolio. While there are other portfolios that have still greater reductions in SCC and SCM, notwithstanding the uncertainties around curtailment impacts to those figures, the Alternative Portfolio exceeds the 80 percent emissions reductions set forth in the statute while balancing other factors such as costs, reliability, and future optionality.

99. While the Alternative Portfolio—like other portfolios the Company claims protect reliability<sup>104</sup>—includes over 600 MW of gas resources, these gas resources do not impede Colorado's emissions reductions goals. Rather, the new gas resources are all equipped with both fast start and fast shutdown capability, which allows the units to sit idle most of the time while providing essential operating reserves and ancillary services.<sup>105</sup> The Commission reluctantly recognizes that there does not appear to be a path forward that excludes or significantly reduces the need for new gas resources, given the Company's repeated assertions that it cannot support any reduction in gas resources based on the Company's reliability analysis<sup>106</sup> and the lack of modeling demonstrating the contrary within the record.

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<sup>101</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, pp. 1, 26.

<sup>102</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 97.

<sup>103</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, p. 26.

<sup>104</sup> Public Service argues that the No New Gas and No Gas Portfolios are not reliable. The Lower Dispatchable portfolio includes somewhat fewer gas resources (504 MW), but the Company has raised reliability concerns with this portfolio as well. (Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 29-30).

<sup>105</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 80-81, 126.

<sup>106</sup> Public Service Response Comments, p.29

100. Moreover, as discussed more below, rather than simply eliminating 200 MW of gas-fired resources as argued by some parties and sacrificing reliability, the Alternative Portfolio reduces the amount of Company-owned gas resources, increasing the Company's ability to fully transition away from carbon emitting resources as we approach 2050 and reducing risk of stranded assets to ratepayers. This reduction in Company ownership provides continued opportunities to further accelerate towards 100 percent renewable resources by not tying the Company – and Colorado – to the full amount of utility-owned gas-fired resources presented in the UPP.

101. Under SB 19-236, the CEP must achieve 80 percent emissions reductions by 2030 while working towards 100 percent clean energy by 2050, and the Commission must consider reliability and affordability when determining whether the CEP is in the public interest. The Alternative Portfolio with its 669 MW of gas resources provides this balanced, transitional plan that SB 19-236 contemplates. Even though the gas resources will be run infrequently with the vast majority of the energy coming from wind and solar resources, the units provide an important insurance policy during sustained periods of hot or cold weather – including in extreme circumstances given the realities of climate change.<sup>107</sup> Providing this backup option and permitting the integration of substantial additions of new clean energy resources allows Public Service to retire its remaining coal plants and several of its older gas units.<sup>108</sup>

102. In sum, when considering emission reductions, the Alternative Portfolio exceeds Colorado's ambitious emission reduction goals, sets the state towards a path for 100 percent renewable resources, all while continuing to avoid extreme costs and outages.

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<sup>107</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 22-23, 80-81.

<sup>108</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 22-23, 80-81.

## 2. Reasonable Cost to Customers

103. The statute requires the Commission consider if the CEP will result in a reasonable cost to customers on an NPV basis. The NPV of the UPP is \$44,479 million while the NPV of the Alternative Portfolio as presented is \$43,997 million.<sup>109</sup> However, in its Response Comments, Public Service states that the \$288 million NPV increase from the Preferred Portfolio to the UPP is a result of unavoidable changes that would appear in virtually all portfolios.<sup>110</sup> Assuming that the same incremental change appears in the Alternative Portfolio, the updated NPV of the Alternative Portfolio is \$44,285 million ( $\$43,997 + \$288 = \$44,285$ ). Even using this updated NPV, the Alternative Portfolio is \$194 million less expensive than the UPP ( $\$44,479 - \$44,285 = \$194$ ).

104. While the Alternative Portfolio is preferable to customers on an NPV basis as contemplated in SB 19-236, another relevant factor the Commission must consider is the cost to customers as experienced through increased rates. Intervenors such as Staff, UCA, and CEC have raised alarms regarding the Preferred Portfolio's impact on rates. For instance, Staff states that the rate increase attributable to the Preferred Portfolio for the single year from 2026 to 2027 is just over 10 percent.<sup>111</sup> As discussed more below, the rate analysis the Company provides in the 120-Day Report only includes the impact of the CEP and fails to include other planned investments such as \$4.5 billion in projected distribution investments through 2028, an additional \$800 million in generation projects outside of the CEP, as well as investments in wildfire mitigation, transportation electrification, distributed solar, and others.<sup>112</sup> Staff asserts that the impact of real time operations, construction schedules, system curtailments, and other factors will likely result in

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<sup>109</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 9; 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, p. 26.

<sup>110</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 9.

<sup>111</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 19.

<sup>112</sup> See Staff's Comments, p. 19.

higher rate impacts than the Company's calculations suggest.<sup>113</sup> Given the importance of maintaining affordability, the Commission must consider these costs to customers more generally and not limit our consideration to the NPV comparison of the various resource portfolios.

105. An example of a cost to customers that does not explicitly appear in the NPV considerations is the likely cost of curtailments that the modeling fails to capture. Although the NPV estimates do include the costs of curtailments included in the modeling, the Company admits as discussed above that the model's curtailment forecasting is "more a 'best possible case scenario' than a realistic expectation of what would occur in real time operations."<sup>114</sup> Public Service notes that "a large percentage of curtailment" is caused by perturbations in the system from transmission issues or reliability events and that these curtailments "are not captured in the model."<sup>115</sup> The curtailments resulting from transmission issues are especially concerning given that under the UPP the Company will be connecting vast amounts of new renewable generation years before most of the associated transmission upgrades can be constructed.<sup>116</sup> The Company indicates that while the transmission investments are being built, Public Service will maintain reliable service using tools such as curtailments and redispatch.<sup>117</sup> Thus, the NPV calculations do not reflect significant amounts of curtailments that the modeling fails to capture, but these missing curtailments will result in additional costs that customers must pay.

106. The Alternative Portfolio cuts modeled curtailments from 15 percent in the UPP to 5 percent,<sup>118</sup> and curtailments that the model does not capture will likely also be reduced due to a decreased reliance on yet-to-be-built transmission and an increased investment in storage. By way

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<sup>113</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 19.

<sup>114</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 95.

<sup>115</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 95.

<sup>116</sup> See Staff's Comments, pp. 43-44.

<sup>117</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 134.

<sup>118</sup> See Staff's Comments, p. 49.

of analogy, Public Service predicts that the UPP will have 6,043 GWh of curtailments in 2028,<sup>119</sup> but the Alternative Portfolio is only predicted to have 1,629 GWh of curtailments in 2028.<sup>120</sup> It is reasonable to assume that curtailments that the model fails to capture will follow similar trajectories resulting in significant additional costs savings in the Alternative Portfolio.

107. Put simply, the Alternative Portfolio will achieve the state's ambitious clean energy targets while mitigating the risk that ratepayers will be required to pay for resources that have less incremental value because they are significantly curtailed.

108. Another category of costs that does not appear in the NPV calculations are the potential costs associated with Company-owned gas generation assets, including construction and operational cost overruns, decommissioning costs, and the potential that the gas resources will become stranded. On this last point, several parties including UCA, WRA, Conservation Coalition, and Boulder, as well as numerous public comments, raised concerns that the new gas resources will become stranded assets. The Alternative Portfolio is again preferable to the UPP in this regard because it contains a substantial decrease in Company-ownership of new gas capacity. Specifically, the UPP contains 628 MW of new build gas resources, all of which are Company-owned.<sup>121</sup> The Alternative Portfolio contains 669 MW of new build gas resources, but of this 669 MW, 219 MW is a PPA resource with a 20-year term.<sup>122</sup> By diversifying the ownership of the gas resources, the Alternative Portfolio reduces the risks that customers will be saddled with future costs associated with Company-owned gas resources.

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<sup>119</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, Attachment 2, p. 1.

<sup>120</sup> 120 Day Report (Appendix T), p. 23.

<sup>121</sup> Public Service's Response Comment, p. 9.

<sup>122</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, p. 26.

109. Finally, yet another cost that is not included in the NPV estimates is the risk that a larger, more sprawling resource portfolio like the UPP will eliminate opportunities to take advantage of future technology developments or reductions in price in some of the newer technologies. As discussed more below, acquiring a smaller portfolio of resources in this Proceeding creates more optionality in future proceedings for efficiencies and cost savings, including through a more robust use of demand side resources. In other words, the Alternative Portfolio reduces the risk that customers will pay for generation and transmission resources that could have been avoided through better use of developing technologies.

110. As we consider costs, we believe that least-cost options presented in the Phase II report may be unworkable for Colorado. We find unpersuasive arguments raised during Phase II that the Commission should select the Least Cost Portfolio. While the Least Cost Portfolio is slightly less expensive on a NPV basis than the Alternative Portfolio,<sup>123</sup> the Company has raised reliability concerns with the portfolio because it does not include the strategically located gas resources the Company asserts are necessary for transmission support.<sup>124</sup>

111. Similarly, we reject arguments that selecting a larger portfolio to reduce emissions at any cost is appropriate. It is critical that we examine costs and emissions together, and in conjunction with reliability as required by statute. Not only is the diverse technical makeup of the Alternative Portfolio needed for the reliability needs raised by the Company and discussed more below, but because of the increase in storage in the Alternative Portfolio, modifying the CEP to move forward with this portfolio also allows further development with not only load but storage capacity that could help increase efficiencies and reduce costs in the future. In addition,

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<sup>123</sup> The Least Cost Portfolio has a PVRR of \$43,984 million, which is \$13 million less than the Alternative Portfolio's PVRR or 43,9997. (120-Day Report, p. 38; 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, p. 26).

<sup>124</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 39-40; Public Service's Response Comments, p. 29.

overinvesting in the system could price electricity out of competition with other fuels, jeopardizing beneficial electrification efforts.<sup>125</sup> To help ensure that Colorado can continue to decarbonize all sectors of the economy—many parts of which will rely on the electrical system as the backbone of the transition—it is essential to provide electrical service at a reasonable cost and rate impact.

112. Finally, CRES and certain public commentors note that Public Service’s NPV cost numbers were calculated using the Company’s weighted average cost of capital (WACC) as the discount rate, and they urge the Commission to use a lower discount rate. CRES argues that using the WACC as the discount rate will have the effect of discounting future fuel and other costs sharply. Moreover, CRES states that in enacting SB 23-291, the legislature has directed the Commission in C.R.S. § 40-2-139 to use a discount rate for future fuel costs that does not exceed the long-term rate of inflation. CRES recommends that the Commission direct the Company to resubmit the NPV values in accordance with what is now Colorado law.<sup>126</sup>

113. We note that the appropriate use of discount rates was litigated in Phase I. The Phase I Decision put forward a compromise to help mitigate the substantive concerns raised by CRES, requiring Public Service to provide in Phase II the annual nominal cash flows associated with each portfolio so that the parties and the Commission could calculate the NPV calculation using various discount rates.<sup>127</sup> As such, this Commission believes it is important to understand the potential cost and other resource choice impacts that might occur at lower discount rates, but

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<sup>125</sup> Numerous public commenters argue that the Alternative Portfolio is more expensive than the UPP on a dollars per MW basis. This argument only looks at the nameplate capacity of the respective portfolios and does not account for important distinctions in how different resources contribute to the electrical system. For example, a 300 MW solar facility will be of no value to the electrical system after the sun sets. A 300 MW solar plus storage facility, however, is able to help serve load after the sun sets and, in this way, can be more useful to the electrical system, even though it has the same nameplate capacity as the solar facility. Thus, the addition of storage resources to a portfolio can contribute value in ways that are not reflected in the amount of nameplate capacity.

<sup>126</sup> CRES’s Comments, pp. 2-3.

<sup>127</sup> Phase I Decision, ¶ 211.

declines to upset the compromise position we adopted in the Phase I decision particularly since the Company did provide the requested Excel worksheet as Appendix W to the 120-Day Report.

114. Likewise, we reject CRES's argument that the Commission is required in this Phase II process to use an alternative discount rate per SB 23-291's amendment to C.R.S. § 40-2-139, which would further extend the Phase II process with additional modeling and process by relitigating issues resolved in Phase I. CRES is correct that, going forward, the requirement imposed by the amended § 40-2-139, C.R.S. imposes a duty on the Commission that, if it relies on the use of a discount rate when calculating NPV of future carbon-based fuel costs, the rate must not exceed the long-term rate of inflation. However, the law does not consider or include the necessary Phase I and II process or other clarifications.

115. A law is presumed prospective unless the legislature "clearly and unequivocally expressed" <sup>128</sup> intent for the statute to apply retrospectively. Generally, when the cause of action "accrues prior to the effective date of an amending statute," the prior statute controls. <sup>129</sup>

116. Here, Public Service filed its application in this Proceeding in March 2021. At that time, and at the time of the Phase I order, the statute did not include the updated language, which went into effect in August 2023. The party evidence and record overall, including the expectation of the Company when it filed the application, were set well before the 2023 legislative session. The issue was fully concluded through the Phase I Decision issued in 2022. To change the required scope of the considerations at this late phase is not required and counters long-standing precedent. <sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> *Edelstein v. Carlile*, 33 Colo. 54, 57, 78 P. 680, 681 (1904)

<sup>129</sup> *United Bank of Denver Nat. Ass'n v. Wright*, 660 P.2d 510, 511 (Colo. App. 1983); *Diversified Veterans Corp. Ctr. v. Hewuse*, 942 P.2d 1312, 1314 (Colo. App. 1997) (holding that the imposition of penalties involves substantive rights and liabilities and is therefore governed by the law in effect on the date of the party's injury).

<sup>130</sup> *See, e.g., United Bank of Denver Nat. Ass'n v. Wright*, 660 P.2d at 511.

117. Phase I is complete and has always been the appropriate phase for determination of the applicable discount rate. In enacting its statute in 2023, the Legislature is presumed to understand this process, and the Commission certainly will be required to apply the statute in future ERP Phase I decisions that direct the necessary considerations of discount rate determinations. The Commission is not, however, required to alter its Phase II process and extend already tight timelines for further modeling, analysis, and to expand the record. Indeed, if it did, these actions would potentially put at risk the time-sensitive bidding process.

118. Nevertheless, as the Commission did in its Phase I order in considering updates to statute subsequent to the 2021 ERP application filing by directing the Company to include the social cost of methane in its Phase II information, the Commission is in no way precluded from recognizing the statutory considerations and discussing the spirit and application based on the record. The Commission generally has a broad delegation of power to regulate utilities from the Colorado legislature.<sup>131</sup> Where the legislature has not directly prohibited the Commission from considering certain factors, the Commission generally can exercise its power over rates and utilities as it sees fits.<sup>132</sup> Specifically, when approving resource plans, the Commission can consider “other relevant factors, as determined by the commission.”<sup>133</sup> The legislature grants the Commission broad power here to determine what factors are appropriate to use to compare bids in a resource plan.<sup>134</sup> Recognizing these statutory provisions, the record here indicates that the Alternative Portfolio would still be the most appropriate selection.

119. No parties to this Proceeding submitted analysis during Phase II showing the PVRR of various portfolios using a lower discount rate, although certain public commentators submitted

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<sup>131</sup> See *City of Montrose v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n*, 629 P.2d 619, 622 (Colo. 1981).

<sup>132</sup> See § 40-3-102, C.R.S.

<sup>133</sup> § 40-3.2-106(3)(c), C.R.S.

<sup>134</sup> § 40-3.2-106(3)(c), C.R.S.

analysis regarding the impact of different discount rates on the NPV of fuel costs. Regardless, even assuming that certain that a lower discount rate makes the Alternative Portfolio more expensive on a NPV basis compared to the lower dispatchable portfolio, the no new gas portfolio, and the no gas portfolio, this does not justify the selection of a different portfolio. First, the Commission is still prohibited from selecting a portfolio that fails to protect reliability. Public Service states in its Response Comments: “neither the No New Gas Portfolio nor the No Gas Portfolio protect system reliability and therefore cannot be approved by law.”<sup>135</sup> Public Service has also raised concerns with the reliability of the lower dispatchable portfolio. Moreover, while one of the enumerated statutory factors is the cost on a NPV basis, the statute permits the Commission to also consider other relevant factors. One such unenumerated factor the Commission is considering is the cost to customers more generally. Through this lens, the lower dispatchable portfolio, the no new gas portfolio, and the no gas portfolio all require significantly more resource acquisitions in the short term that will have significant consequences for the affordability of electric service. This factor weighs in favor of granting authority to Public Service to move forward with acquiring the resources in the Alternative Portfolio.

### **3. Reliability and resilience of the electric system**

120. The statute also requires the Commission to consider the impact of the CEP on the reliability and resilience of the electric system and prohibits the Commission from approving a plan that does not protect system reliability. Based on modeling in this record, the Alternative Portfolio is just as reliable, if not more so, than the UPP.

121. As presented by the Company, gas-fired generation resources are a key factor in ensuring reliability. In response to arguments that the Commission should reduce the amount of

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<sup>135</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 60.

gas resources, Public Service asserts that it “cannot become comfortable with any level of reduction in dispatchable resources.”<sup>136</sup> In addition to the total amount of gas resources included in the portfolio, Public Service asserts that two gas resources within the UPP are strategically located and necessary to provide transmission support: Bid 989 in the Denver Metro area and a new gas resource in the Alamosa area. Regarding Bid 989, the Company states that it “is the only bid submitted that includes firm dispatchable generation providing supportive benefit to the transmission constraint” in the Denver Metro area.<sup>137</sup> Similarly, the Company notes that, after a 2026 retirement of an existing gas resource, there will be no firm dispatchable resources located in the San Luis Valley. The Company asserts that it is essential from a reliability perspective to continue to have firm dispatchable generation in the region.<sup>138</sup>

122. The Alternative Portfolio slightly increases the amount of gas resources included in the UPP and retains the two gas resources that Public Service argues are strategically located and necessary to provide transmission support.<sup>139</sup> The only modification the Alternative Portfolio makes to the gas resources in the UPP is to Bid 1000, which the Company does not flag as being necessary for transmission support.<sup>140</sup> Bid 1000 is a Company-owned project with two 200 MW combustion turbines (CTs). The Alternative Portfolio would eliminate one of the 200 MW CTs in Bid 1000 and replace it with a 219 MW CT (Bid 235) that is owned by an IPP. As set forth above, this change provides valuable diversification benefits that, among other things, reduces the risk of stranded assets that customers face from Company-owned gas resources. In addition, Public Service has raised no reliability concerns with Bid 235. Indeed, Bid 235 is included in the backup

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<sup>136</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 29.

<sup>137</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 39.

<sup>138</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 39.

<sup>139</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, p. 26. While the Alternative Portfolio replaces the UPP’s Alamosa gas resource with a slightly larger gas resource that is also located in the Alamosa area.

<sup>140</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 29.

portfolio and is the only gas bid that the Company includes in its Prospective New Load portfolio.<sup>141</sup> Thus, the Alternative Portfolio maintains or increases the reliability of the UPP in that it retains the two strategically located gas resources, slightly increases the total amount of gas resources, and replaces a Company-owned gas resource with a PPA resource that the Company has found to be reliable.<sup>142</sup>

123. Furthermore, the Company ran both the Alternative Portfolio and the Preferred Portfolio (which closely resembles the UPP) through an “extreme summer” scenario that—according to the Company—“provides useful information on the reliability of the portfolios under extreme events.”<sup>143</sup> Under this extreme summer scenario, the Alternative Portfolio performed better than the Preferred Portfolio.<sup>144</sup> Thus, we are left to conclude that the Alternative Portfolio is not only reliable based on Public Service’s own metrics, it appears to be more reliable than the UPP.

124. Although the UPP and the Alternative Portfolio have comparable levels of gas-fired generation, we acknowledge the arguments from several parties and numerous members of the public that the Commission should only approve a resource portfolio with fewer or no new gas resources. We share their disappointment that the Phase II competitive resource solicitation failed to result in any viable portfolio with fewer gas resources and again urge the Company to come

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<sup>141</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 55; Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 27.

<sup>142</sup> Pursuant to the Phase I Settlement and the Phase I Decision, the model PPA for dispatchable resources was amended to, among other things, require that gas resources have backup fuel on site necessary to allow the facility to run continuously for a minimum of five days at maximum load on the alternative fuel. Firm gas transportation contracts could serve as a substitute for the requirement to have a backup alternative fuel on site. (Phase I Decision, pp. 106-06; 120-Day Report, pp. 122-23). In the 120-Day Report, Public Service confirms that “[a]ll bids that were advanced to EnCompass modeling are compliant with the requirement for either onsite backup fuel storage or firm gas transportation contracts” but that the model did not select the fuel oil storage bids due to economics. (120-Day Report, p. 125). The Commission reiterates its interest in having five days of backup fuel onsite for the new gas resources.

<sup>143</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 77.

<sup>144</sup> Corrected Table 19 of 120-Day Report, p. 1.

forward in future proceedings, including the 2024 JTS, with more developed demand side resources and other reliability solutions that do not involve new gas resources. As described above, the requirement to include at or near the amount of gas resources in the Alternative Portfolio stemmed from the Company's reliability determinations and their direct modifications to the modeling in Phase II, as a result. The Commission is disappointed that specific, locational reliability concerns were not clearly communicated in Phase I, which could have been informative to potential bidders and provided additional options.

125. We therefore find that granting authority to Public Service to move forward with acquiring the resources in the Alternative Portfolio, including its gas resources, is in the public interest. First, SB 19-236 prohibits the Commission from approving a plan that does not protect system reliability. Thus, we cannot simply carve out from a modeled resource portfolio some or all of the firm dispatchable resources that Public Service maintains are necessary for reliability.

126. Other modeled resource portfolios with fewer gas resources than the Alternative Portfolio were presented by Public Service—including the Lower Dispatchable portfolio, the No New Gas portfolio, and the No Gas portfolio. None of these portfolios, however, represent a better option than the Alternative Portfolio. Public Service states in its Response Comments that “neither the No New Gas Portfolio nor the No Gas Portfolio protect system reliability and therefore cannot be approved by law.”<sup>145</sup> In addition, we note the No New Gas portfolio and the No Gas portfolio are significantly larger and more costly than the Alternative Portfolio.

127. As for the Lower Dispatchable portfolio, it is much larger than the Alternative Portfolio (7,163 MW instead of 5,835 MW) and more expensive on a NPV basis (\$45,315

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<sup>145</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 60.

compared to 43,997).<sup>146</sup> Moreover, as compared to the Alternative Portfolio, the Lower Dispatchable portfolio simply reduces the amount of PPA gas resources by selecting a smaller CT (Bid 1061). The Company-owned gas resources are essentially unchanged.<sup>147</sup> In addition, the Company argues in its Response Comments that it has reliability concerns with Bid 1061.<sup>148</sup> Thus, on this record we find that the Alternative Portfolio is superior to the Lower Dispatchable portfolio, the No New Gas portfolio, and the No Gas portfolio.<sup>149</sup>

128. Even though we would have preferred selecting a portfolio with fewer or no gas resources, we find it useful to consider the total amount of gas resources in the context of what was originally anticipated in Phase I of this Proceeding. Based on the inputs and assumptions established in the Phase I Settlement, the modeling predicted that the competitive solicitation could lead the Company to acquire 1,372 MW of gas additions.<sup>150</sup> The vast majority of the parties in this Proceeding joined the Phase I Settlement, including CEO, WRA, and Conservation Coalition. Thus, we conclude that the 669 MW of gas resources in the Alternative Portfolio are well within the guardrails established in Phase I.

129. While we find on this record that the Alternative Portfolio and its gas resources are in the public interest, we acknowledge the numerous concerns that parties raised regarding how Public Service tested for reliability in the Phase II modeling and the manual adjustments the Company made regarding gas resources. In particular, we share the concerns raised by parties

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<sup>146</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, pp. 26, 28.

<sup>147</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, pp. 26, 28.

<sup>148</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 30.

<sup>149</sup> For similar reasons, we reject CIEA's arguments that the Commission select a portfolio that use the annuity tail instead of the replacement chain modeling. As between the Alternative Plan and the Alternative Plan with the annuity tail, the new 219 MW PPA CT (Bid 235) is replaced with three short-term extensions of existing PPA CTs, but the Company-owned gas resources remain essentially the same. The record before us better supports the reliability of Bid 235 as compared to the extensions of the existing PPA CTs. Moreover, because the annuity tail version is just a sensitivity, its projected emissions have not been reviewed by CDPHE.

<sup>150</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 28 (citing Phase I Settlement (Attachment D), at Table 3 and noting that the 1,372 MW of gas additions is over a longer RAP).

such as Staff, COSSA/SEIA, and Conservation Coalition regarding the Company's reliability rubric.<sup>151</sup> We also question whether the Company adequately communicated to bidders the importance of strategically located gas resources. It is our expectation that the Company will strive to resolve these issues prior to the 2024 JTS. Nevertheless, while these concerns further support our decision to select a tailored resource portfolio, we are unconvinced that these concerns warrant additional Phase II modeling or the manual removal of gas resources from the modeled portfolios.

#### **4. Future Technology Development**

130. Another related factor that the Commission considers when evaluating the CEP is the impact of future technology developments. For instance, the Alternative Portfolio includes a much higher percentage of storage resources than the UPP. This significantly expanded level of storage may be critical to future efforts to incorporate still greater amounts of renewables without unreasonable levels of curtailments while reducing the need for gas resources.

131. Colorado's bold clean energy targets necessitate a rapid shift in the electrical system, which in turn requires us to think about our electrical system in a different way. We cannot attempt to build Colorado's future, low-emission electrical system by continuing to build the system as we have in the past. Simply building increasing amounts of generation resources as the UPP would do results in high curtailments and high costs. In contrast, modifying the CEP to include the Alternative Portfolio helps the Commission start building a different type of electrical system that takes advantage of developing technologies in several ways. Efficient and cost-effective planning of such a system will rely on a variety of components: flexible supply, flexible demand, participation in larger geographic markets, energy efficiency and acquisition of

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<sup>151</sup> See, e.g., Staff's Comments, pp. 29-30; COSSA/SEIA's Comments, pp. 14-15; Conservation Coalition's Comments, pp. 10-13.

clean resources. While other dockets are addressing regional markets, demand flexibility and energy efficiency, in this CEP we address clean resources and flexible supply, placing a greater emphasis on supply management through increased storage capacity. As an example, energy storage resources in the Alternative Portfolio represent 32 percent of new capacity,<sup>152</sup> compared to just 16 percent in the UPP.<sup>153</sup> In this way, the Alternative Portfolio marks the first step in a new approach to resource planning for a modern, efficient, and cost-effective grid.

132. In addition, the modification of the CEP to include the Alternative Portfolio results in a smaller, less aggressive resource acquisition. Although it is likely that our selection of a smaller resource portfolio in this Proceeding will result in a larger acquisition in the 2024 JTS, deferral of some of the new generation resources will also provide additional time for the Commission to better understand and take advantage of developing technologies that might reduce the cost of, or eliminate the need for, new generation and transmission resources. In this vein, the Alternative Portfolio's acquisition of a PPA gas resource reduces the amount of gas resources that Public Service would otherwise own.<sup>154</sup> This gives Public Service more flexibility if future technology improvements render gas resources unnecessary. Moreover, advancements in various types of distribution system management are particularly promising for ensuring that the distribution system is more capable of the dynamic load management that will be more important as beneficial electrification advances. The Commission also expects that more robust and innovative demand response programs will be a critical part of the future electrical system. As more items like electric vehicles, heat pumps, and heat pump water heaters come onto the grid, the management of these loads will become increasingly important, but also increasingly possible.

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<sup>152</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 11.

<sup>153</sup> Public Service's Response Comments (Attachment 1), p. 1.

<sup>154</sup> See 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, p. 26.

To ensure that the Commission is being good stewards of ratepayer funds, we need the Company and their planning processes to evolve away from overbuilding resources and instead look for ways to enable more dynamic management of both supply resources and demand resources.

133. Several parties similarly argue that the Commission should continue examining how new technological developments could be used to meet system needs instead of traditional generation and transmission investments. For instance, WRA suggests that the need for some of the Denver Metro transmission upgrades could instead be addressed by load management programs. WRA states that investment in transmission system upgrades to alleviate the Denver Metro constraint may be needed but recommends that the Company develop without delay load management programs in the metro area. WRA also recommends that the Company improve distributed energy resource (DER) programs and interconnection rules, with financial incentives to ensure the growing DER capacity provides benefits to the grid.<sup>155</sup>

134. Similarly, noting that the Company's proposal for metro Denver transmission upgrades was "significantly influenced by the lack of cost-effective bids [for generation] in the Denver metro area," COSSA/SEIA asserts that the Company should consider alternatives to conventional transmission upgrades, including non-wires alternatives such as virtual power plants (VPPs).<sup>156</sup> CEO likewise encourages the exploration of non-wires alternatives associated with the proposed upgrades in its new Distribution System Plan as well as additional details in the 2024 JTS.<sup>157</sup> CRES argues that with the new storage contained in the Preferred Portfolio, together with the fact that long-term storage technologies are evolving quickly, the Commission should not

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<sup>155</sup> WRA's Comments, p. 22.

<sup>156</sup> COSSA/SEIA's Comments, pp. 22.

<sup>157</sup> CEO's Comments, pp. 29-30.

approve the proposed gas resources until Public Service has gained significant experience operating its system with the large amount of storage that will be added in the coming years.<sup>158</sup>

135. Staff asserts that Public Service never mentioned the possibility of demand side or other generation solutions to alleviate the \$2.1 billion in transmission in the Denver Metro area. Staff notes that demand response solutions, aggregation of customer-sited generation and storage, and the use of electric vehicles to deliver grid benefits are being discussed in the Commission's Distribution System Plan proceedings and VPP Miscellaneous Proceeding. Staff argues that it is unclear whether solutions such as Time-of-Use rates, critical peak pricing, additional demand response, VPPs focused on this period, managed charging, Vehicle-to-Grid programs, strategically located storage at Community Solar Gardens, etc. could prove to be more cost-effective solutions than what the Company proposes.<sup>159</sup>

136. Future development also implicates changing needs for workforce labor and development. Despite the many positive attributes of the Alternative Portfolio, we have not lost sight of best value regarding employment of Colorado labor and the impacts the Alternative Portfolio will have on the long-term economic viability of Colorado communities.<sup>160</sup> As set forth more below, the 120-Day Report assigns a BVEM score to each portfolio and the Alternative Portfolio's BVEM score is slightly lower than the UPP's BVEM score. Although it is disappointing that the Alternative Portfolio has a lower BVEM score, just as deferral of some of the new generation resources will provide additional time for the Commission to take advantage of developing technologies, the Alternative Portfolio allows time for better evaluation of BVEM for those resources that will be acquired in future solicitations. Notably, the BVEM scores appear

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<sup>158</sup> CRES's Comments, p. 2.

<sup>159</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 41.

<sup>160</sup> See generally § 40-2-129(1)(a), C.R.S.

to track to some degree with the percentage of utility ownership, so as IPPs prepare for future solicitations, they should take special care to improve BVEM performance to ensure that in future solicitations the Commission does not see lower BVEM scores as a reason to disturb the ownership balance between the utility and IPPs. Ultimately, we believe that the positive attributes of the Alternative Portfolio, including cost, emissions reductions, reliability, and the ability to better address future technology developments and transmission concerns, outweigh the lower BVEM score.

137. In sum, the prospect of future technology developments weighs in favor of modifying the CEP to include the resources in the Alternative Portfolio. The composition of the Alternative Portfolio itself with the large amounts of storage will likely be key for the future low emissions electrical system. Likewise, the more tailored acquisition of resources provides the Commission with more opportunities to evaluate quickly advancing technologies such as distribution management and new demand response programs and balances the risk that some of these new technologies could reduce the need for future generation and transmission investments.

## **5. Transmission Concerns**

138. The transmission concerns that have arisen in Phase II are another factor that contributes to the finding that granting Public Service authority to move forward with acquiring the resources in the Alternative Portfolio is necessary for the public interest. The Company presents several categories of transmission costs, but all are overshadowed by the \$2.2 billion in investments for transmission network upgrades to the Denver Metro area.<sup>161</sup> In Phase I of this Proceeding, the Company identified a need in the Denver Metro area, but only estimated the need

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<sup>161</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 130.

at a capital cost of “approximately \$250 million”.<sup>162</sup> Therefore, the Phase II modeling did not consider the new and significantly larger cost or how to minimize or avoid it as part of the resource selection process. Moreover, as noted above, the majority of the transmission investments are not scheduled to be completed until 2030, years after many of the resources in UPP would otherwise come online,<sup>163</sup> exacerbating concerns regarding both the modelled and actual levels of curtailments that will occur in the UPP.

139. As discussed in more detail elsewhere in this Decision, several parties raise concerns about the \$2.2 billion investment in transmission upgrades that Public Service states is necessary for the Denver Metro area and question whether the selection of resources could be better optimized to reduce the transmission upgrades. For example, Staff states that there “seems to be a fundamental problem that the modeling process does not integrate transmission planning in a meaningful way” and notes that Public Service “has not provided any analysis of the amount and type of metro area generation that would be needed to reduce this transmission network upgrade cost or the amount by which it could be reduced.”<sup>164</sup> Staff argues that the \$2.2 billion surprise raises several questions including whether the transmission costs would be substantially different under any other generation portfolio, whether there are cost effective Denver Metro bids, and whether demand side or other generation resources could reduce the overall cost and need for the transmission network upgrades.<sup>165</sup>

140. Among the other parties that raise transmission concerns, CEC argues that the estimated \$2.2 billion in transmission upgrades for the Denver Metro area is “shocking” and notes that this current estimate is almost nine times larger than the estimate provided in Phase I. CEC

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<sup>162</sup> HE 107 p. 50-51

<sup>163</sup> Staff’s Comments, pp. 43-44 (citing Appendix Q to the 120-Day Report).

<sup>164</sup> Staff’s Comments, p. 40.

<sup>165</sup> Staff’s Comments, pp. 39-41.

asserts that this change fundamentally alters the facts the Commission and stakeholders relied on in Phase I.<sup>166</sup> UCA similarly argues that in the Preferred Portfolio Public Service intertwines generation and transmission projects to provide a circular basis for one another, which significantly expands Company ownership, costs, and capacity beyond what was contemplated in the Phase I Settlement.<sup>167</sup>

141. In the 120-Day Report, the Company cites several factors driving the need for large investments in the Denver Metro area, including population growth, the scale and location of new generation that the Company is acquiring in the Preferred Portfolio, and the lack of cost-effective bids in the Denver Metro area.<sup>168</sup> In its Response Comments, Public Service recognizes that “additional work remains to better integrate transmission and generation planning” but argues against the idea that material cost savings could be obtained with further analysis of the transmission costs or tweaks to the resource portfolio.<sup>169</sup> As support, the Company notes that a 30 percent reduction in the size of the resource portfolio only results in a 20 percent reduction in modeled transmission costs.<sup>170</sup>

142. The large and unexpected costs of the transmission investments, the timing of the investments compared to the associated generation, and the analysis that resulted in the proposed transmission investments all support the selection of the Alternative Portfolio. The costs associated with curtailments is discussed above, but the UPP creates a timing mismatch in which the majority of the transmission resources will be put into service years after the generation resources. In addition, we share Staff’s questions as to whether alternatives exist that could reduce

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<sup>166</sup> CEC’s Comments, pp. 5-7.

<sup>167</sup> UCA’s Comments, pp. 11-15.

<sup>168</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 131-32.

<sup>169</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, pp. 68-69.

<sup>170</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 69.

the overall costs and need for the network upgrades. While we cannot determine on this record whether the transmission network upgrades in the Denver Metro area will be necessary in the future,<sup>171</sup> the Alternative Portfolio defers certain resource acquisitions. At the very least, the deferrals provide more opportunities to further evaluate the proposed transmission network upgrades and enable the Commission – and Colorado as a whole – to have greater confidence that the acquisition of new resources minimizes transmission investments and is in the public interest.

## 6. Conclusion

143. Granting authority to Public Service to move forward with acquiring the resources in the Alternative Portfolio instead of the UPP will likely reduce costs to customers, especially when the Commission considers costs more generally. Such costs include those that are likely to result from the curtailments that the model fails to capture and the potential future costs associated with Company-owned gas resources in the UPP (*e.g.*, decommissioning). At the same time, the Alternative Portfolio is just as reliable as the UPP, and perhaps more so. While the modeling shows that the UPP achieves greater emissions reductions than the Alternative Portfolio, the Alternative Portfolio still exceeds the state's ambitious clean energy targets, while leaving open the possibility for more cost effective emission reductions in the future. Furthermore, the emissions reductions in the UPP, and especially the interim emissions reductions, appear to be optimistic given the likely impact of curtailments that the modeling presented in the 120-Day Report does not fully incorporate. Finally, pursuing a smaller, more tailored portfolio of resources is necessary for the public interest because it creates an opportunity to investigate how to better optimize transmission upgrades during resource selection and provides more opportunities to take advantage of

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<sup>171</sup> While the estimated cost of the transmission investments is still quite large in Alternative Plan, it is approximately \$397 million less than the associated transmission investments in the UPP (\$2,353 - \$1,956 = \$397). (*Compare* Public Service's Response Comments, p. 9, *with* 120-Day Report (Appendix S) Rev. 1, p. 26.)

developing technologies that might reduce or eliminate investments in traditional generation and transmission assets. Given the point in this Proceeding in which the significantly higher transmission costs were disclosed and the opportunity to take advantage of other technologies to limit ratepayer expenses, including the UPP in the approved CEP cannot be found to be in the public interest, as the UPP leaves too many unanswered questions and opportunities for optimization still on the table. As discussed throughout this decision, modifying the CEP by including the Alternative Portfolio is necessary to ensure the plan is in the public interest.

144. To reach an approved CEP that meets Colorado’s needs, we find that modification of the presented CEP to include the Alternative Portfolio is necessary to ensure the approved CEP is in the public interest. With its CEP activities—including the Coal Action Plan that is critical for reducing emissions—and the plans for workforce transition and community assistance, the modified CEP moves Colorado significantly forward in its clean energy transition.

## **F. Transmission**

### **1. Phase II Changes in Transmission Investments**

145. In Phase I of this Proceeding, Public Service explained that it would need to make transmission investments in four areas to accommodate the new generating resources to be procured: 1) Denver Metro network upgrades, 2) grid strength reinforcement, 3) reactive power/voltage support, and 4) generator interconnections. At that time, Public Service provided a “preliminary and illustrative” cost estimate of \$250 million for the Denver Metro upgrades, and a “rough” estimate of the combined costs for voltage support and grid strength of \$150 to \$250 million.<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Hearing Exhibit 107, Direct Testimony and Attachments of Hari Singh, pp. 50-59.

146. In the 120-Day Report, the Company states that the transmission analysis it conducted to support the CEP is its most thorough transmission analysis for an ERP ever, involving numerous power flow studies, scenario modeling and “tabletop exercises” to develop project scoping and cost estimates. The Company states that 1) the scale and (largely remote) location of the new generation the Company will procure via this ERP, 2) the planned generation retirements the ERP entails, and 3) the lack of bids for new or existing generation located within the Denver Metro area transmission constraint all combine to require significant evolution of, and investment in, the transmission system to maintain reliable delivery of power to load centers.<sup>173</sup>

147. More specifically, the Company states that its existing substations lack the space for expansions necessary to eliminate overloads and expand the system’s capacity, and that it has identified significant needs for new substations and new transmission lines. Moreover, it states that siting, permitting, and the need for extensive undergrounding in the Denver Metro area add cost and complexity to many of the network upgrade projects it has identified. Given these siting challenges, the Company states that its planning approach has been to create long-term ratepayer value by considering not only what upgrades are needed for its Preferred Portfolio, but also designing to accommodate future renewable development and growth in electricity demand.<sup>174</sup>

148. The Phase II cost estimates for grid strength/voltage support and the MVLE are consistent with the estimates for those costs in Phase I of this Proceeding. However, the Company adds a new, previously unreported category of transmission investments in Phase II—the San Luis Valley (SLV) network upgrades with an estimated cost of \$176 million. In addition, in Phase II the estimated costs of the Denver Metro upgrades increase from \$250 million to \$2,146 million.

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<sup>173</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 128-134.

<sup>174</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 128-134.

While Public Service asserts that its Phase II costs are not CPCN-level estimates, the Company states that its “process improvements” give it a higher confidence in these estimates than in those provided in previous ERPs.<sup>175</sup>

149. The Company claims that the need for Metro Denver upgrades have greatly expanded in Phase II and that the Phase II analysis identified substantial network upgrades needed within the SLV as well. The Company states that “[w]hile the smaller portfolio of transmission projects contemplated in Phase I may have alleviated transmission overloads within a short time window, the customer value of a smaller transmission portfolio would be quickly overwhelmed by additional load growth and resource acquisitions, requiring costly and difficult upgrades to new transmission facilities.”<sup>176</sup> The Company stated reasons for the higher costs of the transmission investments include the following: siting and permitting challenges and the need for undergrounding many facilities in the Denver Metro area, the scale and location of new generation that will be acquired in this Proceeding, and the lack of cost-effective generation bids in the Denver Metro area.<sup>177</sup>

## **2. Party Comments**

150. Staff reiterates that Public Service’s transmission power flow analysis—conducted at the tail end of the Phase II modeling—estimates that almost \$3 billion in transmission investment is needed to support the Preferred Portfolio (in addition to the approximately \$1.7 billion investment recently approved in the CPP). Staff states that this estimated \$4.5 billion in transmission investments is perhaps “Staff’s largest concern with the Company’s Preferred

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<sup>175</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix Q), p. 3.

<sup>176</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix Q), p. 11.

<sup>177</sup> 120-Day Report (Appendix Q), p. 12.

Plan.”<sup>178</sup> Staff reviews the Company’s explanation of the necessary transmission upgrades but states that it is left with more questions than answers. Staff recommends that 1) the Commission make clear that “the Commission is in no way approving the transmission projects presented and described in the Report;” 2) the Commission add consideration of improved integration between transmission and resource planning and modeling to the recently-opened transmission pre-rulemaking docket 23M-0472E; 3) the Commission consider directing the Company to file a standalone transmission planning application; and 4) that the Commission consider options for implementing an independent transmission monitor.<sup>179</sup>

151. Staff acknowledges the concern that some of its recommendations could further delay transmission investments needed to deliver renewable energy. Given that many of the ISDs for the transmission investments are in 2029 and 2030, however, Staff argues that such delays might be avoidable.<sup>180</sup>

152. CEO, UCA, and CEC similarly criticize the transmission network upgrade proposals the Company presents in the 120-Day Report. For example, CEO recommends the Commission clarify that it is not providing a presumption of prudence on the proposed Denver Metro transmission network upgrades until additional information is provided. Specifically, CEO recommends the Company provide more information on the degree to which upgrades are necessary for reliability, as compared to planning for future growth.<sup>181</sup> UCA complains that the Company did not inform the Commission in the CPP proceeding that additional billions of dollars would be needed to deliver power from the CEP and states that had it

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<sup>178</sup> Staff’s Comments, p. 8.

<sup>179</sup> Staff’s Comments, pp. 44-45.

<sup>180</sup> Staff’s Comments, p. 45.

<sup>181</sup> CEO’s Comments, pp. 29-30.

been aware of the magnitude of the transmission upgrade needs the Company now claims, it would have approached the proceeding differently.<sup>182</sup>

153. In contrast, other parties such as CIEA and COSSA/SEIA generally support the Company's proposed transmission investments.<sup>183</sup> In fact, COSSA/SEIA suggests that the transmission investments should be designed to accommodate continued growth in renewable energy development.<sup>184</sup>

154. In its Response Comments, Public Service maintains that transmission projects will be necessary for any generation portfolio to achieve the aggressive emission reductions the State requires.<sup>185</sup> In response to party comments recommending that the Commission not provide final approval of the network upgrade projects, the Company notes that it has not sought such approval, and reiterates its recommendation that the Commission schedule a Commissioners' Information Meeting (CIM) on CEP-related transmission in the first quarter of 2024 where the Company can further detail its broader transmission plans and analysis, and answer Commissioner questions. Following this, the Commission and parties can vet transmission projects through CPCN filings.<sup>186</sup>

155. The Company urges the Commission to deny the Staff recommendations to require a transmission planning proceeding and an independent transmission monitor. Public Service claims that "[t]hese recommendations are vague and would unnecessarily slow down the energy transition by requiring parties to expend valuable time and resources on processes with little, if any, incremental benefit."<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> UCA's Comments, pp. 14-15.

<sup>183</sup> See, e.g., CIEA's Comments, pp. 19-20.

<sup>184</sup> COSSA/SEIA's Comments, pp. 20-21.

<sup>185</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 65-66.

<sup>186</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 66-67.

<sup>187</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 67-68.

156. The Company expresses strong disagreement with Staff's suggestion that generating resources should be delayed to future ERPs in recognition of the time it will take to put the new transmission assets into service (and the likely curtailment this will cause). The Company argues that the State's policy objectives do not allow for this delay, and it encourages the Commission to approve the UPP now. It claims that delaying approval of generation assets will only result in increased bid prices for generation and increase both the cost and siting difficulties for transmission.<sup>188</sup> Public Service further argues that using tools such as curtailment and redispatch in the short term as transmission buildout is completed is superior to delaying the acquisition of resources.<sup>189</sup>

157. Responding to party arguments that some of the transmission upgrades are unnecessary, the Company notes that none of these parties conducted detailed transmission planning analyses and refers to their contentions as conjecture. The Company asserts that the transmission portfolio is a reasonable set of solutions and states that it sought to upgrade existing transmission facilities wherever possible instead of constructing new greenfield transmission lines.<sup>190</sup>

### **3. Findings and Conclusions regarding Transmission**

158. We share the serious concerns expressed by parties regarding the large, unexpected cost increases in transmission investments. After nearly three years of process, it was incredibly frustrating to see such a major failure of planning and estimating come to light so late in this Proceeding, upending the understandings of this Commission and many of the parties about the cost to integrate resources associated with this solicitation. Public Service will need to improve

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<sup>188</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 72-73.

<sup>189</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 73-74.

<sup>190</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 70-72.

its transmission modelling and cost estimation processes in in future ERP proceedings to allow the Commission and relevant stakeholders a better ability to assess the critical links between generation and transmission resources. As noted above, the concern around transmission that arose in Phase II of this Proceeding was one of the factors that compelled us to select a smaller, more tailored resource portfolio.

159. In addition, the Commission emphasizes that the proposed transmission network upgrades, grid strength reinforcements, and reactive power/voltage support investments presented in the 120-Day Report are not part of the approved CEP. We are neither approving (or denying) these transmission actions here nor entitling the investments to any sort of presumption of prudence (or prejudice). Substantially more process will be required to fully assess the need for, alternatives to, and cost of remedial actions on the transmission grid in light of significant transition that this Proceeding initiates. Not only does the Company note that it is not seeking approval of those actions here, but the Commission has made clear it is modifying the CEP such that these actions are still to-be-determined with possible alternative solutions.

160. Moreover, as presented, the transmission network upgrades appear designed to accommodate future renewable development and growth in electricity demand, not *just* the CEP and its emissions reduction goals. Likewise, the alleged need for some of the proposed transmission upgrades may simply be the result of an aging system and changing dynamics. Though prudence only attaches to the “approved CEP,” Company filings continue to emphasize that the transmission network upgrades presented here are not part of its CEP.

161. In the context of the shocking cost increases associated with the new transmission and concerns regarding the analysis and vetting of the proposed alternatives to the transmission investments, the Commission agrees with Staff that we simply do not have enough information or

reliable modeling to authorize the spending on another \$2.8 billion in transmission investments at the current time.<sup>191</sup> While the Commission recognizes that a prudency determination was not sought by the Company in this Proceeding, we are wary to approve a suite of resources that all but lock in the future need for significant additional future system expenses without first vetting alternatives to mitigate those costs. The Commission needs to see a more holistic picture of the various transmission projects arising from this Proceeding, including what investments are necessary and how the various transmission investments work together with other system requirements and constraints. This additional review of the proposed transmission projects is necessary even if Rule 3206 technically would not require a CPCN for some of the individual transmission projects in other circumstances. Accordingly, we waive Rule 3206 as to the transmission projects arising from this Proceeding; we emphasize that it is incumbent upon Public Service to provide a fulsome and comprehensive description of all transmission projects necessary to accommodate power delivery and maintain reliable service from the approved CEP. Thus, the Company is requested to bring forward one or more CPCN or other filings regarding transmission projects raised in this Proceeding. However, and particularly given our emphasis that selecting the Alternative Portfolio presents the opportunity that not every transmission project raised will ultimately be pursued, we leave it to the Company's discretion on how best to present this type of analysis to the Commission; *i.e.*, both in timing and type of filings made, but also with regard to the number or combination of filings.

162. The Commission does not oppose the Company's offer in its Response Comments to make a presentation on expected transmission requirements in a CIM. As a general matter, we are particularly interested in additional information regarding the differences in transmission plans

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<sup>191</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 45.

between the UPP and the Alternative Portfolio as well as any explanation the Company can provide regarding the failure to better anticipate the significant transmission needs in the Denver Metro area. Likewise, the Commission is interested in learning from Public Service how the Company's planning processes will improve and any innovative ways to approach future ERP proceedings so that the optimization of costs includes transmission investments, and to avoid similar major discrepancies between Phase I and Phase II expectations presented in modeling. Nevertheless, we recognize that when the Company proposed the transmission CIM, it did so in the context of the UPP rather than the Alternative Portfolio. Given the significant changes associated with the Alternative Portfolio and timing concerns with the upcoming filing of the 2024 JTS, we refrain from directing a transmission CIM at this time but invite the Company to determine the appropriate time and forum to address our concerns.

163. In addition, we find merit in Staff's proposal that the scope of Proceeding No. 23M-0472E (*i.e.*, regarding review of the provisions addressing transmission CPCN and planning in the Commission's Rules Regulating Electric Utilities, 4 CCR 723-3, in anticipation of future rulemaking) should be specifically defined to include consideration of improved processes for integrating transmission planning into generation resource plan proceedings and modeling. It is reasonable to expect that a previously unknown \$2 billion in additional expenses is an important variable to optimize around by reevaluating what different resource acquisition decisions would or could have been made to bring the entire portfolio of resource and transmission needs to a reasonable and optimized cost for ratepayers. As appropriate we will address these considerations in the context of Proceeding No. 23M-0472E, including through future order in that proceeding.<sup>192</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> Staff and interested stakeholders are encouraged to bring forward proposals in the context of that proceeding. The Commission will address any necessary direction directly in the context of the pre-rulemaking proceeding.

164. We similarly find merit in Staff's recommendation to consider options for implementing an independent transmission analyst. The Commission sees value in having some independent transmission and power flow modeling expertise among Staff, CEO, and UCA with which the Company could collaborate. The presence of such outside expertise could help accelerate approvals and lessen the overwhelmingly negative reactions of "surprises," such as the \$2.2 billion in transmission network upgrades for the Denver Metro area. We see the primary role of this independent transmission analyst as building up the analytical capabilities of parties, particularly Staff, UCA, and CEO, regarding power flow modeling and other transmission issues.

165. Accordingly, we direct Staff to initiate a stakeholder process with UCA and CEO and in conferral with Public Service. The objective of the stakeholder process would be for Staff to bring forward a scope of work for hiring an independent transmission analyst. While we will leave it to the stakeholders to work through the details, this scope of work could be based on the IE contracting approach the Commission uses in ERP proceedings in which the Company contracts with the outside expert. Our expectation is that the analyst would work integrally with Staff. Ultimately, however, the independent transmission analyst must maintain independence from the Company.

166. Regarding timing, Staff should bring forward the proposed scope of work as soon as reasonably feasible but no later than through initial filings at the commencement of the 2024 JTS proceeding. Ideally, the independent transmission analyst could assist with the modeling in Phase I of the 2024 JTS. It would be ideal in Phase I of the process to have the help of an expert third-party to identify approximate quantities of certain resource types in targeted geographic areas to test assumptions about total costs for different portfolios, inclusive of both generation and transmission costs. We acknowledge the short timeframe this creates but find that time is of the

essence to ensure that the relevant state agencies have this type of expertise available during Phase I of the 2024 JTS to inform the parameters of the Phase II portfolios, given the shortcomings of this Proceeding.

167. As should be evident from our decisions on items such as the selection of the Alternative Portfolio and the directive for Staff to produce a scope of work for an independent transmission analyst, it is our expectation that the Company will look for better ways to model and analyze transmission costs in Phase I of the 2024 JTS. Part of these efforts should focus on mechanisms to provide reliable electrical service through dynamically managing both supply resource and demand resources—as opposed to simply building more generation and transmission resources.

168. We aspire for the independent transmission analyst discussed above to be engaged during Phase I of the 2024 JTS to bolster the analytical capabilities of Staff, CEO, and UCA regarding the integration of transmission and generation resources. However, given the possibility that the independent transmission analyst cannot be engaged in time for Phase I, as a backstop we direct Public Service to include certain portfolios in its direct case. Specifically, Public Service must present—at a bare minimum—one or more portfolios that examine minimizing transmission costs by increasing resources interconnecting in the Denver Metro area or using capacity on existing transmission lines, including capacity that will become available as thermal generating units retire. Broadly communicating the geographic areas for resource development anticipated to minimize transmission costs could also increase the likelihood of bidders to provide additional options in these target areas.

## **G. Performance Incentive Mechanisms**

### **1. Background and Party Comments**

169. After the filing of the 120-Day Report, in Decision No. C23-0672-I<sup>193</sup> the Commission directed the Company to submit comments outlining a potential symmetric risk sharing mechanism that would apply to Company-owned projects. The goal of this project-specific mechanism would be to better align customer and utility incentives, treat Company-owned generation projects in ways that are at least somewhat closer to the risks that are routinely imposed on IPP projects, and to ensure reasonable costs for customers.<sup>194</sup> While the Commission required a response from Public Service, it also invited comments from the intervenors.<sup>195</sup>

170. On October 20, 2023, Public Service filed its Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I. Staff similarly filed a proposal on October 20, 2023, which UCA and CEC joined.

171. Public Service proposes two complimentary risk-sharing proposals or PIMs, with possible variations for both PIMs. The first is a cost to construct PIM intended to incentivize the Company to complete projects within its estimated capital expenditures that formed the basis of its Phase II bids. The Company proposes either (1) a dead band with sharing approach, or (2) a fixed capital cost approach. For either of these two approaches, the Company recognizes that the Commission could implement the PIM on either a project specific basis or on a portfolio basis.<sup>196</sup>

172. The second PIM is an “operational performance” PIM modeled after the Commission’s suggested Levelized Energy Cost (LEC) metric identified in Appendix P to the 120-Day Report. Noting that the committed energy and weather adjustment provisions of PPA

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<sup>193</sup> Issued October 6, 2023.

<sup>194</sup> Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 3.

<sup>195</sup> Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 4.

<sup>196</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, pp. 6-7.

allow IPPs some flexibility in how much energy their projects produce, the Company argues that a 15 percent dead band around the Appendix P LEC is appropriate.<sup>197</sup> The Company further argues that the operational PIM should not seek to manage curtailments but that this is better addressed in the emissions reduction PIM.<sup>198</sup> In fact, the Company argues that any operational PIM should include curtailed volumes in the calculation of the LEC in part because this avoids creating a perverse incentive to favor Company-owned generation when determining which units to curtail.<sup>199</sup>

173. The Company asserts that the combination of these two PIMs should meet the Commission's expectation regarding cost discipline regarding both capital investment and operational performance.<sup>200</sup>

174. Under Staff's proposed PIM for utility-owned generation, Public Service would be required to recover the costs of Company-owned renewable generation assets entirely through the electric commodity adjustment (ECA) as opposed to base rates.<sup>201</sup>

175. Other intervenors suggest various other types of PIMs in their comments to the 120-Day Report. For example, Boulder's suggestions include a PIM for Company-owned projects that would use as a baseline the cost of seemingly lower priced bids as well as a PIM to address the capacity factors for gas resources.<sup>202</sup> COSSA/SEIA suggests that the Commission consider deploying a PIM that would incentivize the on-time construction and deployment of new

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<sup>197</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 11.

<sup>198</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, pp. 12-13.

<sup>199</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 13.

<sup>200</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, pp. 1-2.

<sup>201</sup> Staff Response to Risk Sharing Mechanism, p. 14.

<sup>202</sup> Boulder's Comments, pp. 14-15.

transmission assets.<sup>203</sup> Conservation Coalition in turn proposes a mechanism in which the Company would bear any incremental costs for hydrogen conversion of its gas plants.<sup>204</sup>

176. In its Response Comments, the Company appears to argue that the cost to construct PIM should only be a fixed capital cost approach based on the total portfolio. Without much explanation, Public Service states that to facilitate approval of a PIM framework in this Proceeding, there should be no dead band for the construction capital cost PIM. Instead, the baseline should be set at the approved portfolio capital budget/point cost estimate.<sup>205</sup>

177. For the operational PIM, the Company argues in its Response Comments that the baseline should be adjusted to exclude the effect of construction capital expenditures in order to avoid such capital expenditures being subject to both PIMs. Public Service states that this is necessary to avoid double penalty or double reward.<sup>206</sup> In addition, the Company states that the evaluation period for projects subject to the operational PIM should occur on three-year intervals beginning with the first through third full calendar years of project operation. As an example, for a project with a commercial operation date of September 30, 2026, the evaluation period for the operational performance PIM would begin January 1, 2027, and extend through December 31, 2029. Public Service argues that this promotes administrative efficiency and better addresses annual variation in weather, maintenance patterns and other performance drivers.<sup>207</sup>

178. In contrast, Public Service vehemently opposes Staff's proposal, stating that "[t]he magnitude and ramifications of this proposed sea change are difficult to overstate."<sup>208</sup> Public Service asserts that Staff's PIM would "essentially deregulate generation in the state" in

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<sup>203</sup> COSSA/SEIA's Comments, pp. 20-21.

<sup>204</sup> Conservation Coalition's Comments, pp. 16-17.

<sup>205</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 81-82.

<sup>206</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 82.

<sup>207</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 82.

<sup>208</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 83.

that it would reconstitute the Company as an IPP in all but name.<sup>209</sup> The Company argues that Staff's proposal would increase the risks conferred to the Company with little incremental benefit and no opportunity to price that risk into its bids. Public Service asserts that, if implemented, Staff's proposal "would require the Company to reassess its project commitments, increasing the cost and delaying the delivery of this plan, or whatever is left of it."<sup>210</sup>

179. On December 19, 2023, Public Service filed its Response to Decision No. C23-0841-I, providing additional point costs and capacity factors data in connection with the Alternative Portfolio and setting forth the Company's proposed sharing percentages for the operational PIM in a non-confidential format.

## **2. Findings and Conclusions**

180. The Commission appreciates that the Company has "sharpened its pencil" and is willing to "stand behind its pricing and performance metrics as bid."<sup>211</sup> Given the significant amount of Company-owned generation projects in the portfolio of resources Public Service will acquire,<sup>212</sup> this confidence and willingness to share risks is an important component of our decision to move forward with the Alternative Portfolio. In other contexts, costs, performance, or scheduling issues have increased costs for customers relative to the initial estimates the Company provided, and material changes to the cost and performance metrics of a project could impact the justification of the need determinations made in the ERP process.<sup>213</sup> More generally, competitive solicitation is the lynchpin of Colorado's ERP process, and a successful competitive solicitation

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<sup>209</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 83.

<sup>210</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 86.

<sup>211</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 4.

<sup>212</sup> Of the 5,835 MW that the Alternative Portfolio contemplates acquiring, Public Service would own 53.7 percent of the capacity resources and 67.3 percent of the energy resources. (120-Day Report (Appendix S), Rev. 1, p. 26.)

<sup>213</sup> See Decision No. C23-0672-I, pp. 2-3.

relies upon some degree of certainty that, after winning at a lower price, bidders will not be able to materially increase the price of their bids without consequences. To date, the Commission has not had a mechanism in place to hold the Company to their bids and performance, in a similar way to the IPP contracts, which has increasingly become a point of concern. In Phase I of this Proceeding, the Company put forth a plan to convert the Brush Coal Plant to burn natural gas at a capital cost of \$44 million. The Commission and parties relied upon the information provided by the Company to make decisions in Phase I of this Proceeding, broadly considered the Company's Coal Action Plan, which was agreed to be carried forward into the Phase II modeling. Several months later, the Company put forth a CPCN application to complete the conversion at the significantly increased cost of \$85 million. The Commission finds a compelling need to ensure that the pricing relied upon during this Proceeding will not be significantly altered after the fact without a meaningful sharing of risk with the Company. The Company-ownership PIMs that Public Service proposes help ensure that the Commission is making informed resource acquisition decisions, promoting fairness amongst the bidders and the Company, and providing necessary protections to ratepayers.<sup>214</sup>

181. Accordingly, as part of the Commission's approval of the planned acquisition of Company-owned generations projects consistent with the Alternative Portfolio, we adopt a cost to construct PIM and an operational PIM for all Company-owned generation projects arising from this Proceeding.<sup>215</sup> These cost to construct and operational PIM are based on the Company's proposals, subject to the modifications detailed below.

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<sup>214</sup> See Decision No. C23-0672-I, pp. 2-3.

<sup>215</sup> The cost to construct PIM applies to all Company-owned generation projects from this Proceeding, including Bid 1029. As set forth below, however, the operational PIM only applies to Company-owned LEC projects.

**a. Cost to Construct PIM**

182. Starting with the cost to construct PIM, we reject the Company's arguments that the cost to construct PIM should be applied on a portfolio basis. Rather, the cost to construct PIM shall be a project-specific PIM for each Company-owned project in the Alternative Portfolio. Applying this PIM on a portfolio level would be inconsistent with how IPP bids are treated and contrary to the underlying principles of the competitive solicitation that each project must stand on its own.

183. The baseline for each cost to construct PIM will be the point cost for capital costs to construct the particular generation project that was used in the Company's Phase II bid. In its Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, Public Service states that "each Company-owned bid has a point cost for capital cost to construct that can serve as a baseline for PIM evaluation purposes."<sup>216</sup> During the course of Phase II, the Company provided the point costs for all relevant Company-owned projects.

184. Under the cost to construct PIM, there would be a five percent dead band around the baseline in which Public Service earns no incentive or disincentive. Outside of the five percent dead band, however, the Company and ratepayers would share any cost overruns or savings based on three symmetrical tiers. Specifically, for a total variance of more than 5.0 percent through 10.0 percent above or below the baseline, 40 percent of the cost overruns or savings would be allocated to Public Service. For a variance of more than 10.0 percent through 15.0 percent above or below the baseline, 50 percent of the cost overruns or savings would be allocated to Public Service. For any variance above or below 15.0 percent of the baseline, 60 percent of the cost overruns or savings would be allocated to Public Service.

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<sup>216</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 6.

185. The sharing percentage will be applied to the overage and not on the total project amount. Also, there will be no deduction due to the 5 percent dead band or any other previous tiers. For example, if a project with a \$100 million point cost is actually constructed for \$114 million, Public Service would incur a \$7 million disincentive; *i.e.*, the 14 percent overage means that 50 percent of additional costs are allocated to Public Service (50 percent of \$14 million is \$7 million). The same calculation would be used if Public Service was able to construct the project for only \$86 million. In that scenario, the Company would earn a \$7 million incentive. Resolution of the appropriate PIM assessment (*i.e.* the calculation of any incentive or disincentive) will occur in the first rate case following the ISD of the relevant generation project.

**b. Operational PIM**

186. Turning to the operational PIM, the baseline will be the LEC for the relevant project set forth in the corrected Appendix P. The operational PIM will be applied on a project-specific basis. Except for LCC-based projects like standalone storage and gas, the operational PIM will apply to all Company-owned generation arising from this Proceeding. Regarding the exclusion of LCC-based projects, we find persuasive the Company's argument that including such project could have an unintended consequence of incentivizing the overuse of dispatchable resources in order to avoid penalties or to accrue incentives.<sup>217</sup>

187. The Commission rejects the 15 percent dead band that Public Service proposes for the operational PIM and will replace it with a 5 percent dead band around the LEC baseline. This narrower dead band is supported by—among other things—CIEA's Comments. CIEA asserts that the Company either exaggerates or obscures the true costs and risks of its proposal when compared to PPA arrangements. CIEA points out that IPPs have no dead band around their bid

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<sup>217</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 12.

price and suggests that the Company should not have the benefit of a dead band either.<sup>218</sup> While we do not agree that removing the dead band altogether is appropriate, we agree with CIEA that the intent of the PIM is to set the Company's bidding risk on par with IPPs more readily. Establishing the mechanism here with a narrower dead band than proposed by the Company better aligns these goals.

188. Aside from the narrower dead band, the basic calculation structure for assessing the incentive or disincentive under the operational PIM would generally match the Company's proposal. Specifically, for variances of more than 5 percent through 10 percent above or below the baseline, 20 percent of the costs or savings would be allocated to Public Service. For variances of more than 10 percent through 15 percent above or below the baseline, 30 percent of the costs or savings would be allocated to Public Service. For variances of more than 15 percent through 20 percent above or below the baseline, 40 percent of the costs or savings would be allocated to Public Service. For variances of more than 20 percent through 25 percent above or below the baseline, 50 percent of the costs or savings would be allocated to Public Service. And finally, for any variance more than 25 percent above or below the baseline, 60 percent of the costs or savings would be allocated to Public Service.<sup>219</sup>

189. Regarding the timing of performance evaluations, the Commission agrees with the Company that performance evaluation for projects should be conducted on a three-year rolling average after the third full operational year is complete and on a similar cadence thereafter.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> CIEA's Comments (Attachment A), p. 5-6.

<sup>219</sup> See Public Service's Response to Decision No. C23-0841, pp. 2-3.

<sup>220</sup> In its Response Comments, Public Service provides the following example of this timing: "As an example, for a project with a commercial operation date of September 30, 2026, the evaluation period for the operational performance PIM would begin January 1, 2027 and extend through December 31, 2029." (Public Service's Response Comments, p. 82).

This approach will stagger the performance reviews so that a subset of projects (*e.g.*, all those with 2026 ISDs) is evaluated each year.

190. We similarly agree with Public Service's arguments that the baseline of the operational PIM should be adjusted to exclude the effect of construction capital expenditures in order to avoid such capital expenditures being subject to both PIMs.<sup>221</sup> Excluding the effect of construction capital expenditures is necessary to avoid double penalty or double reward.

191. In connection with the establishment of the operational PIM, all projects subject to the operational PIM in this Proceeding will receive cost recovery through the appropriate rider (RESA or ECA) from the ISD of the project until the project is rolled into base rates.

192. While we direct that the operational PIM as described above apply to all Company-owned LEC projects arising from this Proceeding, we recognize that certain considerations warrant further exploration in future proceedings. For instance, we invite interested stakeholders and the Company to explore whether an operational PIM could be crafted in which the baseline is derived from the project's estimated capacity factor as opposed to the estimated LEC. This would essentially exclude factors such as the capital construction costs and the Company's estimated WACC. We welcome a more robust consideration of this approach in the upcoming 2024 JTS.

193. Similarly, we reiterate the importance of timing as a performance metric,<sup>222</sup> and have a strong interest in evaluating in the follow-on CPCN proceedings a mechanism to incentivize timely completion of Company-owned projects, in accordance with the timing anticipated in the modeling and bidding processes. For example, one possibility would be to commence the LEC

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<sup>221</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 82.

<sup>222</sup> See Decision No. C23-0672-I, ¶ 6.

calculations on the as-bid ISD of the Company-owned project. Thus, if the as-bid ISD of a project was May of 2026 but the project experienced delays and did not commence operations until October 2026, this six-month delay would decrease the project's achieved LEC as compared to the as-bid baseline LEC. While we do not adopt this structure as part of this Decision, we intend to evaluate in the follow on CPCN proceedings how best to align the Company's incentives regarding the completion of generation projects.

194. Regarding curtailments, we likewise intend to continue evaluating in the follow on CPCN proceedings how exactly the operational PIM should account for curtailments. To be clear, we do not intend for the operational PIM to somehow shift the risk of curtailments on to the Company. The issue of appropriately disincentivizing curtailments across the entire electrical system is better addressed elsewhere, including possibly through the emissions reduction PIM that the Phase I Decision contemplates. In this way, we largely agree with the Company's position that the operational PIM should not seek to manage curtailments.<sup>223</sup> Nevertheless, there are unresolved details regarding how to make the operational PIM appropriately indifferent to curtailments, and we intend to address these details in the follow on CPCN proceedings.

**c. Extraordinary Circumstances**

195. Finally, as to both the cost to construct PIM and the operational PIM, the Commission finds merit in Public Service's argument that the Company should be able to petition the Commission for relief in the event of extraordinary circumstances. In other words, Public Service can seek relief from the Commission for any amounts assessed to the Company under either the cost to construct PIM or the operational PIM, with the Company bearing the burden of establishing the existence of extraordinary circumstances and the impact of any such

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<sup>223</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, pp. 12-13.

circumstances on unit construction.<sup>224</sup> We clarify that the starting point for the definition of “extraordinary circumstances” could be similar to the definition of “force majeure” in the Model PPA for Wind and Solar.<sup>225</sup> That said, in the proceeding in which the Company attempts to establish the existence of extraordinary circumstances, the parties—including the Company—may advocate for modifications to the definition of “extraordinary circumstances” as appropriate, recognizing that Company-owned projects may not have identical extraordinary issues to the Model PPA.

**d. Other proposed PIMs**

196. We decline to implement Staff’s proposed PIM in this Proceeding given our adoption of a cost to construct PIM and operational PIM. Nevertheless, we are intrigued about the possibilities offered by Staff’s PIM. As Staff notes, under its PIM, cost recovery increases in direct proportion to the amount of renewable energy the assets produce while also tying cost recovery to Public Service’s Phase II bids. Likewise, the PIM would account for both capital construction costs and performance of the assets.<sup>226</sup> The Commission sees Staff’s PIM as a potential avenue to engage in performance based regulation (PBR) on a more fundamental level as opposed to simply overlaying PIMs on top of the standard cost of service ratemaking, providing a potential opportunity to realign utility incentives to benefit ratepayers.

197. Many of Public Service’s arguments against Staff’s PIM are focused on why it should not be applied to the Company-owned projects arising from this Proceeding. Arguments that Staff’s PIM “moves the goalposts” after submission of Phase II bids and that Staff’s PIM has many unresolved details might be legitimate as to this Proceeding but are far less

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<sup>224</sup> Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 15.

<sup>225</sup> Hearing Exhibit 101, Attachment AKJ-3 (Volume 3.2), pp. 142-43.

<sup>226</sup> Staff’s Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, pp. 14-15.

persuasive regarding future implementation of Staff's PIM. Given the Commission's longstanding interest in PBR and the fact that the Commission has already approved a similar approach for one of Black Hills' wind projects,<sup>227</sup> the Company's claims that Staff's PIM would essentially deregulate generation in Colorado seem exaggerated.

198. The Commission intends to evaluate in the 2024 JTS whether Staff's PIM can be applied to the Company-owned projects arising from that proceeding. As such, we request that Public Service confer with Staff on its proposed PIM<sup>228</sup> prior to the 2024 JTS in an attempt to reach consensus. Regardless of the outcome of the conferral, we invite the parties in the 2024 JTS to raise this issue for our continued consideration.

199. As for the remaining proposed PIMs, including those that Boulder, COSSA/SEIA, and Conservation Coalition put forth in their comments, we decline to adopt these concepts in this Proceeding. Although the expedited nature of this Phase II process did not allow for the development of a robust record for these proposals, we invite the parties to consider bringing these proposals forward in the PIM stakeholder process that the Phase I Decision contemplates and through future proceedings.

#### **H. The Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site and Bid 1029**

200. Bid 1029 is included in the Preferred Portfolio, the UPP, and the Alternative Portfolio and is a 500 MW Company-owned wind project with an in-service date of 2026. Although the Commission does not know the precise location of Bid 1029, it appears to be close to and possibly adversely impacts, the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site view shed.

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<sup>227</sup> Staff recounts that Black Hills recovers the cost of the Peak View wind farm exclusively through the ECA and RESA for the first ten years of commercial operation. (Staff's Response to Decision No. C23-0672-I, p. 9).

<sup>228</sup> This conferral should include further evaluation of whether Staff's PIM could be modified to apply to LCC-based projects instead of only LEC-based projects.

201. On October 25, 2023, elder and tribal administrator Mr. William Walksalong of the Northern Cheyenne Nation spoke at the Commissioner's weekly business meeting. Through comments, tribal representatives requested that the Commission protect from energy development the viewshed of the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site given its sacred importance to several tribal nations. In addition, Mr. Walksalong asked that the Commission ensure that energy development not disturb any human remains or cultural artifacts from the area around the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site. Mr. Walksalong noted that the massacre spilled well-beyond the boundaries of the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site that Congress has designated. Consequently, he urged the Commission to require utilities and developers to consult tribal representatives as to how to proceed should remains or artifacts be discovered in the course of construction.

202. In its comments, Staff recommends the Commission not approve Bid 1029 as part of this Proceeding. Staff asserts that a preliminary viewshed analysis indicates that wind turbines from Bid 1029 might impact the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site's viewshed. Staff also ran its own modeling runs that forced the model to exclude Bid 1029 and suggests that the Commission could approve a 200 MW solar plant (Bid 375) or a 603 MW wind plant (Bid 1024) in place of Bid 1029.<sup>229</sup>

203. CEO also recognizes concerns regarding Bid 1029 but does not suggest that the Commission exclude it from the approved CEP. Rather, CEO recommends the Commission direct the Company to include additional information in subsequent CPCNs, including discussions between the Company and Tribal governments regarding the proposed projects, the status of those

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<sup>229</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 58-59.

discussions, and any outcomes or results of such discussions.<sup>230</sup> CEO argues that approach will allow the Commission to take action in the instant proceeding consistent with the presentation by the Northern Cheyenne Nation and also rely on the existing CPCN process to consider alternatives and proposed impacts when making a determination on specific resource proposals.<sup>231</sup>

204. In its Response Comments, Public Service argues that Bid 1029 has “strong economics” and was included in almost all portfolios. Thus, the Company maintains that it would be premature to set this bid aside. Public Service does, however, acknowledge Staff’s concerns and states that the identified impacts are important to work through and address. Indeed, the Company states that it is already engaged with these issues. Ultimately, Public Service asks that the Commission allow Bid 1029 to move forward and states that the Company would then provide an update on efforts to mitigate the impacts of concern in the follow on CPCN proceeding.<sup>232</sup>

205. The Commission agrees with the positions of Public Service and CEO and rejects Staff’s proposal to exclude Bid 1029 from the approved CEP. We emphasize, however, that allowing the Company to include Bid 1029 in the Alternative Portfolio is in no way an approval of the project, which must necessarily be vetted through continued stakeholder and community considerations. In this vein, we adopt Public Service’s suggestion to approve a backup bid for Bid 1029 so that the Company can pivot to a different project if stakeholder processes, including the Company’s further discussions with the Northern Cheyenne Nation, do not resolve concerns. In addition, we adopt CEO’s recommendation and direct Public Service to include additional information in subsequent CPCN proceedings, including discussions between the Company and Tribal governments.

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<sup>230</sup> CEO’s Comments, pp. 26.

<sup>231</sup> CEO’s Comments, pp. 26.

<sup>232</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, pp. 23-24.

206. Resolution of this issue will require collaboration of the interested stakeholders, and we are encouraged by indications that Public Service is already engaging with the Northern Cheyenne Nation regarding Bid 1029. In this instance, Public Service needs to take the lead and work with interested stakeholders, including the Northern Cheyenne Nation, to address potential impacts to the Sand Creek Massacre National Historic Site.

207. As to the precise backup for Bid 1029, in its Response Comments Public Service recommends that the Commission approve Bid 1018. However, Bid 1018 is unavailable as a backup because it is located on the MVLE, which the Alternative Portfolio does not include. Ultimately, we permit the Company discretion to select an appropriate backup for Bid 1029 pursuant to the approved backup selection process set forth in this Decision. We note, however, that Bid 1016 (a 554 MW Company-owned wind bid) appears to be a good candidate.

### **I. Hayden Biomass**

208. Bid 1031 is a 19 MW Company-owned biomass project that Public Service proposes as a Section 123 resource.<sup>233</sup> The proposed project is located near Hayden, Colorado to support workforce transition as part of the planned retirement of the Hayden coal units.<sup>234</sup>

209. Public Service states that it would employ 26 full-time employees, thus reducing workforce transition costs associated with the early retirement of the Hayden coal plants. Public Service further asserts that the project, which is anticipated to use primarily forest waste from fire prevention activities and debris from pine beetle outbreaks, is carbon neutral and would reduce air emissions, including particulate matter, carbon monoxide, volatile organics, and

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<sup>233</sup> Public Service also states that it “complies with the spirit of” the portfolio development framework for HB 21-1324. (120-Day Report, p. 52).

<sup>234</sup> In its Response Comments, Public Service intentionally presents the bid name with the bid ID as public information.

nitrogen oxides.<sup>235</sup> In comparing the Preferred Portfolio with the Hayden biomass project to a reoptimized portfolio without the project, the portfolio excluding biomass adds 19 MW gas and 200 MW solar and is \$257 million less in PVRR.<sup>236</sup>

### 1. Party Comments

210. The Labor Interests argue that the Hayden biomass project should belong in any Commission-approved portfolio, listing its benefits as including 26 well-paid jobs and a high total BVEM rating for its construction phase. The Labor Interests add that the Hayden biomass unit represents an innovative technology under both Section 123 and HB 21-1324, noting that wind and solar projects have often dominated discussions about innovation despite patterns of low-paying jobs post-construction.<sup>237</sup>

211. CEO supports the inclusion of the Hayden biomass plant in the Commission-approved CEP primarily because of its just transition benefits. CEO acknowledges, however, that Public Service “does not provide information on the salaries or the estimated tax benefits” and requests that the Company provide more details about the public benefits of the project “so the Commission has a full record on which to make its Phase II decision.”<sup>238</sup> CEO also notes the relatively high cost of the biomass plant, concluding that the Hayden biomass project increases the PVRR of the Preferred Portfolio by \$257 million.<sup>239</sup> CEO recommends that if the Commission does not approve the Hayden Biomass project here, the Commission direct the Company to evaluate the project in future ERPs for additional consideration.<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 40.

<sup>236</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 138.

<sup>237</sup> Labor Interests’ Comments, pp. 11-14.

<sup>238</sup> CEO’s Comments, p. 23.

<sup>239</sup> CEO’s Comments, p. 22.

<sup>240</sup> CEO’s Comments, pp. 17.

212. OJT endorses CEO's Comments as to the just transition issues, including the evaluation of the Hayden biomass project.<sup>241</sup> OJT opines that the biomass project would employ a third of the coal plant's current workforce, generate a "significant, though yet-unspecified, amount of property tax revenues," and create long-term supply chain jobs in the region for timber harvesting and processing.<sup>242</sup> However, OJT also requests that Public Service provide more specific information on the expected local economic and employment benefits, including information about jobs retained or created and property and other tax revenues generated.<sup>243</sup>

213. Public comments from entities such as the Moffat County Board of County Commissioners, the Routt County Board of County Commissioners, the City of Craig, Northwest Colorado Development Council, Colorado State Senator Dylan Roberts, and the Town Council and Mayor of Hayden also expressed support for the Hayden biomass project, citing the risk that not replacing the coal plant will lead to cascading effects in the form of losing high-paying jobs and reducing funding for important government services.

214. In contrast, certain other parties recommend the Commission reject the Hayden biomass project and potentially reconsider it in an alternative proceeding, mostly pointing to the upcoming 2024 JTS. For example, CEC asserts that the Company has not established that the project is the best solution for the Hayden community, nor that it is worth the additional expense or necessary for emissions reductions.<sup>244</sup>

215. Staff argues that the Hayden biomass project is very high cost and is overall uneconomic, with unclear information about jobs benefits and tax revenue replacement.

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<sup>241</sup> OJT's Comments, p. 3.

<sup>242</sup> OJT's Comments, p. 6.

<sup>243</sup> See OJT's Comments, pp. 3, 6.

<sup>244</sup> CEC's Comments, pp. 13-14.

Staff asserts that the Hayden biomass plant is not designed as a closed-loop facility and thus will not enjoy access to a full production tax credit, meaning that the cost of the biomass unit presented in the 120-Day Report is artificially low. Staff states that it conferred with the Company, which agreed with this critique.<sup>245</sup> Staff also raises concerns that the Hayden biomass project is not sufficiently novel or scalable to be a Section 123 project.<sup>246</sup> Staff suggests that the Commission consider alternatives to the biomass facility in future proceedings.<sup>247</sup>

216. Similar to Staff, WRA raises concerns not only about cost, but also about environmental claims made about the Hayden biomass project. Referencing recent studies, WRA asserts that emissions from the harvesting stage strongly erode any potential emissions benefit, and inefficiencies mean electricity generation with woody biomass can be more carbon-intensive per MWh than coal-generated electricity.<sup>248</sup> WRA argues that Public Service's assertions about the Hayden biomass project being greenhouse gas neutral are incorrect as a matter of practice—biomass electricity generation produces carbon dioxide—and also that the Company has failed to provide information demonstrating that emissions released from combustion are less than would have been emitted without being converted to electrification, pursuant to § 40-2-124(1)(a)(IV).<sup>249</sup> Moreover, WRA states that the 120-Day Report provides insufficient information about planned forest management practices and leaves open the idea that other fuel would be used besides that from fire prevention and pine beetle kill.<sup>250</sup>

217. Like Staff and WRA, Conservation Coalition raises concerns that greenhouse gas emissions from the biomass project will exceed the Company's estimates. Conservation Coalition

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<sup>245</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 53.

<sup>246</sup> Staff's Comments, pp. 51-52.

<sup>247</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 51.

<sup>248</sup> WRA's Comments, pp. 9-10.

<sup>249</sup> WRA's Comments, p. 11.

<sup>250</sup> WRA's Comments, p. 12.

argues that the Commission can consider additional measures for the Hayden community in the 2024 JTS, noting that the last unit at Hayden is not scheduled to retire until 2028.<sup>251</sup> Additionally, public comments from entities like 350 Colorado similarly urge the Commission to find other ways to meet just transition needs due to environmental risks associated with the proposed biomass project, including air pollutant emissions and the potential that salvage logging and deforestation activities may be required to meet fuel needs.

218. In its Response Comments, Public Service reiterates that the Hayden biomass project contributes to three policy objectives: developing clean firm dispatchable capacity with wildfire mitigation benefits, making progress towards emissions reduction goals, and providing just transition benefits. The Company states that not providing new workforce opportunities for communities affected by energy transition is “not a viable path.”<sup>252</sup> However, Public Service also recognizes that questions about cost and tax credit eligibility are legitimate, and therefore proposes alternative procedural pathways, including conditional approval of the project with additional analysis in a follow-on CPCN filing or consideration within the Hayden JTP filing.<sup>253</sup>

## **2. Findings and Conclusions**

219. In its Phase I Decision, the Commission approved provisions of the Phase I Settlement specifying that Public Service will make follow-on JTP filings for each area with an affected coal plant after the Phase II final decision.<sup>254</sup> For purposes of Phase II modeling, JTP costs will include costs associated with workforce transition and community assistance.

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<sup>251</sup> Conservation Coalition’s Comments, pp. 15-16.

<sup>252</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 19.

<sup>253</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, pp. 19-20.

<sup>254</sup> Phase I Settlement, ¶ 109.

220. Regarding the Hayden 1 and Hayden 2 coal plants, the estimated costs of the community assistance is the projected lost property tax revenues for six years following retirement of the respective plant, but these costs may be offset by other investments in the community.<sup>255</sup>

221. The Commission takes seriously its role in supporting a just transition for workers and communities that are impacted by the closure of coal units as part of creating a cleaner energy system. The labors and skills of these communities helped propel Colorado's economy and the reliable electricity we have enjoyed for generations. We have a commitment to do what we can to ensure these communities are not left behind in the energy transition, and this might go beyond even the six-year commitment that was contemplated in the Phase I Settlement. Regarding the closures of Hayden 1 and Hayden 2, we recognize the transmission resources that will be made available in the near future as well as the potential expansion of these transmission resources into the western market. In short, the Commission is hopeful that there will be opportunities for resource development that benefit both local communities and ratepayers in general.

222. Nevertheless, we decline to approve the Hayden biomass project in this Proceeding. We do not have in front of us a complete proposal that allows us to determine whether the project is in the public interest. For example, we are concerned by Staff's assertion that the Company will not qualify for closed-loop biomass tax credits, which leaves the actual cost of the project uncertain, and we are troubled by the potential environmental impacts of the plant that WRA and others raise. Moreover, even CEO and OJT seem to acknowledge that the current proposal lacks important information regarding workforce transition and community benefits. The Hayden biomass project would cost ratepayers approximately \$257 million in PVRR before upward

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<sup>255</sup> Phase I Settlement, p. 19.

adjustments due to tax credit miscalculations, and this is for a relatively small 19 MW project that would replace what has been hundreds of MW of capacity from the Hayden coal plants.<sup>256</sup>

223. While we decline to approve the Hayden biomass project here, in the event Public Service develops clearer answers to the questions raised by parties about the environmental, financial, workforce, and community benefits of the plant, we encourage the Company to bring this or another just transition proposal forward for further consideration as part of the 2024 JTS. The 2024 JTS proceeding<sup>257</sup>—as opposed to the Hayden JTP or a standalone CPCN—will allow the Commission and stakeholder to evaluate the costs and benefits of the biomass project, if rebid, more holistically with other alternatives, including potentially other bids from IPPs that could provide similar tax, employment, and other benefits to the local community. We conclude that reconsidering this or other similar projects in a full competitive solicitation will be the best way to maximize benefits to both the Hayden community and to ratepayers more generally.

224. To effectuate this, Public Service shall confer with relevant stakeholders and determine whether it makes sense to bring forward the Hayden JTP within 120 days of the Phase II decision, consistent with approved provisions of the Phase I Settlement, or to postpone that filing. In conferral with settling parties, and particularly those affected by the potential Hayden JTP filing, since the Hayden Biomass project or other beneficial projects could potentially be reevaluated in the 2024 JTS, we permit flexibility on whether the Hayden JTP should be filed 120 days following the Phase II decision or at a later date.

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<sup>256</sup> See CEO's Comments, p. 22 (comparing Preferred Portfolio with Hayden biomass to the Preferred Portfolio without Hayden biomass).

<sup>257</sup> The Commission emphasizes that the primary focus of the 2024 JTS is the replacement of Unit 3 and the corresponding impacts to the Pueblo community. Nevertheless, as an interim ERP the 2024 JTS also provides an opportunity to evaluate more holistically the various resource opportunities in the Hayden community.

**J. Backup Bids**

225. In the 120-Day Report, the Company proposes three tools to mitigate the risks associated with potential project failure: extensive due diligence, right of first offer (ROFO), and backup bids. Public Service further notes that the 2024 JTS allows for a more rapid opportunity to course correct than the standard four-year ERP cycle typically provides.<sup>258</sup> Regarding the backup bids, Public Service states that these bids are intended to be pre-approved by the Commission as a set of projects to be “next in line” to replace a project in the approved portfolio if it fails.

**1. Party Comments**

226. Staff is generally supportive of the establishment of a pool of back-up resources. However, Staff is concerned that approving a backup pool of bids that includes both Company-owned and PPA bids may create perverse incentives for the Company in negotiating projects. For instance, Staff questions whether the Company’s PPA negotiations with an IPP would be impacted if the IPP project would be replaced with a Company-owned project.<sup>259</sup>

227. Staff recommends that the Commission consider a back-up bid replacement process in which additional process is required for Company-owned backup bids. If a failed project is being replaced by a PPA project, the Company should notify the Commission of such a failure and the steps it intends to take to address the failure, but the Company need not seek Commission approval prior to commencing negotiations. If a failed project is being replaced by a Company-owned project, however, the Company would be required to do the following: (a) notify the Commission and provide additional evidence and detail regarding the steps taken to attempt to

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<sup>258</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 44-46.

<sup>259</sup> Staff’s Comments, p. 66.

remediate the failed project; (b) retain the burden to prove that the Company-owned project was the prudent replacement; and (c) provide robust alternatives analysis as part of the follow-on CPCN proceeding. Regarding the available pool of backup bids, Staff recommends that any project included in the Company's inverse Preferred Portfolio that is not ultimately approved in this Proceeding should be eligible for inclusion in the back-up pool.<sup>260</sup>

228. Similar to Staff, CIEA approves of the backup bid concept and recommends that the Commission approve the backup bid projects as contingency projects. However, CIEA asserts that it will be important for the Commission to clarify the back-up bid process and list clear criteria to avoid controversy in the implementation of Phase II.<sup>261</sup>

229. COSSA/SEIA also raises concerns with perverse incentives that could arise when an IPP project fails but focuses its concern on the Company's ROFO. The ROFO is a provision in the model PPA that allows the Company to step into a failed IPP project and take over development. COSSA/SEIA recommends that the Commission require the Company to first use its identified list of backup bids before deploying the ROFO, as the latter guarantees that the Company's ownership share will grow after a project fails. COSSA/SEIA argues that allowing for ROFO to be used prior to backup bids could incentivize the Company to slow-walk PPA negotiations, placing IPP projects in peril, with the knowledge that the Company can simply offer to buy the developer out if or when the project goes south.<sup>262</sup>

230. In its Response Comments, the Company agrees that some of the intervenor recommendations have merit but argues for the importance of maintaining price integrity and

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<sup>260</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 66.

<sup>261</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 24-25.

<sup>262</sup> COSSA/SEIA's Comments, pp. 18-20.

allowing for flexibility to move to a backup bid for timely replacement.<sup>263</sup> The Company argues that, to the extent practicable, the Company will try to select “like for like” backup bids both in terms of technology and ownership. More specifically, Public Service argues that it should be able to move forward with an IPP backup bid after a simple notice provided to the Commission and when the backup bid is Company-owned, the Company should only be subject to a “limited-scope” CPCN process similar to any other Company-owned project in an approved resource plan.<sup>264</sup>

231. Public Service argues against adopting an approach set forth by Staff and others in which the Company would be required to undergo more process when it replaces an IPP project with a Company-owned project. The Company acknowledges the “academic” concerns about perverse incentives but argues that its commitment to strive for “like for like” replacements and the Company’s conduct in this Proceeding should comfort the Commission.<sup>265</sup> Public Service further argues that a limited scope CPCN is appropriate because Company-owned replacement projects would need to move quickly in order to meet resource needs.

232. Public Service also argues the presumption of prudence under Rule 3617(d) should apply to all backup bids as they move forward, providing regulatory certainty for these projects.

233. Finally, in its Response Comments, Public Service notes two resource modifications in the UPP: (1) replacing a Company-owned solar plus storage project (Bid 0476) with an IPP solar plus storage project (Bid 0303), and (2) replacing a Company-owned wind project (Bid 0045) with a different Company-owned wind project (Bid 1024). The Company also requests that the Commission approve a specific backup for Bid 0044. Bid 0044 is an IPP wind

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<sup>263</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, pp. 39-40.

<sup>264</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 42.

<sup>265</sup> As an example of the Company’s conduct, Public Service notes that in the UPP the Company proposes to replace a Company-owned bid (Bid 0467) with an IPP bid (Bid 0303). (Public Service’s Response Comments, p. 42).

bid that might not be able to move forward at its as-bid price. The Company requests that the Commission approve Bid 0254 as its backup. Bid 0254 is also an IPP wind project.<sup>266</sup>

234. Because the resource modifications in the UPP impact the backup bid portfolio, Public Service provides an updated portfolio of backup bids set forth in Table 3 of its Response Comments.<sup>267</sup>

## **2. Findings and Conclusions**

235. At the outset, the Commission expressly approves the updated list of backup bids set forth in Table 3 of the Company's Response Comments. Recognizing that the backup bids in Table 3 were compiled in anticipation of the UPP and not the Alternative Portfolio, however, we clarify that the Company may use its discretion to adjust the portfolio of backup bids as necessary given the authorizations we have attached to the Alternative Portfolio. For instance, consistent with Staff's recommendation to include projects from the inverse Preferred Portfolio, it would be reasonable to include as a backup bid any bid within the UPP that is not in the Alternative Portfolio.

236. In addition, we agree with the Company's position and confirm that the presumption of prudence set forth in Rule 3617(d) applies to any backup bid that moves forward in accordance with the Commission's approved process for selecting backup bids.

237. Regarding the selection of backup bids, the Commission finds merit in the concerns raised by Staff, CIEA, and COSSA/SEIA that there should be more process in place for when Public Service selects a Company-owned backup bid or when the Company uses its ROFO to buy-out a failing IPP bid. We find persuasive the arguments regarding perverse incentives and worry that without additional process, the selection of a Company-owned backup bid or the

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<sup>266</sup> See Public Service's Response Comments, p. 6.

<sup>267</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 27.

exercise of the Company's ROFO could give rise to the appearance of bias. While the Commission acknowledges the benefits of allowing the Company discretion to quickly pivot to a backup bid, these benefits must be balanced with guardrails that protect customers, enhance fairness amongst bidders, and increase transparency. Conversely, the Commission disagrees with suggestions from CIEA that the Commission should establish clear criteria for the selection of backup bids or mandate like-for-like replacements. Apart from concerns regarding the selection of a Company-owned bid instead of an IPP project, we believe that Public Service should have the flexibility to use its discretion to select the most appropriate backup bid.

238. Accordingly, we generally adopt Staff's suggested approach in which—among other things—Public Service retains the burden of proving that any Company-owned backup project was the prudent replacement and would need to provide a robust alternatives analysis as part of the follow-on CPCN proceeding.<sup>268</sup> The additional protections set forth in Staff's approach also apply when the Company exercises its ROFO and when the Company replaces a Company-owned project with a Company-owned backup. That said, we emphasize that the additional process set forth in Staff's proposal must move quickly, especially in instances in which the replacement is like for like.

239. Finally, we clarify that the backup bid selection process set forth above does not apply to the two replacement projects the Company proposed as part of the UPP. Specifically, the Company may replace Bid 0476 with Bid 0303 and may replace Bid 0045 with Bid 1024. The Company already explains the need for replacement and the economics of alternative backup bids in its Response Comments. Moreover, the concerns that the Company would have perverse incentives during PPA negotiations do not apply at this point in the process. For the same reasons,

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<sup>268</sup> See Staff's Comments, p. 66.

we approve Bid 0254 as the backup bid for Bid 0044 if Bid 0044 cannot move forward. Acknowledging that the Company's Response Comments presumed the selection of the UPP, as opposed to the Alternative Portfolio, we clarify that the Company has the flexibility to make the necessary resource modifications consistent with the Company's Response Comments.

#### **K. Section 123 Resources**

240. In the 120-Day Report, Public Service states five bids qualified as Section 123 Resources pursuant to the criteria established in the Phase I Decision.<sup>269</sup> In addition to the Hayden biomass project, Bids 0011, 0106, 0269, and 0552 were considered as Section 123 Resources. Other than the Hayden biomass, only Bid 0011 was sometimes selected in the Phase II portfolios.<sup>270</sup> While Public Service included the Hayden biomass project in its Preferred Portfolio, the Company rejected the other Section 123 resources for various reasons, including cost, project risk, and location. Regarding Bid 0106 (a hydrogen fuel cell project) and Bid 0269 (a long-duration storage project), the Company states that there could be long term benefits if these projects are successful. Public Service states that the Company would be interested in moving forward with these projects if the Commission were to approve them *in addition to* the other projects in the Preferred Portfolio.<sup>271</sup>

241. CEO supports the Commission approving Bid 0106 (the hydrogen fuel cell project). CEO argues that pursuing this project as a firm resource would help the state continue its development of hydrogen as a pathway to decarbonization. While CEO acknowledges the project involves certain risks, CEO argues that the potential benefits outweigh these risks, noting that the

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<sup>269</sup> Public Service notes that one additional project claimed Section 123 but did not meet the Phase I Decision's criteria.

<sup>270</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 139.

<sup>271</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 150-51.

State intends to continue pursuing the development of hydrogen. Alternatively, if the Commission does not believe it is the right time to approve the project, CEO recommends that the Commission “direct Public Service to pursue a similar project in either the Just Transition Plan or through its next ERP in 2026.”<sup>272</sup>

242. In its Response Comments, Public Service maintains that it does not recommend approval of the project as part of this Phase II ERP. However, the Company states that it appreciates and shares CEO’s interest in pursuing the hydrogen fuel cell project and that Public Service is interested in exploring the viability of the project. Public Service goes on to state that it sees opportunities to pursue Bid 0106 or other hydrogen projects as part of proceedings conducted pursuant to HB 23-1281, the upcoming 2024 JTS, or through a separate filing.<sup>273</sup>

243. Pursuant to § 40-2-123(1)(a), C.R.S., the Commission shall:

give the fullest possible consideration to the cost-effective implementation of new clean energy and energy-efficient technologies in its consideration of generation acquisitions for electric utilities, bearing in mind the beneficial contributions such technologies make to Colorado’s energy security, economic prosperity, insulation from fuel price increases, and environmental protection, including risk mitigation in areas of high wildfire risk as designated by the state forest service.

244. As required, the Commission has fully considered Section 123 Resources. This consideration began in Phase I when the Commission approved a modeling approach for Section 123 Resources and adopted guidelines proposed by Public Service to define these resources, emphasizing that they must be new, innovative, not commercialized, and could not include standalone wind, solar, or lithium-ion storage.<sup>274</sup> This framework enabled the efficient presentation of Section 123 Resources in the 120-Day Report, which in turn allowed the

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<sup>272</sup> CEO’s Comments, pp. 18-20.

<sup>273</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, pp. 110-11.

<sup>274</sup> Phase I Decision, ¶ 501.

Commission and stakeholders to evaluate the various risks and potential benefits of the Section 123 Resources.

245. We have considered the beneficial attributes of all of the Section 123 Resources, including Bid 0106 which CEO supports. We further note that the Alternative Portfolio includes Bid 0011 which, while proposed as a Section 123 Resource, was included based on economic modeling. As to the question of whether additional Section 123 Resources should be pursued at this time, however, we agree with Public Service's position set forth above in its Response Comments. Given uncertainty ranging from tax credits to the implementation of HB 23-1281, it would be premature to approve additional projects here, including Bid 0106. Should hydrogen projects be included as bids within the 2024 JTS, they can be more appropriately considered there. Accordingly, no further Section 123 Resources are approved here, and we look forward to consideration of innovative technologies in the 2024 JTS.

#### **L. Prospective New Load**

246. In its 120-Day Report, Public Service states that large loads, such as the demand and energy requirements of new data centers, are developing at a faster pace than historic trends. The Company thus requests that the Commission approve a "Prospective New Load Preferred Plan" (PNL) portfolio to accommodate potential new load of 300 MW beginning in January 2026. Public Service states that at least some of this 300 MW new load would be better described as "more likely" than "possible." The Company recommends the Commission allow it to use the backup bid pool to serve this load if needed. Public Service specifically puts forth four additional bids that would be included in the PNL portfolio: two storage projects, as solar project, and a 219 MW gas project.<sup>275</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 55-57.

247. Several parties, including CEO, Conservation Coalition, Interwest, Staff, and WRA raise concerns about the PNL portfolio, particularly its inclusion of 219 MW of new gas generation. CEO and Staff suggest that the new load is speculative and could fail to materialize, and with Conservation Coalition and WRA, recommend that new load be addressed as part of the load forecast in the 2024 JTS.<sup>276</sup> Staff asserts that two large wholesale loads have announced the intention to leave the Company's system but remain in the Company's load forecast, which cuts against the arguments that additional generation resources will be necessary. Likewise, Staff critiques the Company's demand response sensitivity analysis, arguing that aggressive demand side solutions would mitigate concerns regarding new load.<sup>277</sup> CEO adds that if the Commission does approve the PNL portfolio, it should ensure ratepayer protections if the new load fails to emerge. For example, CEO suggests that if new load does not emerge, shareholders should be responsible for the cost of additional new gas generation instead of ratepayers.<sup>278</sup>

248. In its Response Comments, the Company maintains that that the PNL portfolio has value in this Proceeding and as a general resource planning matter in the current environment. Public Service acknowledges intervenors' comments that new load is speculative but states that it has more information than intervenors and reiterates the challenge associated with new, large loads developing at a faster pace than before. Public Service agrees, however, that should additional resources not be approved for procurement here, it is reasonable to revisit the issue in the 2024 JTS.<sup>279</sup>

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<sup>276</sup> Staff's Comments, pp. 53-54; CEO's Comments, pp. 15-16; WRA's Comments, pp. 19-20; Conservation Coalition's Comments, p. 14.

<sup>277</sup> Staff's Comments, pp. 53-54.

<sup>278</sup> CEO's Comments, p. 16.

<sup>279</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 106.

249. We take the risk that new load is increasing seriously,<sup>280</sup> but we decline to approve the PNL portfolio. We agree with Staff's assertion that based on what is currently publicly known, these load additions are speculative and could be offset by future load departures and more effective efforts around demand response. Moreover, given that the new load is speculative but would directly result in adding a new gas resource, it deserves both the full vetting of a Phase I process, through which such questions of appropriate load forecasts and sensitivities are traditionally considered, and consideration as to the impact of new large loads that might seek economic development rates on state emissions targets.

**M. Clean Energy Plan Rider (CEPR)**

250. Section 40-2-125.5(5), C.R.S. authorizes Public Service to initiate a CEPR, capped at a maximum rate of 1.5 percent of customers' total electric bill, to collect new revenues to fund the approved, additional clean energy plan activities that are undertaken to meet the clean energy target applicable to the Company. However, the statute also prescribes limitations on what the CEPR can fund.

251. In Phase I, the Commission rejected the complex, counterfactual modeling proposal put forward by Public Service in support of the approval and prospective implementation of its CEPR. The Commission further declined to move forward with Public Service's presumption that the Company could apply RESA funding to offset CEP costs, even as the Commission approved certain related provisions of the Phase I Settlement that relate to reporting and treatment of over- and under-collections. Instead, the Commission directed Public Service to file significantly more detail on anticipated cost recovery mechanisms in the 120-Day Report and to file an

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<sup>280</sup> To address this risk, we encourage Public Service to work to ensure that it has additional firm dispatchable resources as close to construction ready as reasonably possible.

application in a separate future proceeding presenting its methodology for defining and assigning costs related to additional clean energy activities as between the CEPR and the RESA, no later than one year in advance of beginning to recover costs attributable to the CEPR.

### **1. Public Service's New CEPR Proposals and Party Comments**

252. In its 120-Day Report, Public Service completely revises its cost recovery methodology as compared to the proposals the Company presented in Phase I of this Proceeding. For instance, the Company compared its Preferred Portfolio to the reference case and identified the following incremental actions and investments: acquisition of clean energy resources, the Brush Coal Plant gas conversion, reduction of Pueblo Unit 3 operations, gas storage, transmission, and community assistance and workforce transition plans. Out of these, Public Service states that clean energy resources, Brush Coal Plant conversion costs from 2025-2030,<sup>281</sup> and community assistance and workforce transition plans should be considered clean energy plan activities that are eligible for CEPR recovery (noting that community assistance and workforce transition costs are statutorily also eligible to be recovered through other riders). Public Service explains that, pursuant to § 40-2-125.5(5)(b)(III), the Company will exclude transmission, fuel costs for Pueblo unit 3 operations, and gas storage, and proposes they be collected from other cost recovery mechanisms, such as the ECA, the Transmission Cost Adjustment, and base rates.<sup>282</sup>

253. To attribute the costs of clean energy plan activities to the CEPR, Public Services proposes to sort resources into energy or capacity and then to stack them from lowest to highest based on accredited capacity and levelized cost of energy or capacity calculated using Encompass, the model used for bid evaluation and selection.<sup>283</sup> This approach results in three solar and storage

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<sup>281</sup> The Brush Coal Plant conversion costs are also being considered within Proceeding No. 22A-0563E.

<sup>282</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 168-69.

<sup>283</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 169.

resources being identified as attributable to the CEP in the “energy resource stack” and no resources being identified as attributable to the CEP in the “capacity resource stack.” Public Service suggests refining this methodology and extending it to CEPR/RESA interactions through the post-Phase II application. Public Service also adds that the exact costs for community assistance and workforce transition will be evaluated in future JTP filings.<sup>284</sup>

254. Public Service requests that the Commission authorize it to file an advice letter to initiate the CEPR for collections purposes beginning either January 1, 2024, or January 1, 2025, depending on when the Phase II Decision is issued. Public Service forecasts that by starting collections at 1.4 percent in 2024, it would be over-collected by \$6.3 million in 2030, and it would be under-collected by \$19.3 million in 2030 if it began collections at 1.5 percent in 2025.<sup>285</sup>

255. UCA raises concerns about the Company’s approach, including that the presentation of levelized energy costs for resource stacking does not match costs presented in appendices, and therefore the bids may be incorrectly sorted as to cost recovery mechanism. UCA further argues that the costs associated with the early retirement of Hayden 1, Hayden 2, Craig 2, and the entire costs of the Brush Coal Plant conversion should be considered CEP costs, and therefore the under-collections for the CEPR will be higher than Public Service anticipates.<sup>286</sup>

256. Public Service argues that UCA has not correctly applied updated modeling values and explains that only the conversion of the Brush Coal Plant from coal to gas would be considered an additional clean energy plan activity. With regard to the RESA, Public Service states that the methodology it used to distinguish between the ERP and the CEP will also be used to distinguish between clean energy resources and eligible energy resources. The Company reiterates that it

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<sup>284</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 170-72.

<sup>285</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 172-73.

<sup>286</sup> UCA’s Comments, pp. 27-28.

intends to file the application presenting its methodology for defining and assigning costs between the RESA and CEPR promptly after the final Phase II decision, consistent with the Phase I decision. Accordingly, Public Service reiterates its request that the Commission approve the establishment of the CEPR at the full 1.5 percent in its Phase II decision, with collections to begin as soon as possible upon filing of an advice letter.<sup>287</sup>

## 2. Findings and Conclusions

257. We conclude that further process is still required to determine whether the CEPR should be initiated at the full 1.5 percent as proposed by Public Service in its 120-Day Report. Nevertheless, we generally agree with, and approve, its categorization of actions and investments which should be considered additional clean energy plan activities, including those that may be recoverable through the CEPR,<sup>288</sup> as the Company's new proposals are clearer and will avoid the inappropriate levels of complexity that were present in the counterfactual Phase I proposal.<sup>289</sup> That said, given its late introduction, the balance of the Company's latest CEPR proposals has not been fully vetted by stakeholders and questions remain as to variations between data tables and appendices. Moreover, the application of this methodology for RESA/CEPR cost recovery is less clear than its applicability for ERP/CEP questions. Finally, the Commission has selected the Alternative Portfolio instead of the UPP, necessitating greater clarity on cost recovery (*e.g.*, whether the resource stack changes and results in different allocations between cost recovery mechanisms).

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<sup>287</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 98-100.

<sup>288</sup> To clarify, consistent with the discussion above, transmission investments as presented in the 120-Day Report are not considered additional clean energy plan activities.

<sup>289</sup> We note that while the Commission deferred the specifics of cost recovery for early retirement for Craig 2, Hayden 1, and Hayden 2, it approved the provisions of the Phase I Settlement that affirmed that they should be excluded from CEPR recovery (*i.e.*, they would be included within the reference case for modeling purposes), (Phase I Decision, ¶ 63; Phase I Settlement, ¶¶ 27-28). *See also* Proceeding No. 22A-0515E.

258. Given the timing of this Phase II Decision, pursuant to § 40-2-125.5(b)(II), C.R.S., the earliest the CEPR would be able to be placed into effect is January 1, 2025. Accordingly, we direct the Company, as part of its application regarding attribution of costs between the CEPR and RESA as still required by the Phase I Decision, to address the recovery of specific activities within the categories set forth above, based on the approved resource portfolio. The application should also address the appropriate level for the CEPR to be initiated on January 1, 2025.

**N. Best Value Employment Metrics**

259. The Phase I Settlement established a multistep process in the Phase II bid evaluation to ensure consideration of BVEM in accordance with § 40-2-129(1)(a), C.R.S. First, the RFP directed bidders to include quantitative information with bid packages that addressed the BVEM statutory requirements, including access to apprenticeships and industry-standard wages and benefits. Second, a bid incorporating a Project Labor Agreement (PLA) was deemed to meet threshold BVEM standards. Third, the Company agreed to screen bids based on BVEM and disqualify those that did not provide sufficient BVEM. Fourth, the Company would retain a labor economist to score the bids for advancement to computer modeling. The Phase I Settlement goes on to specify that the Company will provide a cumulative BVEM score for each portfolio in the 120-Day Report.<sup>290</sup> Finally, one of the required Phase II portfolios was a “high PLA portfolio.”

260. In the 120-Day Report, Public Service confirms that it implemented this multi-step BVEM process during Phase II. The Leeds School of Business at the University of Colorado-Boulder was hired as a labor economist and provided scoring of 166 bids. The Company states that it disqualified bids with insufficient BVEM information. In addition, the

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<sup>290</sup> Phase I Settlement, ¶ 69.

Company notes that Appendix K to the 120-Day Report contains the BVEM documentation that the bidders provided.<sup>291</sup>

261. The Labor Interests describe the challenging history of Colorado's efforts to account for the employment impacts of resource planning through the Phase II solicitation and modeling process. The Labor Interests describe the quantitative scoring provided by the labor economist as a positive evolution in the consideration of BVEM but remain concerned that BVEM was less emphasized after bids were advanced to modeling. Ultimately, however, the Labor Interests support the Preferred Portfolio including the Hayden biomass unit as having a strong BVEM score that matches or exceeds other modelled portfolios and offers an imperfect, but positive, middle ground. The Labor Interests note the positive relationship between utility ownership and BVEM due to Public Service's involvement in collective bargaining.<sup>292</sup> They further add that SB 23-292 is a recent and strong statement in support of robust and protective labor policies which will have a significant impact on all phases of energy generation in the future.<sup>293</sup>

262. Staff argues that the RFP informed the bidders of the categories and subcategories of information that would be used to develop the BVEM score, however, it did not specify the weighting of these categories and subcategories to the bidders. Staff is concerned that the approach incentivizes detail over quality. Staff suggests that the BVEM scoring methodology could use improved documentation as verifying the methodology is challenging due to lack of sufficient information. That said, Staff notes that it checked for consistency of BVEM scoring across

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<sup>291</sup> 120-Day Report, pp. 159-60.

<sup>292</sup> Labor Interests' Comments, pp. 7-8.

<sup>293</sup> Labor Interests' Comments, pp. 8.

different bids and found it to be consistent and objective.<sup>294</sup> WRA likewise supports utilization of a BVEM scoring methodology in future ERPs.<sup>295</sup>

263. In its Response Comments, Public Service agrees with the Labor Interests that the BVEM scoring methodology in this ERP is an improvement and should be continued, with iterations. Public Service specifically supports using a similar BVEM scoring methodology in future ERPs, including the 2024 JTS.<sup>296</sup>

264. As noted earlier, the Commission has considered the employment of Colorado labor and its positive impacts on the long-term economic viability of Colorado communities throughout this ERP proceeding pursuant to § 40-2-129, C.R.S. These considerations began in Phase I of this Proceeding when the Commission approved the multistep process in the Phase II bid evaluation regarding BVEM and continued in Phase II in our review of the 120-Day Report, the relevant party comments, and the cumulative BVEM score for all portfolios. In addition to BVEM, the Commission must consider and balance many factors in its decision regarding the optimal resource portfolio, including emissions reductions, costs, and reliability. The consideration of these combined factors culminates in a Phase II decision.

265. The Alternative Portfolio has a slightly lower BVEM score (48 percent) than the UPP's BVEM score (52.7 percent). Nevertheless, we find that the positive attributes of the Alternative Portfolio, including cost, emissions reductions, reliability, and the ability to better address future technology developments and transmission concerns as detailed above, outweigh the lower BVEM score.

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<sup>294</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 68.

<sup>295</sup> WRA's Comments, pp. 25-29.

<sup>296</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 106-07.

266. As Labor Interests set forth, the process of evolving a qualitative concept like BVEM into a meaningful component of bid evaluation has been a long and thoughtful process, with a significant amount of evolution demonstrated through the Phase I Settlement and Phase II. In such a sweeping and significant process as an ERP, even though moving incrementally can be frustrating, nuanced iterations are often the best course of action.

267. Moreover, the Alternative Portfolio includes slightly fewer resources and therefore will provide time for the application of BVEM to continue to evolve. This also means that resources that are deferred now could be brought into the future ERPs through an even more robust process, which is necessary to comply with additional statutory requirements in § 40-2-129, C.R.S.<sup>297</sup>

268. We also agree with Labor Interests that the thoughtful work performed by the labor economist in this Proceeding represents an enhancement of how BVEM can be incorporated into decision-making. However, Staff also raises valid points in that the methodology could be more clearly articulated for bidders. In this vein, we would be interested in seeing proposed changes to the model PPAs in the 2024 JTS aimed at clarifying standards for BVEM to ensure that IPPs and the Company are competing on a level playing field regarding BVEM. We encourage the collaboration of Labor Interests in this effort, such that work on the model PPAs will account for the role that the IRA can play in producing projects with high BVEM scores by incorporating factors such as the IRA's prevailing wage requirements. We also note that high BVEM scores generally track high utility ownership percentages and express our desire that IPPs that are interested in building projects in Colorado should improve their BVEM to ensure they stay competitive with Company-owned bids in this regard.

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<sup>297</sup> These new requirements in § 40-2-129, C.R.S., are effective January 1, 2024.

**O. In Service Date Extensions**

269. In connection with the delays in this Proceeding associated with Public Service's filing of the 120-Day Report, CIEA argues that the Commission should allow IPPs to have a corresponding extension of the ISDs of their projects. CIEA specifically proposes that all projects in the selected portfolio as well as backup bids with ISDs in 2026 and 2027 (spilling into 2028 by up to 75 days if necessary) should have a one-time election to extend the ISDs up to 75 days. CIEA argues that this will address the acute issues in the market and Public Service's delays in the Phase II process in a straightforward and transparent manner.<sup>298</sup> In addition, CIEA requests that backup bids should be granted an ISD extension equal to the number of days after the Phase II Decision when the backup bid gets approved to move to the selected portfolio.<sup>299</sup>

270. In its Response Comments, the Company supports CIEA's recommendations and agrees that all project developers should have the opportunity to extend the ISD of their approved projects and backup bids commensurate with the extended Phase II timeline. The Company further recommends the Commission acknowledge that delays in generation resource ISDs due to transmission-related delays, such as delays associated with interconnection, backfeed, and substation construction, shall be considered reasonable.<sup>300</sup>

271. Likewise, Public Service asserts that backup bids should be allowed an extension of their commercial operation date (COD) by the number of days after the Phase II Decision that the backup bid is approved to move to the selected portfolio. The Company supports this COD extension because selected backup bids will see a delay in their selection given their backup bid

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<sup>298</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 41-42

<sup>299</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 41-42.

<sup>300</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 103-04.

status, and the COD extension increases the likelihood that the backup projects will come to fruition.<sup>301</sup>

272. In accordance with CIEA's recommendations, we authorize Public Service to extend ISDs upon application by IPPs by up to 75 days as well as any delays in transmission assets to which individual projects interconnect. No support should be required of the IPP for ISD delays of 75 days or fewer. Before granting an ISD extension greater than 75 days, the Company should be directed to obtain a thorough and credible explanation from the IPP detailing how delays related to completion of Public Service transmission projects prevented it from achieving its proposed ISD. We likewise adopt the ISD extension for backup bids that Public Service sets forth in its Response Comments.

#### **P. Repricing**

273. CIEA also requests that the Commission clarify that Public Service can allow IPPs to reprice their projects if delays in transmission project completion cause cost increases through no fault of the IPP. CIEA asserts that IPPs "cannot be expected to maintain as-bid pricing through material delays in transmission upgrade and interconnection processes."<sup>302</sup> CIEA similarly argues that backup bids are likely to be stale by the time Public Service calls upon such bids to move forward. Accordingly, CIEA argues that the Commission should allow an opportunity for limited repricing of backup bids to keep up with inflation.<sup>303</sup>

274. Public Service argues against the suggestion that backup bids should be provided a repricing opportunity, arguing that doing so could impugn the integrity of the process. However, the Company does support allowing price increases in the limited circumstance where a

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<sup>301</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 40-41.

<sup>302</sup> CIEA's Comments, p. 22.

<sup>303</sup> CIEA's Comments, p. 25.

transmission cost estimate is different than the estimate provided as part of the RFP. Public Service states that this should be the only basis for repricing and should be equally applicable to any bid with which the Company moves forward.<sup>304</sup>

275. The Commission agrees with Public Service's position and denies CIEA's request to allow backup bids to reprice. The one exception is that repricing is allowed for backup bids in the case where the transmission costs provided in the RFP have changed, consistent with Public Service's proposal in its Response Comments.

### **Q. 2024 Just Transition Solicitation**

276. Given the various issues that have arisen in Phase II of this Proceeding, several intervenors argue that the Commission should issue various directives to Public Service to improve the ERP process. As discussed below, these proposed improvements cover topics including modeling, the ability of IPPs to negotiate the terms of Model PPAs during Phase II, and the appropriate amount of Company ownership.

#### **1. Modeling Improvements**

277. Staff, CIEA, Interwest, Conservation Coalition, and WRA all put forth various proposals aimed at improving the modeling process of bids in the 2024 JTS. Relatedly, CEO suggests process improvements for the 2026 ERP. For example, CIEA's proposals include asking the Commission to reject the use of the things like the best-in-class modeling and the reliability rubric for use in the 2024 JTS.<sup>305</sup> CIEA also argues that the annuity method of modeling portfolios should be used going forward and that Public Service should be required to analyze the failure of

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<sup>304</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 41.

<sup>305</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 6-7, 29-31.

the model and possible solutions, including a process for returning to the Commission in the event of model failures.<sup>306</sup>

278. Interwest requests that the Commission require a full analysis of both the computer system used in this ERP as well as an estimate of what computer system would have been able to run the modeling software in the timeframe required under the ERP rules.<sup>307</sup> For future ERPs, Interwest argues that the curtailment projections must be more flexible and consider the likelihood that curtailments will be reduced over the long term.<sup>308</sup>

279. Conservation Coalition proposes numerous directives for the Commission to issue regarding the 2024 JTS. As an example of some of these proposals, Conservation Coalition argues that the Company should be required to provide the modeling input and output files to all parties and provide written explanation for all manual adjustments made to the modeling. Conservation Coalition also recommends that the Commission require the use of round-trip modeling, building all portfolios to the same minimum level of reliability, and running a scenario in which, the model replaces all 2-hour storage with 4-hour storage. Similarly, Conservation Coalition argues that Public Service should be required to conduct capacity accreditation studies and planning reserve studies in the same software tool and database to ensure consistency.<sup>309</sup>

280. WRA's proposals include things such as how generic prices should be used, requirements for the IE, and—more broadly—a different approach to ERP solicitations that uses sequential, rolling solicitations. WRA also proposes that Public Service develop and propose a

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<sup>306</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 30-31.

<sup>307</sup> Interwest's Comments, p. 11.

<sup>308</sup> Interwest's Comments, p. 12.

<sup>309</sup> Conservation Coalition's Comments, pp. 18-20.

transparent scoring system for non-price factors, such as environmental compliance and community support.<sup>310</sup>

281. Arguing for higher-level changes to the ERP process, CEO raises concerns that the ERP process fails to develop a set of portfolios that are significantly different in terms of the resources considered or even the relative cost. Citing its proposals in Proceeding No. 19R-0096E for requiring electric utilities to submit various types of plans with their ERPs, CEO recommends that the Commission direct the Company to include scenario-type analysis as part of the 2026 ERP. CEO also encourages the Commission to re-open its ERP rules and adopt new rules that are more relevant to today's utility environment and that will help Colorado achieve its climate goals.<sup>311</sup>

282. Staff proposes that the Company explain in the 2024 JTS how it will update the effective load carrying capability (ELCC) and planning reserve margin (PRM) studies with the goal of accurately modeling portfolio level ELCC interactions to create reliable portfolios in EnCompass. Staff also recommends that Public Service work with Staff prior to the 2024 JTS to develop more robust modeling processes regarding things like best-in-class modeling, the reliability rubric, meaningful demand side resources options, and inconsistent or unexplained modeling results.<sup>312</sup>

283. In its Response Comments, the Company does not oppose Staff's recommendation to include an explanation in the Pueblo JTP filing as to how it plans to improve the accuracy of modeling portfolio level ELCC interactions.<sup>313</sup> However, Public Service appears to disagree with

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<sup>310</sup> WRA's Comments, pp. 25-29.

<sup>311</sup> CEO's Comments, p. 30.

<sup>312</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 74.

<sup>313</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 104.

Staff's recommendation that the Company be required to work with Staff in the interim to develop more robust modeling processes.<sup>314</sup>

284. Regarding Conservation Coalition's recommendation that the Company conduct capacity accreditation studies and planning reserve studies in the same software tool, Public Service states that, as part of the Phase I Settlement, the Company has already committed to utilize the same modeling software and inputs for ELCC and PRM studies in future resource planning cycles and will also survey best practices in other jurisdictions when developing its methodology for these studies. The Company thus argues that the Phase II Decision does not need to reiterate this requirement.<sup>315</sup>

285. As for the arguments about increased information sharing, process improvements, and transparency, the Company asserts that no directives addressing these issues should be issued in this Proceeding. While Public Service acknowledges that there is always room for improvement in the resource planning and intervenor participation process, the Company argues that such issues are more appropriately resolved a part of a robust Phase I process in the 2024 JTS and the 2026 ERP.<sup>316</sup>

286. The Commission hereby adopts Staff's recommendations and will require Public Service to explain how the Company plans on accurately modelling portfolio level ELCC interactions in connection with its updated ELCC and PRM studies. We further direct the Company to confer with Staff and other interested parties prior to the 2024 JTS to develop more robust modeling processes regarding things like best-in-class modeling, the reliability rubric, meaningful demand side resources options, and inconsistent or unexplained modeling results.

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<sup>314</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 112.

<sup>315</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 104-05.

<sup>316</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 111-12.

287. In contrast, we decline to adopt in this Phase II Decision the numerous other modeling and process proposals, including those proposed by party commenters that are expressly discussed above. Some of these proposals closely resemble topics that were adjudicated in Phase I (*e.g.*, making the modeling files available for other parties).<sup>317</sup> More generally, the Commission finds that it would be premature on this Phase II record to specify how the next ERP process will resolve these modelling and process issues. Nevertheless, as referenced above, we take seriously the numerous concerns that parties raised regarding how Public Service conducted the Phase II modeling, including the manual adjustments the Company made in Phase II and how difficult it was for the parties to analyze the impact of these adjustments. Likewise, we share many of the parties' concerns regarding the model's shortcomings as to issues such as curtailments and the interaction between new generation and transmission. While resolution of these issues for purposes of future ERP proceedings will benefit from a more robust record than is available to us during this Phase II, many of these concerns contribute to our decision to modify the CEP to include the Alternative Portfolio.

## **2. Non-Negotiable PPA Terms**

288. Interwest asserts that the negotiating process on the model PPAs was not explained in advance and put some bidders at a significant and unexpected disadvantage. Interwest states that Public Service found several redlines to model PPAs unacceptable during the due diligence process, prior to actual PPA negotiations, but necessary to advance in the bid selection process. Interwest recommends that the Commission consider language in the Phase II decision specifying that only after a bid is selected should the PPA negotiations start, and Public Service should be

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<sup>317</sup> Phase I Decision, ¶ 513.

prohibited from using the threat of bid elimination to force bidders to accept terms that this Commission has specifically intended to be negotiable.<sup>318</sup>

289. COSSA/SEIA similarly recommends that the Commission mandate that the Company identify which model PPA terms it considers non-negotiable, and that this be litigated in Phase I of future ERP proceedings so that all parties would enter Phase II on the same page about which terms are open to negotiation.<sup>319</sup>

290. CIEA claims that many IPPs felt bullied to identify model PPA-changes they would accept or forego the opportunity to raise such issues later in contract negotiation and were pressured to adopt Public Service's position just to remain in the evaluation process. CIEA recommends that the Commission direct a new approach that limits Public Service's ability to negotiate PPA terms with bidders during the bid evaluation process.<sup>320</sup>

291. In Public Service's Response Comments, the Company argues that the Commission should reject recommendations that would restrict the Company's ability to negotiate PPA terms with bidders during the bid evaluation process. The Company argues that to the extent bidders do not submit compliant bids, the Company must retain the ability to work with bidders to bring bids into compliance and ensure a viable and comparable bid pool. The Company does, however, support recommendations from CIEA and COSSA/SEIA that non-negotiable model PPA provisions be clearly set forth in its Phase I 2024 JTS filing and be formalized in the Commission's Phase I decision. Public Service states that doing so will provide additional clarity to bidders and

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<sup>318</sup> Interwest's Comments, pp. 9-10.

<sup>319</sup> COSSA/SEIA's Comments, pp. 15-18.

<sup>320</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 32-35 ().

would help mitigate the need for extensive PPA contract discussions during the bid evaluation process.<sup>321</sup>

292. The Commission agrees with the IPP intervenors and the Company that there should be more clarity for bidders regarding what terms of the model PPA contracts are negotiable. We accordingly adopt Public Service's position and require the Company to clearly set forth the non-negotiable PPA terms in its Phase I 2024 JTS filing with the expectation that such terms will be formalized in the Commission's Phase I decision approving model PPAs.

293. As noted by Interwest and Public Service, "Colorado does not have a 'conforming bid' policy whereby bidders have to bid to the model agreements 'as-is.'"<sup>322</sup> However, having the Company and IE attempt to determine on an *ad hoc* basis during the bid evaluation process which terms of the PPAs are negotiable is a challenging situation. We acknowledge that it may be time for Colorado to move towards a conforming bid policy, especially considering that the Commission already addresses many core issues of the model PPAs in Phase I and the fact that in Phase II the Company and IE are called upon to equitably evaluate numerous bids. To be clear, the Commission is not in this Decision adopting any type of conforming bid policy, but we invite party feedback regarding adopting this type of approach in the future.

### 3. Company Ownership

294. Interwest takes issue with the high percentage of Company ownership in the portfolios presented in the 120-Day Report, arguing that it is outside of what was expected by virtually all parties. Interwest suggests that this calls into question the validity of the agreements in the Phase I Settlement regarding the amount of replacement capacity from the 2024 JTS that

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<sup>321</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, p. 105.

<sup>322</sup> See 120-Day Report, p. 86; Interwest's Comments, p. 9.

Public Service would own. Interwest requests that the Commission consider whether Public Service achieved the letter and spirit of the law, whether the Phase I Settlement provisions regarding the ownership of Unit 3's replacement capacity are still valid, and whether action is necessary now to ensure compliance in future ERPs.<sup>323</sup>

295. CIEA similarly recommends that the Commission use the 2024 JTS to course correct and rebalance the resource ownership of IPPs and the Company in the total capacity mix of the system.<sup>324</sup>

296. Public Service urges the Commission to reject suggestions that the ownership percentage allowed in the 2024 JTS be adjusted to account for the high ownership the Company proposes in this Proceeding. Public Service argues that this recommendation could lock the Commission into higher-cost and uneconomic outcomes.<sup>325</sup>

297. The 2024 JTS is an interim ERP that will largely be governed by the Commission's ERP rules. We find that it would be inappropriate in this Phase II to attempt to set bounds around the Company ownership levels of the approved portfolio coming from the 2024 JTS. Moreover, we note that the selection of the Alternative Portfolio significantly reduces the amount of Company-owned capacity resources approved as part of this Proceeding as compared to the UPP.

#### **4. Just Transition Bids**

298. UCA expresses disappointment that there were no bids for wind, solar, storage or solar plus storage at Craig or Hayden. UCA claims that such bids would have contributed to the just transition plan. UCA argues that these type of JTP bids should be encouraged at Craig and

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<sup>323</sup> Interwest's Comments, p. 9.

<sup>324</sup> CIEA's Comments, p. 18.

<sup>325</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 33-34.

Hayden and other west slope locations as well as in the Pueblo area. UCA goes on to suggest that such bids could even be required from Public Service.<sup>326</sup>

299. Although we refrain from creating any sort of requirement for certain bids, we agree with UCA's sentiments about the benefits of bids at Craig, Hayden, and Pueblo and encourage such bids in the upcoming 2024 JTS. We further encourage bids within the Denver Metro area to the extent such bids can mitigate the need for additional transmission investments.

300. The 2024 JTS offers the state an important opportunity to continue acquiring renewable resources to achieve even greater emissions reductions while addressing some of the issues that arose in this Proceeding. Consistent with the Phase I Settlement Agreement, however, we reiterate that the 2024 JTS is the proceeding that will acquire a suitable replacement for the capacity that will be lost when Unit 3 retires and that all parties should work to ensure that the Pueblo community and benefits to the community are the focus of this replacement.<sup>327</sup> In this vein, we note that nothing in this Phase II Decision impacts the Company's commitment in the Phase I Settlement to "make payments to Pueblo County annually from 2031 through 2040 ... in the amount of the projected lost property tax revenues for those years, unless offset by property tax revenues from generation or transmission infrastructure sited at Comanche Station or within Pueblo County."<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> UCA's Comments, p. 20.

<sup>327</sup> See Phase I Decision, p. 43; Phase I Settlement, ¶ 43.

<sup>328</sup> Phase I Settlement, ¶ 42.

## 5. Discount Rates

301. Conservation Coalition suggests that the Commission direct the Company to confer with stakeholders to reach a consensus approach to discounting the social cost of emissions for the June 2024 JTS.<sup>329</sup>

302. While consideration of lower discount rates does not warrant the selection of a different resource portfolio in this Proceeding (as set forth above), we find merit in the Conservation Coalition's request that Public Service attempt to reach consensus with stakeholders on the related issue of discounting the social cost of emissions. Accordingly, we grant Conservation Coalition's request and direct the Company to confer with stakeholders to reach a consensus approach to discounting the social cost of emissions for the 2024 JTS. This conferral should include the impacts of SB 23-291 regarding the appropriate discount rate to use for fuel costs.

## 6. Comprehensive Rate Analysis

303. In the 120-Day Report, Public Service states that "the average bill impact for the Preferred Plan is expected to grow less than the historical rate of inflation."<sup>330</sup> Staff, UCA, and CEC argue, however, that the costs presented in the 120-Day Report are likely to be artificially low.<sup>331</sup> Staff in particular states that there is additional anticipated investment that is not included in the Company's rate impact analysis. Staff asserts that the Company's statement regarding the cumulative average growth rates was carefully worded to include only the incremental rate impact of the CEP, not the rate impact of the entirety of the Company's planned investments including

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<sup>329</sup> Conservation Coalition's Comments, pp. 21-22.

<sup>330</sup> 120-Day Report, p. 34.

<sup>331</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 19; UCA's Comments, pp. 5-7; CEC's Comments, pp. 15-16.

distribution system investment, other transmission system investment, and additional electric generation not included in this Proceeding.<sup>332</sup>

304. Given the importance of affordability, the Commission and interested stakeholders should have access to a consistent view of Public Service's capital expansion plan for the Colorado electrical system and what this plan means for ratepayers. Accordingly, the Commission directs Public Service to provide in the 2024 JTS a comprehensive long-term rate analysis that fully includes all of the projected investments the Company is communicating to the financial community, including for new distribution investment, wildfire mitigation, transmission upgrade, transportation electrification, distributed solar, and other electricity business investments.<sup>333</sup> This comprehensive rate analysis should also include an analysis that better quantifies the actual levels of resource curtailment above the modelled levels and, in format, should be similar to the rate forecast models the Company has recently presented in rate cases.

305. We emphasize that this comprehensive rate analysis shall not be limited to projects that have received official regulatory approval or projects that have final cost estimates. Rather, this comprehensive rate analysis shall include all projected investments in the Colorado electric system that Public Service is communicating to the financial community and any that are reasonably expected.

## **R. Miscellaneous Issues for Future Proceedings**

### **1. Equity Directives**

306. In its Comments on the 120-Day Report, Staff notes the importance of evaluating ERP proceedings through an equity lens. Staff further notes that as part of the solicitation that the

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<sup>332</sup> Staff's Comments, p. 19.

<sup>333</sup> Consistent with prior filing expectations, documents are expected to be as robust as possible and in executable format.

Company performed in this Proceeding, all bidders were required to provide information on the assessment of, and plan for continuing to monitor local community, disproportionately impacted (DI) community, and state reaction to the bidder's proposed project, and a plan to work with the local community and DI communities on project issues. In addition, as part of the 120-Day Report, the Company provided maps that identify which projects are located in DI communities.<sup>334</sup>

307. After assessing the information that was received in this Proceeding, Staff makes a series of recommendations that the Commission could take in future proceedings to continue to improve the Commission's consideration of equity issues. For example, Staff argues that in the future, the 120-Day Report should include a more detailed analysis of community/state reaction, which goes beyond identifying the DI communities. Staff also suggests that the Commission consider developing rules that (1) identify key metrics that should be reported by bids in DI communities to help understand impacts and benefits of bids on DI communities, and (2) define a process for tracking stakeholder engagement in bids approved in the resource plan in DI communities. Finally, Staff recommends that the Commission consider specifying how it will consider equity metrics in decision making and document the consideration of energy equity issues in written decisions prior to approvals for Resource Plans, Plan amendments, and CPCNs.<sup>335</sup>

308. In a similar vein, CEO notes with approval how the Company mapped the bids in this Proceeding relative to DI Communities. CEO encourages a similar presentation of mapping in the Company's next ERP and notes the expectation that the Commission will continue to consider how it will use such mapping in its decision making going forward.<sup>336</sup>

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<sup>334</sup> Staff's Comments, pp. 69-70.

<sup>335</sup> Staff's Comments, pp. 71-72.

<sup>336</sup> CEO's Comments, pp. 24-25.

309. In its Response Comments, the Company expresses appreciation for Staff's recommendations as the consideration of equity issues in resource planning continues to evolve. The Company notes that it has expanded the scope and reach of its community engagement efforts and expects to continue this expansion. Public Service further expects that the presentation and evaluation of equity issues will continue to improve, similar to how the BVEM bid information and evaluation process has improved. Public Service states that it welcomes and encourages continued discussion in the next ERP Phase I process and in future Just Transition Plan proceedings to ensure meaningful consideration of equity issues but that the Company does not believe specific requirements need be prescribed in rules.<sup>337</sup>

310. We acknowledge and appreciate the considerations from Staff and CEO regarding how to continue improving the Commission's consideration of equity issues in future ERP proceedings and rulemakings. At this juncture, however, we will leave it to the relevant stakeholders to work out the appropriate specifics on when and how best to further advance the consideration of equity issues in resource planning. We note that in Proceeding No. 22M-0171ALL the Commission has an ongoing and far-reaching pre-rulemaking underway aimed at improving equity outcomes in the State through reforms to practices, outreach, and rules. The Commission encourages stakeholders to provide comments within that pre-rulemaking proceeding where we are diligently collecting concepts on what rules should be considered and addressed in order to promote equity.

## **2. CPCN Prioritization**

311. CIEA and Conservation Coalition both encourage the Commission to proactively manage the applications for CPCNs that the Company will eventually file for each utility-owned

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<sup>337</sup> Public Service's Response Comments, pp. 107-08.

generation asset included in the approved resource portfolio. For instance, noting the large amount of expected CPCN filings, CIEA recommends that there be a priority established for 2024 CPCNs based on the value to ratepayers of the various projects. Denver metro transmission projects with 2030 ISDs could be delayed to later but generation projects that are critical to system or local reliability should be prioritized.<sup>338</sup>

312. Similarly, the Conservation Coalition suggests that the Commission consider how it can reduce the litigation burden to parties (and the burden on the Commission) of the CPCNs arising from this Proceeding. The Conservation Coalition specifically recommends one of two solutions for consolidating the various CPCNs. The first proposal is to require the Company to confer with all parties and file a reporting containing the proposals for how best to consolidate and minimize the number of CPCN applications. The Commission would then issue an order in this Proceeding addressing consolidation. The second proposal is to simply order the Company to consolidate its CPCN applications based on some criterion or criteria (*e.g.*, technology type or ISD).<sup>339</sup>

313. In its Response Comments, Public Service argues that it has the responsibility to timely file CPCNs and that the Company will need some flexibility to do so. However, the Company proposes providing updates to interested parties and the Commission on the status of CPCN filings in its Annual ERP Reports that it files every year on March 31 as well as in its annual Rule 3205 and Rule 3206 reports. Public Service argues that these existing reporting venues provide the appropriate opportunity for the Company to update stakeholders on CPCN filing

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<sup>338</sup> CIEA's Comments, pp. 8, 35-36.

<sup>339</sup> Conservation Coalition's Comments, pp. 22-23.

readiness as well as the anticipated filing dates, sequencing, and grouping of generation and transmission CPCNs moving forward post-Phase II.<sup>340</sup>

314. We adopt Public Service’s position set forth in its Response Comments and direct the Company to provide additional updates to interested stakeholders regarding the Company’s CPCN prioritization via the existing reporting venues. At this juncture, the Commission will not attempt to dictate the form or timing of Public Service’s CPCN and other applications.

### **3. Voluntary Additional Emissions Reduction Program**

315. Boulder recommends the Commission direct Public Service and interested communities and customers to explore acquiring additional resources to support development of a voluntary customer product that generates additional emissions reductions. Boulder asserts that “communities comprising at least 35 percent of Public Service retail sales seek ‘100% renewable energy’ or zero emissions electricity by 2030.”<sup>341</sup> Given the importance of decarbonizing the electricity sector as soon as possible to support decarbonization in other sectors like buildings and transportation, Boulder argues that “the time is now to develop next-generation voluntary customer products that quantify incremental emissions reductions.”<sup>342</sup>

316. Boulder acknowledges that the Phase I Settlement contains a commitment for Boulder and Public Service to work together to develop such a voluntary program. Boulder indicates that, based on preliminary modeling, it appears that acquiring additional renewable resources could generate incremental emissions reduction but at the significant risk of curtailments. In addition, according to Boulder, the preliminary modeling showed that incremental

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<sup>340</sup> Public Service’s Response Comments, pp. 100-02.

<sup>341</sup> Boulder’s Comments, p. 17.

<sup>342</sup> Boulder’s Comments, p. 17.

costs of such additional resources “suggests that new voluntary emissions reduction products must be available to all Public Service customers and not limited to one community or customer.”<sup>343</sup>

317. Boulder asserts that the bids received in Public Service’s solicitation provide options for the development of a new voluntary emissions reduction product that would enable communities and customers to progress towards their 100 percent renewable energy goals. Boulder suggests that bids included in the Preferred Portfolio could be expanded to add generation or storage, and this expansion could be funded by communities and customers participating in the voluntary emissions reduction program. Boulder also asserts that there are bids that were not included in the Preferred Portfolio, including Section 123 Resources, the acquisition of which could be supported by customers interested in a voluntary emissions reduction program.

318. The Commission understands that certain communities and organizations would prefer to exceed the environmental attributes of Public Service’s general resource mix via a more robust, voluntary offering and believe such a program is feasible. We are interested in better understanding what steps the Commission could put in place to provide such a voluntary program for customers and communities and how the tracking would work to ensure that the program would not dilute the environmental attributes of the general resource mix or unfairly allocate costs.

319. Accordingly, we direct Public Service and Staff of the Commission<sup>344</sup> to work together with interested parties to discuss this topic at a CIM. The discussion could include information regarding what stakeholders are interested in, what attributes are desired, the potential structure of such a program, the status of Public Service’s efforts on this topic, and what the next steps are. We are hopeful that this CIM could be convened in late February or early March.

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<sup>343</sup> Boulder’s Comments, p. 18.

<sup>344</sup> This could be either Trial Staff or staff of the Commission’s Research and Emerging Issues group.

**S. Requests not Explicitly Addressed**

320. The Commission has weighed the information and filings from all parties and public commentors in balancing its policy and reaching the various decisions set out in this Phase II Decision. To the extent this Phase II Decision does not expressly address requests made by Public Service or an intervening party, such requests are denied. However, these requests were considered in balancing our considerations and reaching our ultimate conclusions in this Proceeding.

**II. ORDER****A. The Commission Orders That:**

1. After consideration of the statutory factors and other relevant factors, modifications to the Clean Energy Plan (CEP) presented by Public Service Company of Colorado (Public Service) are necessary to ensure that the Commission's approval of the CEP is in the public interest.

2. In accordance with the discussion above, we authorize Public Service to pursue the modified CEP and the acquisition of the resources included in the Alternative Portfolio with further due diligence and contract negotiations. Public Service shall further file applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for all Company-owned generation resources arising from the modified CEP. Public Service's actions, consistent with this Decision, shall be presumed to be prudent at the time of cost recovery consistent with 4 *Code of Colorado Regulations* (CCR) 723-3-33617(d) of the Commission's Rules Regulating Electric Utilities.

3. All Company-owned generation resources arising from the modified CEP are subject to both the cost to construct performance incentive mechanism (PIM) and the operational PIM, in accordance with the discussion above.

4. The proposed transmission network upgrades, grid strength reinforcements, reactive power investments, and voltage support investments presented in the 120-Day Report are not part of the approved CEP. Additional review of the proposed transmission projects is necessary and, accordingly, 4 CCR 723-3-3206 is waived as to the transmission projects arising from this Proceeding, in accordance with the discussion above.

5. In accordance with the discussion above, Staff of the Colorado Public Utilities Commission (Staff) shall also initiate a stakeholder process with the Colorado Office of Utility Consumer Advocate and the Colorado Energy Office and in conferral with Public Service to bring forward a scope of work for hiring an independent transmission analyst as soon as reasonably feasible but no later than the commencement of the 2024 Just Transition Solicitation (JTS) proceeding. If this independent transmission analyst cannot be engaged in time for Phase I of the 2024 JTS, we direct the Company to include certain transmission-related portfolios in its direct case, in accordance with the discussion above.

6. As part of its application regarding attribution of costs between the CEP rider (CEPR) and the Renewable Energy Standard Adjustment, the Company shall address the recovery of specific activities based on the approved resource portfolio and the appropriate level for the CEPR to be initiated on January 1, 2025, in accordance with the discussion above.

7. With respect to the 2024 JTS, Public Service shall confer with Staff prior to the 2024 JTS to develop more robust modeling processes, clearly set forth the Company's proposed non-negotiable PPA terms in its Phase I 2024 JTS filing and provide in the 2024 JTS a comprehensive long-term rate analysis in addition to our other directives in accordance with the discussion above.

8. Public Service and Staff of the Commission shall work together to present at an upcoming Commissioners Information Meeting the interest in, potential structure of, and current efforts to develop a voluntary emissions reduction program, in accordance with the discussion above.

9. The 90-day deadline for a written Phase II Decision approving, conditioning, modifying, or rejecting the utility's preferred cost-effective resource plan set forth in 4 CCR 723-3-3613(h) is waived.

10. To the extent requests are not addressed in this Decision, they are denied.

11. The 20-day period provided for in § 40-6-114, C.R.S., within which to file applications for rehearing, reargument, or reconsideration, begins on the first day following the effective date of this Decision.

12. This Decision is effective upon its Mailed Date.

**B. ADOPTED IN COMMISSIONERS' WEEKLY MEETINGS  
December 6, 13, and 20, 2023.**

(S E A L)



ATTEST: A TRUE COPY

*Rebecca E. White*

Rebecca E. White,  
Director

THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION  
OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

ERIC BLANK

MEGAN M. GILMAN

TOM PLANT

Commissioners